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Abstract
The fifth-generation (5G)-and-beyond networks will provide broadband access to a massive number of heterogeneous devices with complex interconnections to support a wide variety
of vertical Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications. Any potential security risk in such complex
systems could lead to catastrophic consequences and even system failure of critical infrastructures, particularly for applications relying on tight collaborations among distributed devices
and facilities. While security is the cornerstone for such applications, trust among entities and
information privacy are becoming increasingly important. To effectively support future IoT
systems in vertical industry applications, security, trust and privacy should be dealt with integratively due to their close interactions. However, conventional technologies always treat these
aspects separately, leading to tremendous security loopholes and low efficiency. Existing solutions often feature various distinctive weaknesses, including drastically increased latencies,
communication and computation overheads, as well as privacy leakage, which are extremely
undesirable for delay-sensitive, resource-constrained, and privacy-aware communications.
To overcome these issues, this thesis aims at creating new multi-dimensional intelligent security provisioning and trust management approaches by leveraging the most recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI). The performance of the existing physical-layer authentication could be severely affected by the imperfect estimate and the variation of physical
link attributes, especially when only a single attribute is employed. To overcome this challenge, two multi-dimensional adaptive schemes are proposed as intelligent processes to learn
and track the all available physical attributes, hence to improve the reliability and robustness of
authentication by fusing multiple attributes. To mitigate the effects of false authentication, an
adaptive trust management-based soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme is
proposed by establishing trust between transceivers. The devices are authorized by their trust
values, which are dynamically evaluated in real-time based on the varying attributes, resulting
in soft security and progressive authorization. By jointly considering security and privacypreservation, a distributed accountable recommendation-based access scheme is proposed for
blockchain-enabled IoT systems. Authorized devices are introduced as referrers for collaborative authentication, and the anonymous credential algorithm helps to protect privacy. Wrong
recommendations will decrease the referrers reputations, named as accountability. Finally, to
ii

secure resource-constrained communications, a lightweight continuous authentication scheme
is developed to identify devices via their pre-arranged pseudo-random access sequences. A
device will be authenticated as legitimate if its access sequences are identical to the pre-agreed
unique order between the transceiver pair, without incurring long latency and high overhead.
Applications enabled by 5G-and-beyond networks are expected to play critical roles in
the coming connected society. By exploring new AI techniques, this thesis jointly considers the requirements and challenges of security, trust, and privacy provisioning, and develops
multi-dimensional intelligent continuous processes for ever-growing demands of the quality
of service in diverse applications. These novel approaches provide highly efficient, reliable,
model-independent, situation-aware, and continuous protection for legitimate communications, especially in the complex time-varying environment under unpredictable network dynamics.
Furthermore, the proposed soft security enables flexible designs for heterogeneous IoT devices, and the collaborative schemes provide efficient solutions for massively distributed entities, which are of paramount importance to diverse industrial applications due to their ongoing
convergence with 5G-and-beyond networks.

Keywords: 5G-and-beyond, security provisioning, trust management, privacy protection,
artificial intelligence
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Lay Summary
The fifth-generation (5G)-and-beyond will provide ultra-reliable broadband access everywhere not only to cellular hand-held devices but also to a massive number of new devices related to the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Any potential security
risks and attacks in such dense networks could lead to catastrophic consequences and cause
avalanche-like damages. This is mainly due to the critical roles of 5G-and-beyond to support a
wide variety of vertical applications by connecting massive number of heterogeneous devices,
machines, and industrial processes, as well as cascaded reactions from the enormous parallel
interconnections. Moreover, the widely used resource-constrained devices, e.g., sensors, can
be compromised easily, resulting in widely distributed security threats through data injection,
spoofing, eavesdropping, and so on. With the cascading effects, these security threats could also
lead to the failure of a whole system, especially for those applications relying on tight collaborations among diverse entities. To enhance security and achieve more efficient management
in 5G-and-beyond, this thesis develops intelligent security provisioning and trust management
approaches by exploiting the help of artificial intelligence (AI) to address the related technical
issues and challenges.
Firstly, two multi-dimensional adaptive physical-layer authentication schemes are proposed
based on AI techniques as an intelligent process to learn and utilize the time-varying and imperfectly estimated communication link attributes, i.e., the kernel-learning-based scheme and
fuzzy-learning-based scheme. In the former scheme, a kernel-based fusion model is designed
to deal with the multiple attributes without knowledge of their statistical properties. The proposed authentication is developed as a linear convex model. Such a convex property will
greatly reduce authentication complexity. In the latter scheme, fuzzy functions are explored
to characterize the multiple physical-layer attributes with imperfectness and uncertainties as
parametric models since the model structure can be learned from the data as a priori. A hybrid
learning-based adaptive algorithm is proposed to near-instantaneously update the authentication parameters. These two schemes both act as an intelligent process to tackle the variations of
the utilized attributes and hence to improve the reliability and robustness of the authentication.
To mitigate the effects of inevitable erroneous decision of authentication, an adaptive trust
management based soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme is proposed by
iv

intelligently exploiting the time-varying communication link-related attributes. The trust relationships between transceivers are established based on their evaluations of the selected attributes for fast authentication. The transmitter can be authorized by the specific level of services/resources corresponding to its trust level. To dynamically update the trust level of the
transmitter, an online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed relying on the real-time validation of attributes estimated at the receiver, resulting in soft
security and progressive authorization.
A privacy-preserved distributed access control scheme is proposed for blockchain-enabled
IoT systems, which involves an accountable recommendation mechanism, an anonymous credential generation strategy, and a reputation update mechanism. In the recommendation mechanism, multiple authorized devices are utilized as referrers to authenticate a public device and
issue the required credential for joining the system. Then, the anonymous credential generation strategy helps to further achieve privacy protection, and the reputation update mechanism
evaluates the behaviors of the authorized devices. A wrong recommendation will decrease the
referrers’ reputation, named as accountability.
Finally, to meet the stringent and diverse security requirements of 5G-and-beyond systems,
a lightweight continuous authentication scheme is developed for identifying multiple resourceconstrained IoT devices via their pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequences. A transmitter will be authenticated as legitimate if and only if its access time-sequential order is identical to a pre-agreed unique pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) between itself and the base
station. The seeds for generating PRBS between each transceiver pair are determined by exploiting the channel reciprocity, which is time-varying and difficult for a third party to predict.
Hence, the proposed scheme provides seamless protections for legitimate communications as
the seeds can be refreshed adaptively without incurring long latency, complex computation,
and high communication overhead.
As a conclusion, by exploring AI techniques, this thesis studies security, privacy, and trust
comprehensively to meet diverse communication requirements, supporting emerging applications of future connected society enabled by 5G-and-beyond networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1
1.1.1

Research Motivations
Threats in Explosively Growing Collaboration among Entities

The fifth-generation (5G)-and-beyond wireless networks have received tremendous attention
from both academia and industries alike, which are expected to enable a wide variety of vertical applications by connecting heterogeneous devices and machines [1, 2]. With extremely
dense deployments of base stations, 5G-and-beyond will provide ultra-reliable and affordable
broadband access everywhere not only to cellular hand-held devices but also to a massive number of new devices related to Machine-to-Machine communication (M2M), Internet of Things
(IoT), and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) [3]. In addition, the dramatically growing number of low-cost devices and access points with increased mobility and heterogeneity leads to
the extremely complex and dynamic environment of 5G-and-beyond wireless networks [4].
Such enrichment implies that 5G-and-beyond is not a mere incremental advancement of 4G
as one might intuitively think, but an integration of new disruptive technologies to meet the
ever-growing demands of user traffic, emerging services, and IoT devices [4].
As shown in Figure 1.1, the 5G-and-beyond networks are expected to provide diverse and
stringent Quality of Service (QoS) requirements, including extremely very high data rates,
higher coverage with significantly improved communication reliability, and low latency [3]. To
meet these future communication demands, tight collaboration among devices and communi1
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Figure 1.1: 5G-and-beyond design principle.
cation systems is required and will be extremely important for future wireless communications.
Many related areas and technologies have attracted a multitude of interests from research and
industrial communities, as exemplified by the collaborative computing, manufacturing, software development, and machine learning, just to name a few [5, 6]. However, the complexity
of future communication systems as well as dramatically increased use of intelligent machines
and devices within industry processes bring many vulnerabilities and new design challenges,
which will obviously fail the required collaboration if they are not fully addressed. The threats
in the explosive growth of collaboration among entities can be classified into three categories
as follows:
• Security risks. Potential security risks and attacks could lead to catastrophic consequences and cause avalanche-like damages in 5G-and-beyond networks. This is mainly
due to the critical roles of 5G-and-beyond system to support a wide variety of vertical
applications by connecting tremendous heterogeneous devices, machines, and industrial processes, as well as cascaded reactions from the enormous parallel interconnection
contained in 5G-and-beyond. Moreover, the widely used resource-constrained devices,
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e.g., sensors, can be compromised easily, thus resulting in widely distributed threats to
the IoT network through data injection, spoofing, eavesdropping, and so on. With the
cascading effect, these security threats could also lead to the failure of a whole system,
especially for those applications relying on tight collaboration among diverse entities.
• Lack of trust. The collaborations among devices and communication systems heavily
depend on devices’ perceptions of the system as a trustworthy infrastructure for providing accurate information and reliable communication. On one hand, the trust is based
on the authentication solutions, where messages must be authenticated to prevent external attackers from injecting, altering, and replaying messages, as well as to prevent
eavesdropping and location tracking. On the other hand, assessing the credibility of the
reported data and behaviors of devices could help in establishing the trust of these devices. Hence, the trust establishment for collaboration contains both the solutions for
defending against security risks and methods for assessing the behaviors of devices.
• Privacy leakage. To provide high-quality services, large amounts of multi-dimensional
data will be collected in the 5G-and-beyond networks. However, the collection and correlation of these data allow the creation of detailed profiles encompassing every aspect
of a device/user [10]. Moreover, the significantly increased level of the interconnectivity
of a 5G-and-beyond system could further lead to privacy leakage. To be more specific,
combining multiple dimensions of data from different layers, devices, and applications can improve service quality, but increases the risk for leaks of sensitive data through
correlation as well. The leaked private information of a device/user not only leads to
security risks but also destroys the established trust during the collaboration process.
The relationship between security, trust, and privacy is shown in Figure 1.2. To be more
specific, security risks and attacks could lead to privacy leakage, including the leakage of sensitive data, user location, and identity information [12]. Both security attacks and inappropriate
behaviors of devices could result in untrustworthy collaboration among devices and communication systems. Trust system can also be used in assessing the quality of received information,
to provide network security services such as access control, authentication, malicious node detections, and secure resource sharing [9]. The leaked private information of a device/user could
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Figure 1.2: Security, trust, and privacy in explosively growing collaboration among entities.
be leveraged by attackers, thus leading to security risks and lack of trust. Hence, to effectively
support future IoT systems in vertical industry applications, security, trust, and privacy should
be dealt with integratively due to their close interactions.
In achieving collaboration among entities, multi-dimensional requirements should be considered, which are summarized as follows:
• Authentication and authorization. Both of them have been considered as key security
mechanisms and critical designs for 5G-and-beyond networks since adversaries need
access to communication systems to launch attacks [7, 11]. These mechanisms secure
legitimate communications by confirming the identities of all devices and their right
access to authorized resources, data, and services. To be more specific, the authentication
mechanism confirms the identities of communicating entities, ensures the validity of their
claimed identities, and provides assurance against various attacks [14].
• Access control. This protects against unauthorized use of network resources, and also
ensures that only authorized persons or devices can access the network resources, services, data, and information flows [3].
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• Data confidentiality. It protects data from unauthorized disclosure, and ensures that the
data content cannot be understood by unauthorized entities [3, 18].
• Data integrity. It ensures the correctness and accuracy of data, and protects from unauthorized creation, modification, deletion, and replication [3, 18].
• Availability. It ensures that there is no denial of authorized access to network resources,
stored information, services, and applications [3, 18].
• Trust management. A trust management system aims to provide a process to produce
high-quality trust prediction for users [16, 17]. It usually contains several components,
such as trust calculation, trust propagation, trust aggregation, and trust prediction.
• Privacy protection. It provides protection for information that might be derived from
the observation of network activities as well as for data stored on the Internet [15]. Some
key properties can be used for privacy protection in 5G-and-beyond: anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, and pseudonymity [12].

1.1.2

Open Issues and Challenges for Conventional Mechanisms

The security solutions and architectures used in previous generations of wireless networks (i.e.,
3G and 4G) are apparently not sufficient for 5G-and-beyond, mainly because of its dynamics
of new services and technologies [12]. Moreover, the latency requirements of security management, especially in machine communications, such as vehicular communication or Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), are much critical. Those security architectures of the previous generations lack the sophistication needed to secure 5G-and-beyond networks. Furthermore, there
are new technological concepts or solutions that will be used in 5G-and-beyond to meet the demands of increasingly diverse applications and connected devices, as exemplified by the cloud
computing [19], Software Defined Networking (SDN) [19], and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [20]. These fast-emerging technologies bring new security challenges. Explicitly,
those IoT devices suffering from resource limitation could not support the security methods
requiring high communication and computation overhead. Tremendous devices contained in a
5G-and-beyond system also claim low-delay transmissions to guarantee their communication
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performance. Hence, to defend against threats in the explosive growth of collaboration among
entities, this thesis firstly focuses on studying the challenges for conventional mechanisms and
then on envisioning new approaches for security and trust enhancement.
The conventional security methods, including key-based cryptography techniques and physical layer key generation techniques, may suffer from their high complexity and long latency,
and may be ineffective to adapt to the complex dynamic environment, especially in large-scale
networks. Furthermore, their generated keys may be leaked in the security management procedures, e.g., key distribution. As discussed above, while security is the cornerstone for such
applications, trust among entities and information privacy are becoming increasingly important. Security, trust, and privacy should be dealt with integratively due to their close interactions.
However, conventional technologies always treat these aspects separately, leading to tremendous loopholes and low efficiency. To be more specific, some open issues and challenges for
conventional mechanisms in supporting secure communications are summarized as follows.
• Long security overhead induced latency in large-scale networks. The conventional cryptography techniques require increased overhead and lengthy process for the increased level of security, thus leading to high communication and computation overhead,
as well as long communication latency [2]. These are intolerable for the large-scale
network having significantly increasing number of intelligent machines and resourceconstrained devices with concurrent communications. Moreover, the conventional statisticalbased methods for authentication also require enough time and computational resources
for obtaining the statistical properties [2], thus leading to limited capability in detecting
attacks promptly.
• Ineffective adaptation to dynamic communication environments. Conventional security solutions may also suffer from cascading risks in dynamic communication scenarios due to their reliance on static binary mechanisms. Such mechanisms are difficult
in learning from and adapting to the dynamic environment encountered, thus resulting
in the failure of continuous protections for legitimate communications and decrease of
security performance in dealing with varying security risks.
• Potential key leakage in security management procedures. Conventional crypto-
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graphic techniques also require necessary key management procedures to generate, distribute, refresh and revoke digital security keys, leading to the potential leakage of key
information [2]. Furthermore, the key information transmission is also needed for information reconciliation in the physical key generation techniques [21]. These all result in
tremendous loopholes for adversaries and wide security threats in 5G-and-beyond.
• Separate treatment of security, trust, and privacy in tightly collaborative applications. To achieve tight collaboration among entities in future wireless communications,
security, privacy, and trust should be considered comprehensively. Conventional security
methods that focus only on device-to-device data transmission are lack of trust evaluation in tight collaborative applications, which helps in predicting the future actions of
users/devices and resulting in a good outcome in security enhancement. Hence, those
conventional security methods that separately treat security, trust, and privacy will leave
the amount of loopholes for attackers in tightly collaborative applications.
In a nutshell, the efficient security enhancement and trust management are of paramount
importance for 5G-and-beyond networks, especially in the coming of information age requiring
“Intelligence”.

1.1.3

Intelligent Security Provisioning and Trust Management

This thesis envisions new intelligent security provisioning and trust management approaches
by exploiting the help of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to address the above challenges for security
and trust enhancement as well as more efficient management in 5G-and-beyond networks. As
illustrated in Figure 1.3, the 5G-and-beyond networks are expected to provide wide services
having high communication and security performance as well as privacy-preserving transmissions. Based on these basic requirements, the intelligent security provisioning and trust management approaches are required to meet multi-objectives, namely for high cost-efficiency,
high reliability, model independence, continuous protection, and situation awareness. More
importantly, the flexible designs of security and trust management are extremely helpful in
providing automatic services in different 5G-and-beyond communication scenarios, which are
presented in different colors inside the pentagon of Figure 1.3. Meeting these multiple objec-
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tives supports the advantages of intelligent security provisioning and trust management based
on AI as follows:
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Figure 1.3: Multi-objectives of intelligent security provisioning and trust management in 5Gand-beyond.

• High cost-efficiency: Due to the increasing number of resource-constraint devices in
5G-and-beyond wireless applications, communication, security, privacy, and trust management should be executed concurrently to achieve cost-effective services. The opportunistic selection of features and dimension reduction methods [2] may help in decreasing the complexity of the security and trust management relying on multi-dimensional
information as well as in reducing communication and computation overheads. Furthermore, by performing training and testing at devices having enough energy and storage
space, efficient security and trust management can be achieved at resource-constraint
devices.
• High reliability: Utilizing specific features and relationships in the multi-dimensional
domain is extremely helpful for achieving security enhancement since it is more difficult
for an adversary to succeed in predicting or imitating all attributes based on the received
signals and observations. To be more specific, the multi-dimensional information, such
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as time, frequency, network architecture, and communication process, provides broader protections for legitimate users. Moreover, through using multi-dimensional information, more precise and comprehensive trust evaluation can be achieved. AI techniques could facilitate security and trust management by analyzing and fusing the multidimensional information.
• Model independence: A data-based scheme through exploring machine learning techniques overcomes the difficulties in modeling uncertainties and unknown dynamics of
the security and trust management process. Hence, the model-free schemes remove
the assumption of knowing structures of systems, resulting in a more scalable process
design. This benefits the development of multi-dimensional intelligent processes for
ever-growing demands of the quality of service in diverse applications, especially in the
complex time-varying environment under unpredictable network dynamics.
• Continuous protection: Utilizing the received information along with data transmission
for security enhancement could provide identification after login and control the varying
security risks. In achieving this, machine learning techniques may be explored for data
analysis and processing, so that the seamless protection for legitimate devices can be
achieved in 5G-and-beyond networks.
• Situation awareness: The situation-aware management observes the varying objectives
and security risks, and learns from the complex dynamic environment to enhance security
and to achieve efficient collaboration. AI techniques provide powerful tools to learn the
dynamic adversarial environment for self-optimization and self-organization, thereafter
achieving automatic security and trust management. More importantly, machine learning
techniques could help in the detection of time-varying communication scenarios as well
as the adaptation of security and trust management process.

As a conclusion, by exploring AI techniques, this thesis introduces the intelligence to security and trust management in the complex time-varying environment, supporting radically new
applications of 5G-and-beyond wireless networks.
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1.2

Research Objectives

This thesis explores AI techniques for intelligent security provisioning and trust management.
The research objectives of this thesis are summarized as follows.
• To develop new authentication schemes based on AI techniques as an intelligent process to learn and utilize the time-varying and imperfectly estimated communication link
attributes, thus to provide continuous protection for legitimate devices.
• To propose a soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme based on trust
management for achieving quick access and enhanced security by intelligently exploiting
the time-varying communication link-related attributes.
• To develop a distributed access management scheme for consortium blockchain-enabled
IoT systems by jointly considering security, privacy, and trust for achieving reliable access control to defend against both outside and inside attacks.
• To propose a new lightweight continuous security scheme with the assistance of AI techniques for identifying multiple resource-constrained IoT devices via their pre-agreed
pseudo-random access time sequences.

1.3

Thesis Contributions

The main contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
• Two multi-dimensional adaptive physical layer authentication schemes are proposed
based on AI techniques to learn and utilize the time-varying and imperfectly estimated communication link attributes. In the kernel-learning-based scheme, a fusion model
is designed to deal with the multiple attributes without knowledge of their statistical
properties. The authentication technique is developed as a linear convex model. Such
a convex property will greatly reduce authentication complexity. In the fuzzy learningbased scheme, fuzzy functions are explored to characterize the multiple physical layer
attributes with imperfectness and uncertainties as parametric models since the model
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structure can be learned from the data as a priori. A hybrid learning-based adaptive algorithm is proposed to near-instantaneously update the authentication parameters. These
two schemes both act as an intelligent process to tackle the variations of the utilized
attributes and hence to improve the reliability and robustness of the authentication.
• To mitigate the effects of inevitable wrong decision of authentication relying on the timevarying communication link-related attributes, an adaptive trust management based soft
authentication and progressive authorization scheme is proposed. The trust relationships
between transceivers are established based on their evaluations of the selected attributes
for fast authentication. The transmitter can be authorized by the specific level of services/resources corresponding to its trust level. To dynamically update the trust level of
the transmitter, an online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed relying on the real-time validation of attributes estimated at the receiver,
resulting in soft security and progressive authorization.
• A privacy-preserved distributed access control scheme based on accountable recommendation is proposed for consortium blockchain-enabled IoT systems. It involves an accountable recommendation mechanism, an anonymous credential generation strategy,
and a reputation update mechanism. In the recommendation mechanism, multiple authorized devices act as referrers to authenticate a public device and issue the required
credential for joining the system. Then, the anonymous credential generation strategy
is developed for further privacy protection. The reputation update mechanism is proposed to evaluate the behaviors of the authorized devices for achieving multiple-level
authorization and accountable security services. Hence, the proposed scheme secure
the integrated system through reliable access control to defend against both outside and
inside attacks.
• A lightweight continuous authentication scheme is developed for identifying multiple
resource-constrained IoT devices via their pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequences. A transmitter will be authenticated as legitimate if and only if its access timesequential order is identical to a pre-agreed unique pseudo-random binary sequence
(PRBS) between itself and the base station. The seed for generating PRBS between
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each transceiver pair is determined by exploiting the channel reciprocity, which is timevarying and difficult for a third party to predict. Moreover, the Support Vector Machine
(SVM) algorithm is applied for intelligently quantizing the physical layer attribute estimates to bits. Hence, the proposed scheme provides seamless protections for legitimate
communications as the seeds can be refreshed adaptively without incurring long latency,
complex computation, and high communication overhead.

1.4

Thesis Organization

The following details and Figure 1.4 demonstrate the organization of remaining chapters of
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Figure 1.4: Thesis organization.

It would be beneficial to first provide fundamentals related to wireless communication security, privacy, and trust, existing solutions to secure communication and their challenges, as
well as the introduction of AI techniques for security enhancement, privacy protection, and
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trust management. All of these will be explained in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 proposes two physical layer authentication schemes as an intelligent process to
achieve continuous protections for legitimate devices, including kernel learning-based scheme
and fuzzy learning-based scheme. The proposed kernel learning-based physical layer authentication scheme tracks multiple communication link-related features to achieve reliable authentication that leaves fewer loopholes for spoofers in intermittent communications, which is a
nonparametric method. However, compared with another kind of methods, i.e., the parametric
methods, more observed samples of the adopted attributes are required in building the authentication model by using the nonparametric methods, leading to a larger number of parameters
in the authentication process to be determined. Then, the fuzzy learning-based authentication
scheme is proposed, which is a parametric method. Through providing a form of system expression, more information has been involved in the attribute combination model, thus resulting
in fewer parameters to be determined when compared to the nonparametric methods.
Considering the inherent misdetection and false alarm problems in physical layer authentication, an adaptive trust management-based soft authentication and progressive authorization
scheme is developed in Chapter 4. This scheme establishes trust relationship between the
transmitter and receiver based on the evaluation of selected physical layer attribute for fast
authentication and multiple-level authorization. Through the designed trust model, the transmitter is authorized by the specific level of services/resources corresponding to its trust level,
so that soft security is achieved. To dynamically update the trust level of the transmitter, an
online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed relying on
the real-time validation of its attribute estimates at the receiver, thus resulting in the progressive
authorization.
By jointly considering security and privacy-preservation, an accountable recommendationbased distributed access control scheme is proposed for consortium blockchain-enabled IoT
systems in Chapter 5. This scheme involves an accountable recommendation mechanism, an
anonymous credential generation strategy, and a reputation update mechanism. In the recommendation mechanism, multiple authorized devices are utilized as referrers to authenticate a
public device and issue the required credential for joining the system. Then, the anonymous
credential generation strategy helps to further achieve privacy protection. To ensure the ef-
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fectiveness of the proposed recommendation mechanism, a reputation update method is also
developed to evaluate the behaviors of authorized nodes. An incorrect recommendation will
lead to the decrease of referrers’ reputation values, named as accountability. Moreover, the
dynamic multiple-level authorization can be achieved for all devices based on their adaptive
reputation values.
Chapter 6 develops a new lightweight continuous authentication scheme in IoT systems based on the access time slots of the devices. The access time sequence of each device is
prearranged between itself and the base station based on the channel reciprocity. A new seed
acquisition technique is proposed based on the Support Vector Machine (SVM) to achieve better quantization performance. With the acquired seed, a Pseudo-Random Binary Sequence
(PRBS) can be generated for authentication. The identification of the access time sequences
of devices can dramatically reduce the time latency for authentication. More importantly, the
proposed scheme is lightweight at the IoT devices since they don’t require high computation/communication costs in generating authentication keys/tags.
Finally, conclusions are drawn from the studies and future research directions are pointed
out in Chapter 7.

Chapter 2
Background Study on Security, Trust,
Privacy, and Artificial Intelligence
The 5G-and beyond wireless networks are critical to support diverse vertical applications by
connecting heterogeneous devices and machines, which directly increase vulnerability for various security risks and threats. Conventional cryptographic and physical layer security techniques are facing inevitable challenges in complex dynamic wireless environments, including
significant security overhead, low reliability, as well as difficulties in pre-designing a precise
security model and providing continuous protection. This chapter presents the detailed risks
and threats in 5G-and-beyond networks as well as existing solutions for secure communication and their challenges. Furthermore, the benefits of utilizing Artificial Intelligence (AI)
for security provisioning and trust management are introduced. Machine learning paradigms
for intelligent security design are also presented, namely for parametric/non-parametric and
supervised/unsupervised/reinforcement learning algorithms. Based on these preliminaries, intelligent security provisioning and trust management will be further studied, as well as new
schemes will be developed for achieving the objectives of this thesis in the following chapters.

2.1

Risks and Threats Landscape in 5G-and-Beyond

As shown in Figure 2.1, the backhaul of 5G networks can be divided into three different layers:
infrastructure layer, control layer, and application layer [12]. The infrastructure layer contains
15
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the basic connectivity devices, such as base stations, routers, and switches. All the network
control functionalities and decision-making entities are placed in the control layer, which interacts with the application layer. Besides, it can translate the network service requests from
the application layer as control commands and deliver to the infrastructure layer devices. Thus,
all the network services and applications are implemented in the application layer. In addition,
the end-to-end management is used in parallel to synchronize the operation and collaboration
of these layers.

Operator network
Cloud

Risks and threats

 Spoofing attacks
 Eavesdropping attacks
 False information/
recommendation attacks
 Tampering attacks
 Sybil attacks
 Denial-of-Service (DoS)

Applications/
Services

SDN/NFV
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Internet & remote
Services/systems

Users/IoT devices

Mobile edge
Access network

Smart Applications

Figure 2.1: Typical risks and threats in 5G-and-beyond networks.
To support a wide variety of vertical IoT applications, the 5G-and-beyond networks connect
a dramatically growing number of low-cost devices and access points with increased mobility
and heterogeneity, leading to an extremely complex and dynamic environment. Specifically, due to the open broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, widely adopted standardized
transmission protocols, and intermittent communication characteristic, wireless communications are extremely vulnerable to various attacks [2].
Some typical security threats and privacy risks in 5G-and-beyond are also shown in Figure
2.1, their descriptions are summarized as:
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• Spoofing attacks: The objective of spoofing attacks is to generate and send malicious
packets that seem legitimate in the systems. For example, the adversary may spoof the
IP addresses of authorized devices in an IP-based IoT system, and then send malicious
data with the spoofed IP addresses to gain access to the system [12].

• Eavesdropping attacks: Eavesdropping attacks are the acts of secretly or stealthily listening to the private conversation or communications of others without their consent [12].
An eavesdropping attack can be difficult to detect because the network transmissions will
appear to be operating normally.

• False information/recommendation attacks: A malicious device may collude and provide
false information/recommendations to isolate good devices while keeping malicious devices connected. The malicious device may keep complaining about a peer device and
create the peer’s negative reputation [65].

• Tampering attacks: This kind of attacks can be classified as device tampering and data
tampering [66]. The device tampering can be easily performed especially when an IoT
device is absent most of the time. It can be easily stolen without being noticed and then
be used maliciously. The data tampering involves malicious modification of data, e.g.,
data stored in databases or data transiting between two devices.

• Sybil attacks: This kind of attacks are impersonation attacks, which can be simply prevented by explicitly binding an identity to participate in a system. A malicious device can
use multiple network identities, which can affect topology maintenance and fault-tolerant
schemes, such as multi-path routing [65].

• Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: They aim to overwhelm the network services by inundating them with requests, e.g., servers inundate with requests for services. A malicious
node may block the normal use or management of communications facilities, for example, by causing excessive resource consumption [65].
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2.2

Existing Solutions for Secure Communication and Their
Challenges

This subsection presents some existing solutions for secure communications and their challenges, i.e., authentication, access control, trust management, and privacy protection.

2.2.1

Authentication

The existing solutions for authentication and their challenges are introduced in this subsection,
including cryptographic techniques and physical layer authentication techniques.

Cryptographic Techniques
Although digital key-based cryptographic techniques [22, 23, 24] have been widely used both
for communication security and authentication, they may fall short of the desired performance
in many emerging scenarios. One fundamental weakness of the digital credentials based
on conventional cryptography is that detecting compromised security keys cannot be readily
achieved, since the inherent physical attributes of communication devices and users are disregarded [25]. Given the rapidly growing computational capability of devices, it is becoming
more and more feasible to crack the security key from the intercepted signals of standardized
and static security protocols. Furthermore, conventional cryptographic techniques also require
appropriate key management procedures to generate, distribute, refresh, and revoke digital
security keys, which may result in excessive latencies in large-scale networks. Indeed, this latency may become intolerable for delay-sensitive communications, such as networked control
and vehicular communications. The computational overhead of digital key-based cryptographic methods is also particularly undesirable for devices, which have limited battery lifetime and
computational capability, such as IoT sensors. For example, the group key agreement protocols
require thousands of transmission times to exchange keys and to establish group keys among
5-client groups [26].
The authors of [27] developed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol based on the
public key encryption for smart city applications, which strikes a balance between the efficiency
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and communication costs without sacrificing security. A scalable framework for lightweight
authentication and hierarchical routing in data networking IoT is proposed in [28]. The authors of [29] proposed a two-factor lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme to
enhance the security of vehicular ad-hoc network communications relying on the decentralized
certificate authority and the biological passwords. However, these schemes also require many
rounds for the key generation, refresh, and delivery, resulting in long time latency and high
communication overhead. Furthermore, the key transmission process in security management
procedures of the cryptographic techniques could lead to potential key leakage [30].

Physical Layer Authentication Techniques
Physical layer authentication techniques have attracted a lot of interests, which can be classified
as key-based or keyless, according to whether a secret key shared between the transceiver is
exploited for the physical layer authenticate or not [31].
In [32], the authentication signal is generated and added to the message signal with the
assistance of a secrete key. The communication performance could be reduced in this scheme
since the authentication signal appears as noise to the message signal and vice versa. The superimposed tag-based authentication schemes [33] transmit an additional authentication signal
concurrently with the messages, but corrupt the entire data message and require additional complicated preprocessing, such as message symbol recovery through demodulation and decoding.
The authors of [31] proposed an artificial-noise-aided physical layer phase challenge-response
authentication scheme for orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) transmission.
In [34], a slope authentication method is developed at the physical layer to divide the transmitted signal into multiple groups, and to generate a tag based on a shared secrete key and pilot
signal to mark the time index of each group for authentication. However, the above key-based
physical layer authentication schemes require the procedure of generating keys and assistance
from trusted third parties, resulting in long latency and high computation overhead.
The keyless physical layer authentication technique has been widely studied in the literature [31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48] due to its advantages including
low computational requirement, low network overhead, and modest energy consumption. It
focuses on exploiting the attributes of communication links and devices to protect legitimate
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communications from the spoofing attacks. Such analog-domain attributes directly relate to
the communicating devices and corresponding physical environment, thus are difficult to impersonate and predict, e.g., channel impulse response (CIR) [35, 36], carrier frequency offset (CFO) [37, 38], received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [39], in-phase-quadrature-phase
imbalance (IQI) [40], just to name a few. These attributes are time-varying and imperfectly estimated in practical networks because of the mobility of devices, dynamic channels with
unpredictable interference conditions, estimation errors, and so on.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison of cryptographic and physical authentication techniques.
A detailed comparison of conventional and physical authentication techniques is given in
Figure 2.2.

Challenges for Existing Physical Layer Authentication Techniques
Although physical layer authentication has many advantages, it also faces many challenges.
The main reason is that most of the existing physical layer authentication techniques rely on
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only a single attribute, as well as on static mechanisms while encountering the complex dynamic wireless environment of 5G-and-beyond wireless networks. As shown in Figure 2.2, the
challenges for existing physical layer authentication techniques are summarized as follows.
• Low reliability when using single attribute: Performance of the single attribute-based
physical layer authentication schemes suffers from the imperfect estimates and variations
of the selected attribute [2]. Moreover, the limited range of specific attribute distribution
may not be sufficient for differentiating transmitters all the time. This limits the performance of single attribute-based authentication schemes in many universal applications,
such as mobile device security.
• Difficulty in pre-designing a precise authentication model: Most of the existing physical layer authentication schemes are model-based, as exemplified by [37, 49], which
may be deteriorated when it is operated in a complex time-varying environment. More
importantly, tremendous amounts of data and a priori knowledge are required for obtaining the accurate channel model, which are obviously undesirable for those mobile
networks, such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks and vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). Hence, it is challenging to pre-design a precise authentication model
for supporting new applications in 5G-and-beyond networks.
• Impediment to continuous protection of legitimate devices: Most of the existing authentication schemes are static in time and binary in nature, which means that the devices either pass or fail the authentication, thus leading to the one-time hard verification [37, 49]. Due to the intermittent communications between Alice and Bob, these
schemes may be limited in detecting spoofer after the initial login and in addressing
varying security risks.
• Challenge of learning time-varying attributes: Authentication performance of the existing static authentication schemes could be severely affected by the unpredictable variations of attributes due to the potential decorrelation at different time instants and device
mobility. Hence, the variations of attributes increase the uncertainty for adversaries, but
decrease the authentication accuracy of legitimate devices operating without learning the
diverse attributes as well.

22 Chapter 2. Background Study on Security, Trust, Privacy, and Artificial Intelligence
In addition, there are also some open issues for the adaptive authentication systems utilizing
multiple physical layer attributes as follows:
• Limited computational resources for estimating the statistical properties of attributes for
many IoT devices.
• Large search-space for finding the outcomes of authentication when multiple physical
layer attributes are utilized.
• Nonlinear and non-convex characteristics of authentication systems.
• Timely detection of time-varying attributes and adaptation of the authentication process.
Due to these existing challenges, the authentication enhancement and efficient security provisioning are of paramount importance for 5G-and-beyond wireless networks.

2.2.2

Access Control

The access control mechanisms can be classified as encryption-based and encryption independent based on whether they use a particular encryption technique or are independent of the underlying encryption [147]. In the encryption-based approaches, the content providers encrypt
their content before disseminating them into the network. Clients need to authenticate themselves and obtain the content decryption keys to be able to decrypt and consume the content.
On the contrary, the encryption independent approaches provide access control frameworks
that can use any encryption methods for performing access control.
The encryption-based approaches have been well studied in the literature [53, 54, 148]. A
generalized hierarchical access control scheme named shared encryption-based construction is
proposed in [53] by adding qualified users to the system via perfect secret sharing and symmetric encryption. This protocol defines alternative methods of accessing the system and allows
the distribution of duties to different users. This paper also develops a secure key assignment
scheme called threshold broadcast encryption-based construction. In [54], an attributed-based
encryption mechanism is proposed for access control enforcement that uses either the keypolicy or the ciphertext-policy based encryption models. The authors of [148] proposed a
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probabilistic structure for encryption-based access control. Publishers and clients are equipped
with public-private key pairs and each client initially subscribes to a publisher by sending an
interest. The publisher stores a record for each registered client and identifies the client’s credentials.
Different from the encryption-based approaches, [149] proposes a trust-based approach for
access control. During registration, a new client or publisher presents its credentials and attributes to the broker, thus trust is established. The publisher defines an access policy and
submits it to its broker. In [50], a lightweight digital signature and access control scheme is developed for data networking. The access policies are enforced using generated tokens-metadata
that indicate access levels. Two private tokens enable content access and integrity verification
for each authorized entity. After receiving the entity’s request for a token, the provider encrypts
the token (generated by hashing a key vector) based on the requester’s access level. In [51], an
automated ConfigSynth framework is proposed to provide affordable and synthesizing precise
network configuration. The proposed framework is further refined to provide improved security by developing a refinement mechanism. To prevent from international mobile subscriber
identity downgrade attack with a fake LTE base station, a pseudonym-based solution and a
mechanism to update LTE pseudonyms are proposed in [52].

2.2.3

Trust Management

Trust and reputation management systems can also be used in assessing the quality of received
information, to provide network security services such as access control, authentication, malicious node detections, and secure resource sharing. According to [67, 68, 69, 150], definitions
of trust and reputation are given respectively as: “A node A’s trust in a node B is the subjective expectation of node A receiving positive outcomes from the interaction with node B in
a specific context.” and “Reputation is the global perception of a node’s trustworthiness in a
network.” The concept of “Trust” originally derives from social sciences and is defined as the
degree of subjective belief about the behaviors of a particular entity [63]. The authors in [64]
first introduced the term “Trust Management” and identified it as a separate component of security services in networks and clarified that “Trust management provides a unified approach
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for specifying and interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships.” The concept
of trust also has been attractive to communication and network protocol designers where trust
relationships among participating nodes are critical in building cooperative and collaborative
environments to optimize system objectives in terms of scalability, reconfigurability, and reliability, dependability, or security [65].
The trust management system usually contains multiple functional blocks: trust calculation, trust propagation, trust aggregation, and trust prediction. First of all, a trust value of the
device/user will be calculated based on some metrics or recommendations. These trust values
will be propagated in the network so that the trust can be established between devices which
are not in immediate contact. While propagating the trust, trust values from multiple paths will
be aggregated to get a combined trust value which can be stored in history. The stored trust
value can be used in the trust predictions and this predicted trust value will be further used in
the applications. The stored trust value can also be used in the trust computation in the form
of feedback knowledge. Therefore, trust calculation, trust propagation, trust aggregation, and
trust prediction blocks are closely interconnected in the trust management.
The authors in [70] proposed a highly scalable cluster-based hierarchical trust management
protocol for wireless sensor networks to effectively deal with selfish or malicious nodes. They
considered multidimensional trust attributes derived from communication and social networks
to evaluate the overall trust of a sensor node. The authors of [71] proposed a 3-tier cloudcloudlet device hierarchical trust-based service management protocol for large-scale mobilecloud IoT systems. This protocol allows an IoT customer to report its service experiences and
query its subjective service trust score toward an IoT service provider following a scalable
report-and-query design. In [72], a trust management scheme is proposed for unattended wireless sensor networks to provide efficient and robust trust data storage and trust generation. For
trust data storage, a geographic hash table is employed to identify storage nodes and to significantly decrease storage costs. The subjective logic-based consensus techniques are utilized in
this work to mitigate trust fluctuations caused by environmental factors. To achieve accurate
and energy-efficient trust evaluation in underwater acoustic sensor networks, an attack-resistant
trust model is proposed in [73] based on multidimensional trust metrics, which mainly consists
of three types of trust metrics, i.e., the link trust, data trust, and node trust.
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Privacy Protection

In this subsection, privacy protection can be classified into three different categories, i.e., data
privacy, location privacy, and identity privacy [55], which are summarized as follows.
• Data privacy: 5G-and-beyond networks allow users to utilize smart and data-intensive
services, such as high-resolution streaming, healthcare [56], and smart metering [57],
through the heterogeneous smart devices. To provide these services, the service providers
may store and use private data of individuals without their permission. The stored data
may be shared with other stakeholders so that they can analyze the data for their products.
To mitigate such data privacy issues, service providers must provide clarification for the
users not only how and where the individual’s data have been stored, but also how and
what purpose their data have been used. The authors in [58] argued that the standard
formalization of differential privacy is stricter than that required by the intuitive privacy
guarantee it seeks. In this work, several mechanisms to attain individual differential
privacy are developed.
• Location privacy: More and more devices in 5G-and-beyond networks rely on ubiquitous
location-based services [59]. Indeed, such services make users’ life easier and more enjoyable but bring a plethora of privacy issues that of being continuously tracked as well.
A scalable architecture is provided in [60] for protecting the location privacy from various privacy threats resulting from uncontrolled usage of location-based services. This
architecture includes the development of a personalized location anonymization model
and a suite of location perturbation algorithms. A flexible privacy personalization framework is used to support location k-anonymity for a wide range of mobile clients with
context-sensitive privacy requirements. This framework enables each mobile client to
specify the minimum level of anonymity that it desires and the maximum temporal and
spatial tolerances that it is willing to accept when requesting k-anonymity-preserving
location-based services.
• Identity privacy: It protects the identity-related information of a device/system/ user against attacks. As more and more devices are being connected to the network, it raises
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the probability of identity information leakage by adversaries [61]. The authors of [62]
addressed the privacy risks of identity disclosures in sequential releases of a dynamic
network. To prevent leakage of identity privacy, they proposed kw -structural diversity
anonymity, where k is an appreciated privacy level and w is a time period that an adversary can monitor a victim to collect the attack knowledge.

2.3
2.3.1

AI for Security, Trust, and Privacy Enhancement
Benefits of AI for Security, Trust, and Privacy

The artificial intelligence (AI) [74] is leveraged in this thesis to enhance security, trust, and privacy in 5G-and-beyond networks through learning, reasoning, and self-correction. Explicitly,
AI techniques could be exploited at gateways and routers, and the abundant information contained in large-scale wireless communication systems could be utilized for learning and reasoning, thus achieving security enhancement and trust management based on learned knowledge.
Moreover, through self-correction by AI techniques, the intelligent security provisioning and
trust management may be accomplished to adapt to dynamic wireless environments. To be
more specific, AI may contribute to the secure communications in 5G-and-beyond networks
due to the following reasons.
• Security management may be accelerated based on learned knowledge by AI. In
a large-scale communication system, the gateways and routers may undertake the AI
management, such as data collection, training, and testing, thus the communication and
computation overhead could be reduced at low-power devices. They also have abundant
multi-domain information on communication channels, devices, environments, network
connections, and application software. Such information could be intelligently utilized
for security provisioning as well as for contributing to the learning and reasoning by
AI techniques. More importantly, AI techniques may utilize historical information to
facilitate security management. Hence, the continuous security process at devices could
be accelerated as well as the security induced latency could be reduced based on learned
knowledge by AI techniques.
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• AI provides real-time learning under limited statistical properties and unpredictable
dynamics. In the practical communication environment, it is more and more difficult to
develop accurate statistical models for security enhancement. This is mainly because of
the ubiquitous uncertainties and unpredictable dynamics as well as the limited computational resources and time for obtaining precise statistical properties. Those AI techniques
providing online learning under limited statistical properties and unpredictable dynamics could conduce to the real-time detection of attacks and continuous protections for
legitimate communications. Furthermore, different from the statistical hypothesis testing [75], which requires an accurate statistical model, the machine learning algorithms
allow systems to become more accurate in predicting outcomes based on the training
data.
• Automatic management may be achieved with the help of AI techniques. With the
significant increasing requirements in 5G-and-beyond, automatic management helps to
meet different goals, for example, quality of service (QoS), security enhancement, trust
establishment, and privacy protection. This can be achieved based on the learning of the
dynamic situations of the time-varying systems by AI techniques, thus the different goals
can be automatically adjusted in the process of communications. More importantly, the
objective-aware techniques can be designed utilizing AI to provide benefits for more
efficient management in dynamic environments.
• Privacy protection in security management may be achieved based on AI. As the
leaked private information of a device/user could be leveraged by attackers, leading to
security risks and lack of trust, privacy protection in the security management process
is extremely important. With the help of AI, intelligent security provisioning may be
designed by utilizing the channel reciprocity [21] as well as by tracking the specific
communication link-related, device-related, and biometric features without the transmission of private information. To be more specific, AI techniques may help in amplifying
the channel reciprocity, so that highly similar information can be acquired on transceiver
sides. Moreover, machine learning algorithms can track the specific features for continuous security management without the transmission of private information [2].
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Therefore, through leveraging AI, new intelligent security provisioning and trust management schemes can be developed in large-scale 5G-and-beyond networks.

2.3.2

Categories of Machine Learning for Intelligent Management

The family of machine learning algorithms can be categorized based on their functionality and
structure [1], yielding regression algorithms, decision tree algorithms, Bayesian algorithms,
clustering algorithms, and artificial neural networks, just to name a few. In this subsection,
machine learning techniques are clarified from two perspectives: parametric/non-parametric
learning and supervised/unsupervised/reinforcement learning, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. The
adjectives “parametric/non-parametric” indicate whether there are specific forms of training
functions, while “supervised/unsupervised” indicate whether there are labeled samples in the
database. The focus of reinforcement learning is finding a balance between exploration of
uncharted territory and the exploitation of current knowledge. The basic concepts and typical
examples of these machine learning techniques will be introduced, more importantly, their
applications and possible requirements in designing intelligent security provisioning and trust
management approaches will be discussed for different wireless communication scenarios.

Logistic regression,
Perceptron,
Naive Bayes

Kernel-based
methods, Decision
trees

Parametric
learning

Nonparametric
learning

ML Techniques
for Intelligent
Management

Supervised
learning

Linear and logistic
regression, Bayesian
learning

Unsupervised
learning

k-means clustering,
PCA (Principal
component analysis)

Reinforcement
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Deep deterministic
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Figure 2.3: Categories of machine learning (ML) techniques for intelligent security provisioning and trust management.

Parametric Learning Methods
The family of parametric learning methods has become mature in the literature, as exemplified
by the logistic regression, linear discriminant analysis, perceptron, and naive Bayes, which
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require the specific form of training functions [76]. When the training functions related to
the training samples (i.e., the collection of multi-dimensional information) are selected appropriately, the parametric learning methods could be more accurate, simpler, and require fewer
training samples than the non-parametric learning methods.
In the intelligent physical layer authentication schemes, the parametric learning methods could model the communication link-related attributes independently based on the specific
form of training functions, and the uncertainties caused by the complex time-varying environment may be circumvented. The communication overhead and complexity of training may be
adjusted adaptively by opportunistically leveraging attributes. However, this kind of learning
methods may be challenged in 5G-and-beyond wireless communication scenarios wherein the
statistic properties and a priori knowledge of attributes are not at hand.

Non-Parametric Learning Methods
In contrast to parametric learning methods, the non-parametric learning methods [1, 2, 76] are
not specified a priori, but are determined from the available data. Examples include kernel
estimator, k-nearest neighbors, and decision trees, just to name a few. A kernel machine-based
scheme for intelligent physical layer authentication process is proposed in [2]. The dimensionality of multiple attribute-based authentication systems is reduced by the kernel function
and the resultant authentication process can be modeled as a linear system, thus decreasing the
computation complexity of the authentication process, even though a large number of attributes
are utilized. More importantly, the proposed kernel learning algorithm tracks the time-varying
attributes to enhance security based on continuous device validation.
The non-parametric learning methods dynamically learn from the time-varying environments without requiring any assumptions concerning the training models. Beneficially, this
provides higher flexibility for intelligent management, especially in those time-varying scenarios, where the computational resources and time available for obtaining the statistical properties
of attributes and training functions are limited. However, compared with the parametric learning methods, they require more training data (i.e., collection of multi-dimensional information
and/or their corresponding labels) and may result in overfitting.
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Supervised Learning Techniques
The main difference between supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms is that supervised learning requires the prior knowledge of outputs for the corresponding inputs, while unsupervised learning algorithms do not need labeled outputs. Some supervised machine learning
algorithms are studied in [76] for defending against the false data injection attacks, such as the
perceptron, k-nearest neighbors, and support vector machines (SVM). In intelligent management, the choice between supervised or unsupervised machine learning algorithms typically
depends on the problem and volume of training data at hand. A supervised learning algorithm is suitable when training data and corresponding outputs of a legitimate communication
session are straightforward to obtain. More explicitly, the labeled outputs should be required
near-instantaneously, so that the adaptation of the management process may be achieved in
real-time. When labeled outputs are not at hand, fast labeling techniques may be helpful for
the supervised learning-based intelligent management.

Unsupervised Learning Techniques
In exploring this kind of algorithms, the learner exclusively receives unlabeled training data
and makes predictions for all unobserved points, as exemplified by the K-means clustering [1].
For instance, in physical layer authentication scenarios wherein the samples of a legitimate
device (i.e., estimates of attributes) are much more than that of Spoofer, unsupervised learning
algorithms may be introduced for intelligent authentication. It is reasonable since the spoofing attacks fully rely on the legitimate device’s behaviors for better attacking performance,
including the transmission protocols and attributes. Through applying unsupervised machine
learning techniques for security enhancement and trust management, the time latency and energy consumption for labeling the outputs will be significantly decreased.

Reinforcement Learning Techniques
They do not require accurate inputs and outputs as well as precise parameter updates. A Qlearning-based authentication scheme is proposed in [78] depending on the received signal
strength indicator of signals to achieve the optimal test threshold and to improve the authen-
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tication accuracy. However, it is also a static authentication scheme and maybe unsuitable
when the available resources and time are limited for obtaining complete information, i.e., the
environment and agent states as well as the immediate reward for each action of devices.

2.3.3

AI-based Security Provisioning

As shown in Figure 2.4, a design of machine learning-aided intelligent authentication approaches is introduced as an example by utilizing multi-dimensional attributes and by optimizing the holistic authentication process.
5G-and-beyond applications

Intelligent authentication design
Collection of multidimensional attributes

Attribute analysis and
fusion based on
machine learning

Performance evaluation and adaptation
Feature observations
Intelligent security provisioning

Figure 2.4: Framework diagram of intelligent authentication design.
Phase I: The time-varying multi-dimensional attributes are collected for authentication, which
may be estimated imperfectly having noises and measurement errors. Examples include the
physical layer attributes, network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks, and mobility patterns. In a specific 5G-and-beyond wireless communication scenario, those attributes
providing more information for authentication may be selected first. In detail, the independent
attributes having a broader distribution range and a higher estimation accuracy could offer more
information for distinguishing different transmitters. By utilizing multi-dimensional attributes
as well as sharing the information among different layers and networks, the reliability of authentication will be improved. Explicitly, the design of intelligent authentication only relies
on the estimation data of attributes without requiring a precise structure of the time-varying
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attributes, e.g., the channel model, resulting in model-free device validation.
Phase II: The multi-dimensional attributes can be fused for authentication based on machine
learning techniques. An example is given in [2], which is a kernel learning-based physical layer
authentication scheme. Considering the time-varying network conditions, such as the resource
limitations and uncertainties, the attributes may be opportunistically selected for dealing with
both communication overhead and security management concurrently. Furthermore, developing an appropriate machine learning algorithm and reducing the dimension of the authentication system will also benefit communication performance, thus cost-effective authentication
will be achieved.
Phase III: The authentication for a legitimate device and a spoofer can be conducted based
on the new collection of multi-dimensional attributes. To achieve this, the regression or classification model should be built based on the training data collected from them. Then the
authentication performance can be evaluated, and the authentication process can be adapted to
the complex time-varying environment by exploring machine learning to track the variations of
multi-dimensional attributes. Hence, the continuous and situation-aware process is proposed
for intelligent security provisioning in 5G-and-beyond applications.

2.4

Chapter Summary

This chapter firstly introduced the threats and risks in 5G-and-beyond networks as well as
some existing solutions for secure communications, including authentication, access control,
trust management, and privacy protection techniques. The challenges for the conventional techniques and the advantages of artificial intelligence were presented. Then, the machine learning paradigms for intelligent management were classified into parametric and non-parametric
learning methods, as well as supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement learning techniques.
Based on the preliminaries provided in this chapter, new intelligent security provisioning and
trust management schemes will be developed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3
Physical Layer Authentication as an
Intelligent Process
Physical layer authentication techniques validate wireless transmitters by verifying the dynamic attributes of the associated physical communication links, devices, location, and environment. Performance of the existing physical layer authentication schemes could be severely
affected by the imperfect estimates and the variations of the communication link attributes.
The commonly adopted static hypothesis testing for physical layer authentication faces significant challenges in time-varying communication channels due to the changing propagation and
interference conditions, which are typically unknown at the design stage. To circumvent this
impediment, two multi-dimensional adaptive physical layer authentication schemes are proposed based on artificial intelligence (AI) techniques as an intelligent process in this chapter
to learn and utilize the complex time-varying environment, and hence to improve the reliability and robustness of physical layer authentication. These two schemes are named as kernel
learning-based authentication scheme and fuzzy learning-based authentication scheme.

3.1

Introduction

Due to the open broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, as well as owing to using standardized transmission schemes and intermittent communications, wireless communication
systems are extremely vulnerable to interception and spoofing attacks. First of all, the open
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broadcast nature of wireless medium facilitates the reception of radio signals by any illegitimate receiver within the coverage of the transmitter [25]. Secondly, the standardized transmission and conventional security schemes of wireless networks make interception and eavesdropping fairly straightforward [79, 80]. Moreover, the “on-off” and sporadic transmissions of low
cost wireless devices, especially the significantly growing number of Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices, provide abundant opportunities to adversaries for spoofing attacks. Therefore, the enhancement of authentication schemes is of paramount importance for wireless communication
systems, especially in the light of the ongoing convergence between the wireless infrastructure
and vertical industrial applications enabled by IoT.
Physical layer authentication technique provides an effective approach for authenticating a
user (transmitter) by exploiting the physical layer attributes of its communication links. However, imperfect estimates and variations of the physical layer attributes are inevitable in practical wireless networks. These constitute challenges for the physical layer authentication, but
beneficially, they provide unique distinguishing features. Having said that, their adequate estimation often imposes challenges on physical layer authentication, mainly due to time-varying
channels, dynamic interference conditions, mobility of devices, non-symmetrical observations
at the transmitter and receiver, as well as owing to the measurement errors, just to name a few.
To elaborate a little further on the challenges, the performance of the single-attribute-based
physical layer authentication schemes [31, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48] remains
limited by the imperfect estimates of the specific attribute used. Moreover, the limited range
of the specific attribute distribution may not be sufficiently wide-spread for differentiating the
devices all the time. These estimations lead to low-reliability and low-robustness of physical
layer authentication in conjunction with only a single attribute, especially in a hostile timevarying wireless communication environment.
Hence, multiple physical layer attributes may be taken into account for improving the authentication performance [30, 81], since it is more difficult for an adversary to succeed in
predicting or imitating all the attributes based on the received signal. On the other hand, when
the environment is time-variant, the performance of physical layer authentication could be
severely affected by the unpredictable variations of attributes due to the potential decorrelation
of the physical layer attributes observed at different time instants. Although the variations of

3.1. Introduction

35

attributes provide additional scope for improving the security mechanisms by increasing the
uncertainty for the adversaries, at the same time also brings challenges for the legitimate users
operating without discovering and tracking the variations of physical layer attributes.
In a nutshell, the main challenge is that a multiple varying attributes-based authentication
scheme is capable of achieving high security in the presence of adversaries, but this increases
the grade of challenge imposed on legitimate users as well. More importantly, variations of the
physical layer attributes are typically unknown at the design stage and they are hard to predict,
thus it is very difficult to pre-design a static physical layer authentication scheme. Hence the
conception of adaptive physical layer authentication is extremely helpful for improving the
validation performance, which can promptly adapt to the time-varying environment.
There are in general two classes of methodologies in the literature available for combining
the multiple physical layer attributes for authentication. The first one is the nonparametric
methods [96, 97, 98, 99, 100], which can be used for combining multiple attributes without a
fixed form (structure) of the authentication model. The other one is the parametric methods,
where the forms of system expression are given, as exemplified by the Gaussian function and
polynomial function [101, 102, 103]. The details of these two classes of methodologies have
been introduced in subsection 2.3.2.

3.1.1

Kernel Learning-based Authentication Scheme

When the statistical properties of the physical layer attributes are limited, designing nearinstantaneously adaptive physical layer authentication based on multiple attributes is challenging due to the following reasons:
C1. Both the computational resources and the time available for estimating the statistical properties of the physical layer attributes are limited;
C2. New authentication schemes based on multiple attributes result in a large search-space,
which may lead to both excessive complexity and non-convex property in optimization;
C3. In practical wireless communication, the typical authentication schemes rely on nonlinear
techniques, as exemplified by the binary hypothesis tests of [42, 43, 44] and by the generalized
likelihood ratio test of [82];
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C4. Sophisticated near-instantaneously adaptive processing techniques are required for fast
detection of time-varying physical layer attributes and the adaptation of the physical layer authentication process.
To overcome these difficulties, the kernel-based machine learning technique of [83, 84] is
applied first for modeling the authentication problem in this chapter, which is a non-parametric
learning method. Although the family of parametric learning methods has become mature in
the literature [39, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92], they usually rely on the assumption of knowing the
distribution of samples (i.e., the estimates of physical layer attributes) together with the specific form of the authentication model (e.g., based on linear function or polynomial function).
When the assumptions related to the samples’ distribution are correct, the parametric methods
are usually more accurate than the non-parametric methods. However, once the assumptions concerning the samples’ distribution models become inaccurate, they have a much greater
chance of failing. This dramatically limits the employment of parametric learning methods when they face challenge C1, since computing accurate distributions for multiple physical
layer attributes in a complex time-varying environment is indeed time-consuming. In contrast
to parametric learning methods, the non-parametric methods are not specified a priori, but are
determined from the data available. Some examples are constituted by the classic k-nearest
neighbors [93] and the decision tree based solutions [94]. However, these two non-parametric
methods have a limited ability to deal with challenges C2-C4. To be specific, it is not easy to
determine the most appropriate k-distance in the k-nearest neighbors method. In the decision
tree method, the perturbation of collected data (e.g., by noise) will result in quite a different
decision tree, thus leading to inaccurate authentication results.
The authors of [75] proposed a physical layer authentication scheme based on the extreme
learning machine for improving the spoofing detection accuracy. However, this scheme assumes that all the multiple physical layer attributes obey the same statistical distribution functions, such as the Gaussian distributions, thus their performance is limited in the complex
high-dynamic environments. Furthermore, a few other machine learning techniques are introduced for authentication in [77], such as Q-learning and neural network-based techniques, as
well as some well-studied fusion methods, e.g., the Kalman filter of [37], fuzzy logic of [95],
and Bayesian inference techniques of [75]. However, these methods may be limited in dealing
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with C1-C4. To be specific, the authors of [77] studied the test threshold of authentication
based on the Q-learning technique instead of the variations of attributes in the time-varying
environment encountered. The neural network-based method of [77] may improve the model
accuracy by increasing the number of layers and neurons used, but at the cost of a higher complexity, which hence may not be suitable for near-instantaneous authentication. Moreover, the
Kalman filter aided method of [37] is also model-based, relying on the assumption of having
Gaussian distributed process noise, the fuzzy logic method of [95] requires tuning of the membership function, and the Bayesian inference method of [75] also requires a statistical model of
the observed data, which are hence limited in dealling with challenge C1.
To overcome these challenges, a promising alternative approach of modeling the authentication process is to track multiple physical layer attributes based on the kernel learning [85, 86].
As a benefit, the kernel machine of [83, 84, 85, 86] is capable of reducing the dimensionality
of the authentication problem based on multiple attributes. It models the authentication problem as a linear system without requiring the knowledge of the attributes’ statistical properties.
More importantly, the variations of attributes as well as of the environment may be tracked
(learnt) by the kernel learning. Due to these compelling benefits, this chapter first proposes a
novel authentication scheme based on the kernel learning technique as an intelligent process in
the face of time-varying wireless communication scenarios to achieve reliable authentication
through discovering the complex dynamic environment encountered and through tracking the
variations of multiple physical layer attributes. Firstly, a multiple physical layer attribute fusion
model based on the classic kernel machine is designed for modeling the authentication problem
without requiring the knowledge of those attributes’ statistical properties, which corresponds
to C1. As for C2 and C3, the authentication problem is cast from a high-dimensional search
space to a single-dimensional space by using the classic Gaussian kernel, hence the resultant
physical layer authentication can be considered as a linear system. Then an adaptive algorithm is proposed for tracking the variations of the physical layer attributes to achieve a reliable
authentication performance, which is a solution for C4.
Specifically, the technical contributions of the proposed kernel learning-based physical layer authentication scheme are summarized as follows:
• A kernel machine-based model for determining the authentication attributes is designed
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without requiring the knowledge of their statistical properties, and the authentication system is cast from a high-dimensional space to a single-dimensional space. Then the resultant physical layer authentication process can be considered as a linear system, which
is easier to train based on the estimates of the physical layer attributes and the observed
authentication results. As a result of this transformation, the complexity of the designed
multiple physical layer attribute fusion model can be dramatically reduced, despite considering a high number of physical layer attributes;
• The learning (training) objective of the physical layer authentication based on kernel machine can be formulated as a convex problem. An intelligent authentication process is
proposed based on kernel least-mean-square for tracking the variations of the physical
layer attributes to achieve a reliable authentication performance. By deriving the learning rules for both the system parameters and for the authentication system, the proposed
intelligent authentication process becomes capable of adapting to time-varying environments. Therefore, a timely detection of the physical layer attributes and the adjustment
of the authentication process can be achieved;
• Numerical performance and simulations results demonstrate that a larger number of
physical layer attributes leads to a more pronounced authentication performance improvement without unduly degrading the convergence and training performance. The
results also demonstrate the superiority of the kernel learning-based scheme over its nonadaptive benchmarker.

3.1.2

Fuzzy Learning-based Authentication Scheme

When some statistical properties of the physical layer attributes are available and intermittent
availability of some attributes are considered, the fuzzy theory [104, 105, 106, 107, 108] is
leveraged for combining multiple attributes. It is because fuzzy models or sets are mathematical means of representing vagueness and imprecise information, then make decisions based
on the imprecise and non-numerical information. To be more specific, a fuzzy membership
function is used as a generalization of the indicator function in classical sets and represents the
degree of truth as an extension of valuation. Hence, it provides an effective method to combine
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multiple attribute and to deal with the imperfectness of attribute estimation for achieving accurate authentication. Furthermore, knowing that the fuzzy model using membership function is
a parametric method, the authentication scheme based on fuzzy model can be seen as a compact approach. In a nutshell, through the fuzzy theory, the authentication system can be well
modelled by using a specific expression to combine multiple attributes.
Compared with the parametric methods [101, 102, 103], more observed samples of the
adopted attributes are required in building the authentication model by using the nonparametric methods, leading to a larger number of parameters in the authentication process to be
determined. Although sufficient observations of the adopted physical layer attributes may be
available in some networks, longer time for estimating attributes and larger memory space for
storing them are required in leveraging such methodologies. In the parametric methods, given
a fixed form of authentication model with only parameters to be determined, more information has already been involved in attribute combination, thus resulting in less parameters to
be determined when compared to the nonparametric methods, hence demonstrating a compact
approach.
More importantly, the adopted physical layer attributes in the authentication process are
time-varying and their variations may be difficult to predict, due to the uncertainties and dynamics of communication environments, i.e., the estimation imperfectness, time-varying characteristic of attributes, and intermittent availability of some attributes. In the attribute estimation
stage, the estimates of some attributes may not be available by the receiver at some moments
because of the complex communication environment or the unreliable estimation components.
These all lead to a low authentication performance of the schemes without an adaptive mechanism to overcome the uncertainties and dynamics, as exemplified by [35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. In
detail, to achieve a reliable and robust authentication, an adaptive scheme is extremely helpful
in near-instantaneously updating the system parameters, so that they will remain unknown to
the adversaries.
In this chapter, a fuzzy theory-based adaptive authentication scheme is developed by utilizing multiple physical layer attributes to improve authentication performance in time-varying
environments. First of all, a fuzzy model is designed for combining multiple physical layer
attributes with imperfect estimation, which forms multi-dimensional protections for legitimate
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devices. In order to update system parameters to achieve adaptive authentication, the false
alarm rate and misdetection rate of the fuzzy learning-based scheme are derived. Note that
updating the system parameters is a non-convex optimization problem. To improve the efficiency of learning, system parameters in the proposed fuzzy multiple attribute combination
model are divided into two classes, named linear parameters and nonlinear parameters. Then,
a hybrid learning algorithm is proposed for near-instantaneously updating the system parameters, wherein the least-square estimator is applied for linear parameter update and the gradient
decent is used for nonlinear parameters update.
Specifically, the technical contributions of the proposed adaptive fuzzy learning-based
physical layer authentication scheme are summarized as follows:
• The designed fuzzy model relaxes the accuracy requirement of attribute estimation and
provides an explicit expression of multiple physical layer attribute combination. Compared with the non-parametric methods, the proposed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model requires much less observed samples and less parameters to be determined
in the authentication process due to the given form of system expression, leading to a
compact approach;
• The proposed hybrid learning algorithm achieves reliable and robust authentication in
time-varying environments. On one hand, the system parameters can be updated nearinstantaneously by the adaptive learning algorithm. On the other hand, each attribute in
the adaptive authentication model is independently taken into account, thus once some
attributes are unavailable at some moments, the remaining attributes still contribute to
the authentication model and make the model work, demonstrating a robust approach;
• Simulation results demonstrate the parameter update and authentication performance of
the proposed fuzzy learning-based scheme in simulated urban scenario. Moreover, compared with some existing authentication schemes, the outperformance of the proposed
fuzzy learning-based scheme in defending against the spoofing attacks is shown in dynamic environments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, the system model used
in this chapter is presented. In Section 3.3, the kernel learning-based physical layer authenti-
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cation scheme is proposed. The fuzzy learning-based physical layer authentication scheme is
developed in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter.
Table 3.1: Notations of Chapter 3
Notations
N
H
F (·)
ν
L
α
µ
σκ
e
PFA
PMD
Φ0
Φ1
b
µ
b
σ
b
α

Definitions
Number of physical layer attributes used for authentication.
Estimates of multiple physical layer attributes.
Intelligent adaptive function for physical layer authentication.
Authentication threshold.
Number of observations for training.
Weight vector of Kernel machine.
Step-size parameter of Kernel machine learning.
Kernel width.
Prediction error in the training process.
False alarm rate.
Misdetection rate.
The case that the signal is from Alice.
The case that the signal is from Eve.
Mean of Gaussian fuzzy function in fuzzy learning-based scheme.
Variance of Gaussian fuzzy function in fuzzy learning-based scheme.
Linear system parameter of fuzzy learning-based scheme.

Notations: In this chapter, scalars are denoted by italic letters, while vectors are respectively
denoted by bold-face letters. False alarm (FA) represents an event when the receiver wrongly
believes that the legitimate transmitter is an adversary, while misdetection (MD) is an event
when the receiver wrongly identifies the adversary as a legitimate device. Table 3.1 shows the
notations of this chapter.

3.2

System Model and Problem Formulation

As shown in Figure 3.1, a wireless network is considered, where Alice and Bob communicate
with each other in the presence of an eavesdropper, i.e., Eve, who intends to intercept and impersonate Alice, and then to send spoofing signals to obtain illegal advantages. Bob’s main
objective is to uniquely and unambiguously identify the transmitter by physical layer authentication. The basic physical layer authentication aims for supporting this pair of legitimate
devices by a reciprocal wireless link, while the device-dependent features can be used as a
unique security signature.
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Signal received at Bob
(waveform domain)
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Imperfect estimates
of n time-varying
attributes at time t

Figure 3.1: Adversarial system and physical layer authentication in a wireless network.

The number of physical layer attributes used for authentication is denoted as N and the
estimates of multiple physical layer attributes are denoted as H = (H1 , H2 , ..., HN )T , where T
represents the transposition of a vector. These physical layer attributes may include the channel state information (CSI), carrier frequency offset (CFO), received signal strength indicator
(RSSI), round-trip time (RTT), in-phase-quadrature-phase imbalance (IQI), and so on. These
unique channel and device features offer security guarantee by physical layer authentication.
A few important assumptions are stipulated for the authentication considered in this chapter, as follows:
Assumption 3.1. The physical signals transmitted between a pair of legitimate devices rapidly
become decorrelated in space, time and frequency. This implies that it is hard for the attacker
to observe and predict the channel state between legitimate devices if the attacker is at a third
location, which is farther than a wavelength away from Alice and Bob;
Assumption 3.2. Both the wireless channels and the interference are time-varying, the devices
are moving, and hence the wireless environment is dynamically changing. These all lead to
unpredictable variations of the physical layer attributes;
Assumption 3.3. The estimates of the physical layer attributes are imperfect because the legitimate devices will suffer from different interferences in a dynamic propagation environment
when the devices roam in different locations.
These assumptions characterize a practical scenario, but naturally, it will be more difficult to
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deal with these imperfectly estimated time-varying physical layer attributes.
The physical layer authentication comprises two phases, as described below.
Phase I: Alice broadcasts one or more messages to Bob at time t. From the received signal,
Bob infers an imperfect estimate of the multiple attributes
I
I
I
HAI [t] = (HA1
[t], HA2
[t], ..., HAN
[t])T ,

(3.1)

which are associated with Alice. At the same time, Eve overhears the transmission.
Phase II: Either Alice or Eve transmits a message to Bob at time t + τ. Then Bob obtains
another imperfect estimate
H II [t + τ] = (H1II [t + τ], H2II [t + τ], ..., HNII [t + τ])T ,

(3.2)

where τ represents the time interval between the two phases.
Bob should compare the estimate H II [t + τ] to the previous estimate HAI [t]. If these two
estimates are likely to be originated from the same channel realization and the same imperfect
hardware, then the message at time t + τ is deemed to be coming from Alice.
Remark 3.1. As mentioned in the assumptions, the physical layer attributes are time-variant
and imperfectly estimated. The objective of this chapter is to propose authentication schemes
as an intelligent process relying on these physical layer attributes. The process aims for achieving reliable and robust authentication through discovering and learning the complex operating
environment. Two physical layer authentication schemes will be proposed for specific communication scenarios, i.e., kernel learning-based scheme for the case that the properties of the
attributes are not available and fuzzy learning-based scheme based on the known properties
(which are not perfectly estimated).
An intelligent adaptive function F (·) is conceived, which is used for fusing N independent physical layer attributes. Then the authentication process can be formulated relying on a
threshold ν > 0 as






Φ0 :





Φ1 :

|F (HAI − H II )| ≤ ν;
|F (HAI

− H )| > ν,
II

(3.3)
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where Φ0 indicates that the signal is from Alice, while Φ1 indicates that it is from Eve. Due to
the variations and imperfect estimates of the physical layer attributes between Alice and Bob,
both false alarms and misdetections are encountered. Therefore, the parameters in F (·) should
be promptly updated to achieve low false alarm rate and misdetection rate in a time-varying
environment.

3.3

Kernel Learning-based Authentication Scheme

In order to improve the performance of the authentication schemes using multiple physical
layer attributes, which are imperfectly estimated and time-varying, a kernel machine-based
model is proposed for fusing multiple physical layer attributes without requiring the knowledge
of their statical properties in the spirit of C1. Then, the dimension of the search-space is
reduced from N to 1 with the aid of the developed kernel machine-based physical layer attribute
fusion model and the authentication problem can be modeled by a linear system as detailed in
this section (corresponding to C2 and C3). Therefore, the complexity of the designed multiple
physical layer attribute fusion model can be dramatically reduced, as well as the trade-off
between the authentication false alarm and misdetection can be improved by utilizing multiple
attributes.

3.3.1

Kernel Machine-based Multiple Physical Layer Attribute Fusion
Output

Input

Normalization

Kernel machinebased multiple
attribute fusion

Figure 3.2: Kernel machine-based multiple physical layer attribute fusion.
In the kernel machine-based multiple attribute fusion, Bob will obtain an estimate H II [t +τ]
of (3.2) at time t + τ. Then, Bob will compare the estimate H II [t + τ] to the previous estimate
at time t, namely for HAI [t] of (3.1). The difference between these two estimates is denoted as
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h = (h1 , h2 , ..., hN )T , where each hn ∈ [an , bn ] is formulated as
I
hn = HAn
[t] − HnII [t + τ], n = 1, 2, ..., N.

(3.4)

Since the different attributes exhibit quite different ranges and have different units, the
normalization (see Figure 3.2) is required for scaling the attributes having different ranges to
the same range for the ease of analysis and for the design of the kernel machine-based fusion.
In the following, the attributes having ranges [an , bn ], n = 1, 2, ..., N, are normalized to [−1, 1]
by invoking
e
hn =

2
an + bn
(hn −
), n = 1, 2, ..., N.
bn − an
2

(3.5)

It can be observed from (3.4) and (3.5) that these two equations are only used for normalizing the estimates of the attributes to the range of [−1, 1], so that the rather diverse multiple
physical layer attributes can be processed in the same range. In practical systems, only the
approximate variation ranges of the attributes are required, which is reasonable because there
always have a priori knowledge about the communication systems and environments before
designing the authentication system.
L
Let us assume that a set of observations (e
hl ,b
yl )l=1
∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1} is given, which is used

for training the authentication process, where e
hl = (e
h1l , e
h2l , ..., e
hNl )T is the lth estimate after the
normalization, with each element e
hnl defined in (3.5), and






1
b
yl = 




0

Φ0

.

(3.6)

Φ1

As shown in Figure 3.2, the normalized estimates e
hl , l = 1, 2, ..., L, are considered as the inputs
of the kernel machine, and f (e
hl ) represent the outputs of the kernel machine with the corresponding inputs given by e
hl ∈ [−1, 1]N , l = 1, 2, ..., L. Note that for the legitimate users, the
training data of a legitimate communication session is relatively straightforward to obtain.
The task is then to infer the underlying mapping function b
yl = f (e
hl ) from the training data
L
set (the samples) received (e
hl ,b
yl )l=1
∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1}. In other words, the task in this section
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is to represent the authentication system b
yl = f (e
hl ), and to model the relationship between the
estimates of multiple attributes and the corresponding authentication results. After this, it can
be verified whether a transmitter is that of Alice or of Eve once a new normalized estimate
h = (h1 , h2 , ..., hN )T has been obtained. For example, in a continuous authentication session
as defined in [48], once the transmitter accesses the system again or sends the messages to
Bob continuously, Bob can infer the estimates of this transmitter’s physical attributes, and then
determine its normalized estimate through (3.5). This normalized estimate may be different
from the previous normalized estimates e
hl , l = 1, 2, ..., L, because of the time-varying environment or channels, which will be treated as the new normalized estimate of the attributes and be
applied to the authentication to improve the security.
The kernel machine projects the N-dimensional input vector h ∈ [−1, 1]N into a potentially
infinite-dimensional feature space H through a mapping ϕ : [−1, 1]N → H. Note that the
transformation from the input space into the feature space is nonlinear, and the dimensionality
of the feature space is high enough. Since the linear model defined in feature space H satisfies
the universal approximation property of [29], the authentication system can be expressed as
f (h) = wT ϕ(h),

(3.7)

where w is the weight vector in the feature space H. According to the Representer Theorem
of [109, 110], the authentication system expression of (3.7) can be rewritten as
f (h) =

L
X

αl κ(e
hl , h),

(3.8)

l=1

where κ(e
hl , h) is a Mercer kernel [83]. The classic Gaussian kernel function of [83, 84, 85, 86]
is adopted in this chapter, which has an excellent modelling capability and is numerically
stable. The Gaussian kernel function used in the proposed authentication scheme is given by
−ke
hl − hk2
e
κ( hl , h) = exp(
),
2σ2κ

(3.9)

where σκ is the kernel width and should be chosen by the users. The Gaussian kernel function
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of (3.9) characterizes a similarity between the observed inputs e
hl and the new normalized
estimate h.
From (3.7) and (3.8), the following relationship holds, i.e.,
hl )T ϕ(h).
κ(e
hl , h) = ϕ(e

(3.10)

Remark 3.2. It is observed both from the kernel function of (3.9) and from the authentication
system expression of (3.8) that the physical layer attributes are fused without any specific
knowledge of their statistical properties, which corresponds to C1. As for C2, the search-space
is transformed from being N-dimensional to single-dimensional by the developed multiple
physical layer attribute fusion model.
Remark 3.3. In practical wireless networks, the authentication systems are usually nonlinear
(see C3). By contrast, according to the proposed kernel machine-based physical layer attribute
fusion model of (3.8), the authentication system is formulated as a linear system, since the
expression of (3.8) relies on the linear weights αl , l = 1, 2, ..., L.
The estimates of the multiple physical layer attributes H are time-variant, which may lead to
a low authentication performance without agile adaptation. Therefore, next subsection focuses
on proposing adaptive learning procedures for promptly adjusting the authentication system of
(3.8), which is the solution of C4.

3.3.2

Adaptive Authentication based on Kernel Learning

In this section, a learning procedure is proposed for adaptive authentication based on the kernel
least-mean-square for promptly updating the parameters. This authentication process is based
L
on learning from the observed samples (e
hl ,b
yl )l=1
∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1}. Explicitly, the proposed

learning procedure can be viewed as an intelligent process of learning the time-varying environment for updating the system parameters αl , l = 1, 2, ..., L, to achieve a reliable and robust
authentication.
L
Given the samples (e
hl ,b
yl )l=1
∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1} observed, the N-dimensional input vector

e
hl ∈ [−1, 1]N is transformed into a kernel Hilbert space H through a mapping ϕ : [−1, 1]N →
H according to (3.7). Therefore, a pair of sample sequences {ϕ(e
h1 ), ϕ(e
h2 ), ...} and {b
y1 ,b
y2 , ...} is

48

Chapter 3. Physical Layer Authentication as an Intelligent Process

obtained. The weight vector w in (3.7) at iteration l should be updated for minimizing the cost
function as follows
min
w

l
X

[b
yi − wT ϕ(e
hi )]2 .

(3.11)

i=1

Remark 3.4. It is observed from (3.11) that the learning (training) objective of the adaptive
authentication process is formulated as a convex optimization problem.
The learning rules conceived for updating the authentication system of (3.8) are given as:
Proposition 3.1: The learning rule conceived for updating the weight vector α[l] in the developed multiple physical layer attribute fusion model at iteration l can be expressed as
α[l] = µ × (e[1], e[2], ..., e[l])T ,

(3.12)

where µ represents a step-size parameter. Furthermore, e[l] is the prediction error computed as
the difference between the desired observation of the transmitter and its prediction relying on
the authentication system parameters α[l − 1], which is expressed as
e[l] = b
yl − f (e
hl )[l − 1],

(3.13)

where
f (e
hl )[l − 1] =

l−1
X

αi [l − 1]κ(e
hi , e
hl ).

(3.14)

i=1

Furthermore, the learning rule conceived for adjusting the authentication system at iteration l
is given by
f (h)[l] = f (h)[l − 1] + µe[l]κ(e
hl , h).

(3.15)

Proof: Let
J(w) =

l
X
i=1

[b
yi − wT ϕ(e
hi )]2 .

(3.16)
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By invoking a step-size parameter µ, the learning rule for the parameter w can be derived by using the gradient. The partial derivative of the function J(w) with respect to w = (w1 , w2 , ..., wl )T
is given by
l

X
∂J(w)
ϕ(e
hi )[b
yi − wT ϕ(e
hi )],
= −2
∂w
i=1

(3.17)

and the instantaneous gradient at iteration l is
∂J(w)
[l] = −ϕ(e
hl )[b
yl − w[l − 1]T ϕ(e
hl )].
∂w

(3.18)

According to the steepest descent algorithm, it has
w[l] = w[l − 1] + µϕ(e
hl )[b
yl − w[l − 1]T ϕ(e
hl )].

(3.19)

Since e[l] of (3.13) can also be expressed as
e[l] = b
yl − w[l − 1]T ϕ(e
hl ),

(3.20)

the repeated application of (3.19) through iterations becomes
w[l] = w[l − 1] + µϕ(e
hl )e[l] = w[l − 2] + µϕ(e
hl−1 )e[l − 1] + µϕ(e
hl )e[l]
l
X
= ··· =
µϕ(e
hi )e[i]; (w[0] = 0).

(3.21)

i=1

According to (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9), the authentication system can be derived as
f (h) =

L
X
l=1

αl κ(e
hl , h) =

L
X

αl ϕ(e
hl )T ϕ(h) = w[L]T ϕ(h) =

l=1

L
X

µe[l]ϕ(e
hl )T ϕ(h),

(3.22)

l=1

then the following equation holds
αl [l] = µe[l].

(3.23)
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Therefore, the parameter vector α at iteration l, i.e., α[l] = (α1 [l], α2 [l], ..., αl [l])T , can be
updated through (3.12). Then the authentication system at iteration l can be formulated as
f (h)[l] =

l
X
i=1

αi κ(e
hi , h) = µ

l
X
i=1

e[i]κ(e
hi , h) = µ

l−1
X

e[i]κ(e
hi , h) + µe[l]κ(e
hl , h)

i=1

hl , h).
= f (h)[l − 1] + µe[l]κ(e

(3.24)

Therefore, learning rule for adjusting the authentication system of (3.8) is expressed as (3.15). 

Algorithm 1 Intelligent authentication process based on the kernel learning
1. Initialization:
f [0] = 0: initial value of authentication system
e[0] = 0: initial value of prediction error
α[0] = 0: initial value of system parameter α
µ: step-size parameter of learning
σκ : kernel width
e
h1 : initial input, i.e., the normalized estimate of physical layer attributes
C = {e
h1 }: initial set of input
b
y1 : initial observation of the transmitter with the corresponding normalized estimate e
h1
2. Iteration:
L
2.1 while samples (e
hl ,b
yl )l=1
∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1} available do
2.2 obtain the output of authentication system f [l − 1] at iteration l − 1 via (3.8);
2.3 calculate the prediction error e[l] via (3.13);
2.4 update weight vector α[l] through (3.12);
2.5 adjust the authentication system f [l] via (3.15);
2.6 update the input set as C = C + {e
hl };
2.7 l = l + 1;
2.8 end

According to Proposition 3.1, the intelligent authentication process based on the kernel
least-mean-square is summarized at a glance in Algorithm 1.
Remark 3.5. In conclusion, the search space is transformed from being N-dimensional to
single-dimensional (see Remark 3.2), the authentication is modeled as a linear system (see Remark 3.3), and the learning objective of the authentication is formulated as a convex problem
(see Remark 3.4). Therefore, the complexity of the physical layer authentication scheme relying on multiple attributes is dramatically reduced. It is also observed from Algorithm 1 that
the execution-time is on the order of O(L), which makes Algorithm 1 an attractive solution.
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The step-size parameter directly affects the convergence of the proposed authentication
process, since increasing the step-size of learning will reduce the convergence time but may in
fact lead to divergence. Therefore, the step-size parameter µ should be carefully decided.
Theorem 3.1: The proposed intelligent authentication process (see Algorithm 1) converges to
a steady-state value, if the step-size parameter of learning µ satisfies
L
= 1.
e e
l=1 κ( hl , hl )

0 < µ < PL

(3.25)

Proof: A practical convergence criterion is a convergence in the mean square error sense,
which is formulated as
E[ke[l]k2 ] → constant, as l → ∞,

(3.26)

where E[·] represents the expectation of ·. It was shown in [109, 112] that the least-meansquare criterion-based learning is convergent in the mean square, if µ satisfies
0<µ<

1
βmax

,

(3.27)

where βmax is the largest eigenvalue of the correlation matrix Θ[L] given by
Θ[L] = [ϕ(e
h1 ), ϕ(e
h2 ), ..., ϕ(e
hL )]N×L .

(3.28)

Since βmax < tr(Θ[L])/L, the following inequality is satisfied
0<µ<

L
L
= 1,
= PL
e
e
tr(Θ[L])
κ(
h
,
h
)
l
l
l=1

(3.29)

where tr(Θ[L]) is the trace of the matrix Θ[L]. Therefore, the proposed intelligent authentication process (see Algorithm 1) converges to a steady-state value if the step-size parameter of
learning µ satisfies (3.25).



Remark 3.6. Theorem 3.1 gives the upper bound of the step-size parameter µ in Algorithm 1,
so that the proposed intelligent authentication process will converge to a steady state.
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According to the proposed authentication system of (3.8), the false alarm rate and misde-

tection rate at instant L can be rewritten, respectively, as
PFA = P(|

L−1
X

αl κ(e
hl , e
hL )| < ν | Φ0 )

(3.30)

l=1

and
PMD = P(|1 −

L−1
X

αl κ(e
hl , e
hL )| ≤ ν | Φ1 ),

(3.31)

l=1

where ν ∈ [0, 1).
In the face of the imperfect estimates of time-varying physical layer attributes, they are
divided into two parts: the time-varying part H that is the real value of physical layer attributes
used, and part 4H that is the bias of estimated attributes. Then the estimates HAI [l − τl ] and
H II [l] can be written, respectively, as
I

HAI [l − τl ] = H A [l − τl ] + 4HAI [l − τl ]

(3.32)

and
II

H II [l] = H [l] + 4H II [l],

(3.33)

where τl is the time interval between Phase I and Phase II of the physical layer authentication
at iteration l, l = 1, 2, ..., L. Furthermore, υ(τl ) = (υ1l , υ2l , ..., υNl )T represents the variations of
I

part H A during the time interval τl , which can be expressed as
II

I

υ(τl ) = H A [l] − H A [l − τl ].

(3.34)

Given the distributions of part 4H of the multiple physical layer attributes, the false alarm
rate and misdetection rate of the proposed scheme are calculated as the following theorems.
Theorem 3.2: The false alarm rate expression of the kernel learning-based scheme at iteration
L is given by
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PFA = FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1 (ν) − FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1 (−ν),
where Yl = αl exp(−

53

(3.35)

PN e eΦ0 2
2
eΦ0
n=1 (hnl − hnL ) /2σκ ), l = 1, 2, ..., L−1, hnL is shown in (3.36), F represents

the cumulative distribution function, and ∗ represents the convolution.
Proof: According to (3.5), (3.32), (3.33), and (3.34), e
hL = (e
h1L , e
h2L , ..., e
hNL )T in case of Φ0 is
calculated as
e
hΦnL0 =

an + bn
2
I
II
(υn (τL ) + 4HAn
[L − τL ] − 4HAn
[L] −
), n = 1, 2, ..., N,
bn − an
2

(3.36)

where τL is the time interval between Phase I and Phase II of the proposed physical layI
II
er authentication scheme at iteration L. Given the distributions of 4HAn
and 4HAn
of each

physical layer attribute, the probability of density function of e
hΦnL0 can be obtained. Let Yl =
αl exp(

−

e eΦ0 2
n=1 (hnl −hnL )
2σ2κ

PN

PFA = P(|

L−1
X
l=1

), the false alarm rate at iteration L is calculated as

PN e eΦ0 2
L−1
L−1
X
X
n=1 (hnl − hnL )
αl exp(
)|
<
ν)
=
P(
Y
<
ν)
−
P(
Yl ≤ −ν)
l
2σ2κ
l=1
l=1
−

L−1 (ν) − F PL−1 (−ν).
= FPl=1
Yl
l=1 Yl

(3.37)

Therefore, the false alarm rate expression of the kernel learning-based scheme at iteration L is


shown in (3.35).

Theorem 3.3: The misdetection rate expression of the kernel learning-based scheme at iteration L is expressed as
PMD = FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1 (ν + 1) − FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1 (1 − ν),
where Zl = αl exp(−

(3.38)

PN e eΦ1 2
2
eΦ1
n=1 (hnl − hnL ) /2σκ ), l = 1, 2, ..., L − 1, and hnL is shown in (3.39).

Proof: According to (3.5), (3.32), and (3.33), e
hL = (e
h1L , e
h2L , ..., e
hNL )T in case Φ1 is formulated
as
e
hΦnL1 =

an + bn
2
I
II
I
II
(H An [L − τL ] − H En [L] + 4HAn
[L − τL ] − 4HEn
[L] −
).
bn − an
2

(3.39)
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II
I
of each physical layer attribute, the probability of
and 4HEn
Given the distributions of 4HAn
−
density function of e
hΦnL1 can be obtained. Upon letting Zl = αl exp(

e eΦ1 2
n=1 (hnl −hnL )
2σ2κ

PN

), the misdetec-

tion rate at iteration L yields
PMD = P(|1 −

L−1
X
l=1

PN e eΦ1 2
L−1
L−1
X
X
n=1 (hnl − hnL )
αl exp(
)| ≤ ν) = P( Zl ≤ ν + 1) − P( Zl < 1 − ν)
2σ2κ
l=1
l=1
−

L−1 (ν + 1) − F PL−1 (1 − ν).
= FPl=1
Zl
l=1 Zl

(3.40)

Therefore, the misdetection rate expression of the kernel learning-based scheme at iteration L is
given by (3.38).



Remark 3.7. It can be observed from Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 that the false alarm
rate and misdetection rate of the kernel learning-based scheme depend on both the number of
physical layer attributes N and on the variations of the attributes υ. The kernel learning-based
scheme tracks the variations of the attributes and promptly adjusts the authentication system,
so that a compelling false alarm rate vs. misdetection rate trade-off will be achieved.

3.3.3

Simulation Results

In this subsection, the proposed kernel learning-based scheme is implemented using multiple physical layer attributes. First of all, three physical layer attributes, namely the carrier
frequency offset (CFO), channel impulse response (CIR), and received signal strength indicator (RSSI) are considered to confirm the viability of the proposed intelligent authentication process. Specifically, a communication system having a measurement center frequency
of 2.5 GHz, measurement bandwidth of 10 MHz, coherence bandwidth of 0.99, normalized
time correlation of 0.99 and sampling time of 50 ms is considered. The transmitted signal is
passed through a randomly generated 12-tap multipath fading channel having an exponential
power delay profile. The relative velocity between Alice and Bob is assumed to be around
20 km/h, and the initial distance between Alice and Bob is 5 m. Then the CFO of an individual transmitter can be approximated as a zero-mean Gaussian variable [37, 116], and
the standard deviation of the CFO variation is 4CFO ≈ 2.35 × 10−7 . The CFO estimation
range is [−78.125, 78.125) kHz [37]. Furthermore, according to [82], an autoregressive mod-
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el of order 1 (AR-1) is used for characterizing the temporal amplitude fluctuation Ampk [t]
of the kth-tap in the multipath fading channel. Therefore, the variation of CIR can be givP
en as υCIR = 12
k=1 Ampk [t] exp(− j4.99πk), and the per-tone signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is
in the channel measurements range of [−12.8, 14.2) dB with a median value of 6.4 dB, if
the transmit power is 10 mW [82]. Finally, according to [117], the RSSI can be given as
PL[dB] = 75 + 36.1 log(d/10), where PL is the path loss, and d represents the direct transmis0 .0 0 8
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Figure 3.3: Training performance of the kernel learning-based scheme (Algorithm 1) relying
on the CFO, CIR and RSSI triplet.
sion distance between the transmitter and Bob. The direct transmission distance between the
transmitter and Bob is assumed to be in the range of [0, 100] m.
3
Given 300 samples of the CFO, CIR and RSSI of Alice, i.e., (e
hl ,b
yl )300
l=1 ∈ [−1, 1] × {0, 1},

where b
yl = 1, Figure 3.3 shows the training performance of the kernel learning-based scheme
(Algorithm 1) relying on the CFO, CIR and RSSI triplet. The step-size parameter of Algorithm
1 is set to µ = 0.1. It is observed from Figure 3.3 that the mean square errors E[ke[l]k2 ]
of all the strategies are significantly reduced, as the iteration index increases from 0 to 50.
Furthermore, the mean square error E[ke[l]k2 ] of each strategy reaches its steady-state value
after 30 iterations. Figure 3.3 shows that the CIR estimation performs better than both the CFO
and RSSI estimation in the training performance at the beginning, but its training performance
becomes the worst after 30 iterations. The reason for this trend is that the deviation of CIR
estimation is lower than that of the CFO and RSSI, while its variation is the highest.
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Figure 3.4: Training performance of the kernel learning-based scheme (Algorithm 1) relying
on 2 attributes and 3 attributes.
Figure 3.4 characterizes the training performance of the kernel learning-based scheme (see
Algorithm 1) relying on multiple attributes. Four cases are considered, namely the CFO &
CIR, the CFO & RSSI, the CIR & RSSI, and finally the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios. It
is observed from Figure 3.4 that the proposed intelligent authentication process relying on the
CFO & RSSI pair has the worst training performance before 30 iterations, while that relying
on the CIR & RSSI pair has the lowest mean square error. The reason for this trend is that
the mean square error of the proposed intelligent authentication process relying on the CIR is
lower than that of the CFO and RSSI before 30 iterations seen in Figure 3.5, which adversely
affects the training performance in this communication scenario. Additionally, the mean square
error of the proposed intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO & RSSI pair is the
lowest after 30 iterations, because both the CFO and RSSI are more reliable than the CIR
in the authentication process. Furthermore, it is also shown in Figure 3.4 that the training
performance of the proposed intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO & CIR &
RSSI triplet is worse than that of the CFO & RSSI pair after 30 iterations, while it is better than
that of the CFO & CIR pair and CIR & RSSI pair. This is because the training performance of
the kernel learning-based scheme depends on both the specific attributes and on the number of
physical layer attributes.
Figure 3.5 considers the case that Eve can intercept and imitate the CFO of Alice, which
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Figure 3.5: Authentication performance of the kernel learning-based scheme relying on the
CFO, CFO & CIR, CFO & RSSI, and CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios.
characterizes the authentication performance of the kernel learning-based scheme relying on
the CFO, CFO & CIR, CFO & RSSI, and finally the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios. In other
words, Eve intercepts and impersonates the CFO of Alice to obtain unintended advantages
from Bob in this case. It is observed from Figure 3.5 that the kernel learning-based scheme
relying on the CFO & CIR & RSSI has the best authentication performance, while that only
relying on the CFO performs worst. The reason for this trend is that Bob can better identify
the transmitter by using CIR and RSSI, although Eve imitates the CFO of Alice in the CFO
& CIR & RSSI scenario. On the other hand, Bob suffers from a high misdetection rate in the
CFO scenario, since the CFO of Alice is impersonated by Eve. It is also shown in Figure 3.5
that there is a small difference between the authentication performance of the kernel learningbased scheme relying on the CFO & CIR pair and that of the CFO & RSSI pair; and the
authentication performances of these two attributes scenarios are better than that of a singleattribute scenario (i.e., CFO). This is because Bob can identify the adversary by using CIR or
RSSI in the CFO & CIR or the CFO & RSSI scenarios. Therefore, the increasing number of
physical layer attributes is expected to lead to a higher authentication performance in the kernel
learning-based scheme.
Figure 3.6 considers the scenario when Eve can intercept and impersonate both the CFO
and CIR of Alice. It is observed from Figure 3.6 that the authentication performance of the
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Figure 3.6: Authentication performance of the kernel learning-based scheme relying on the
CFO & CIR and CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios.
kernel learning-based scheme relying on the CFO & CIR & RSSI triplet is better than that of
the CFO & CIR pair. The reason for this trend is that Bob can identify the adversary using
the RSSI in the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenario, although Eve imitates both the CFO and CIR
of Alice. Both Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 confirm that increasing the number of physical layer
attributes leads to a better authentication performance, since it is more difficult for an adversary
to succeed in predicting or imitating all the attributes based on the received signal.
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Figure 3.7: Authentication performance comparison results of the kernel learning-based
scheme with different numbers of attributes.
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Figure 3.7 characterizes the influence of the number of physical layer attributes N on the
authentication performance, which quantifies the MD rate vs. the threshold of FA rate for different numbers of physical layer attributes, namely for N = 2, N = 3, N = 4 and N = 5. It can
be observed that the MD rates are reduced in all cases as the threshold δ of FA rate increases
from 0 to 0.2, because there is an inevitable FA-and-MD trade-off. One can also observe from
Figure 3.7 that a larger number of attributes leads to a more obvious security performance improvement. This trend demonstrates the validity of authentication performance analysis. In a
nutshell, by using more physical layer attributes, the kernel learning-based scheme achieves a
better authentication performance, indicating the presence of a FA-and-MD trade-off, because
the proposed scheme can readily fuse multiple physical layer attributes and control the authentication system to track the variations of multiple attributes. On the same note, the attackers
find it more difficult to predict and imitate a larger number of attributes from a received signal.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison results between the kernel learning-based scheme and the process
without updating system parameters relying on CFO & CIR & RSSI.
In Figure 3.8, the variations on the CFO, CIR and RSSI are imposed for comparing the
kernel learning-based scheme and the authentication process operating without updating the
system parameters. The threshold of the false alarm rate is 0.02. Then it can be observed
from Figure 3.8 that upon increasing the time between updates, the MD rate of the proposed
intelligent process remains robust, tending to around 0.035, while that of the process operating
without updating the system parameters increases dramatically from about 0.035 to almost
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0.35. This demonstrates that without an adaptive scheme, the authentication performance will
be dramatically reduced in time-varying environments. Therefore, the kernel learning-based
scheme performs better than the static scheme operating without updating the parameters.

3.4

Fuzzy Learning-based Authentication Scheme

In order to improve the authentication performance by utilizing multiple attributes when some
statistical properties of the physical layer attributes are available and intermittent availability
of some attributes are considered, a fuzzy theory-based model is designed to combine multiple physical layer attributes. By using fuzzy theory [104, 105, 106, 107], the effects of their
imperfectness can be mitigated and the authentication accuracy can be improved.
Following the normalization of (3.4) and (3.5), each set [an , bn ] is uniformed into specific
set [−1, 1] through
h0n [t] =

2
an + bn
), n = 1, 2, ..., N.
(Hn [t + 1] − HAn [t] −
bn − an
2

(3.41)

In this equation, τ = 1.
The fuzzy membership function is explored to combine the multiple attributes, which is
a generalization of the indicator function in classical sets [106]. Some typical examples of
fuzzy membership function are given as the Gaussian function, triangle function, and trapezoid
function. In this chapter, the fuzzy membership function is designed as the Gaussian function
with means b
µn and variances b
σ2n , i.e.,
u[−1,1] (h0n [t]) = exp(

−(h0n [t] − b
µn )2
).
2b
σ2n

(3.42)

For different physical layer attributes, b
µn and b
σ2n , n = 1, 2, ..., N, experience different values
and control the developed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model. The expression (3.42)
is the fuzzy membership function for combing multiple physical layer attributes rather than
describing the Gaussian noises of attributes’ estimates.
Without loss of generality, through using product inference engine and center average de-
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fuzzifier [113], the fuzzy multiple attribute combination model is designed as
Inputs

→

h0 [t]

→

Outputs
N
X
b
αn u[−1,1] (h0n [t]),
y[t] =

(3.43)

n=1

αn are system parameters, which adjust the weights
where h0 [t] = (h01 [t], h02 [t], ..., h0N [t])T , and b
of multiples physical layer attributes. Therefore, the designed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model can well control the different contributions of attributes on the authentication
accuracy.
Remark 3.8. The fuzzy function of (3.42) describes the form of model expression using Gaussian function, which is a parametric method. It can also be observed from (3.42) that each
attribute is independently taken into account. Hence, although some attributes are unavailable
at some moments, the remaining attributes still contribute to the authentication and make the
model applicable, thus the fuzzy learning-based scheme comes to a robust approach. Moreover,
the robustness of the developed fuzzy authentication model can be improved by increasing the
number of attributes N.
Through the designed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model, a real-valued output y[t]
can be obtained from (3.42) at time t. Then the physical layer authentication process is turned
into a fuzzy authentication process as






Φ0 :





Φ1 :

ν ≤ y[t] ≤ 1;
(3.44)
0 < y[t] < ν.

The false alarm rate and misdetection rate of the designed fuzzy model at time t can be formulated based on the fuzzy authentication process of (3.43) as
PFA [t] = P(0 < y[t] < ν | Φ0 ),

(3.45)

PMD [t] = P(ν ≤ y[t] ≤ 1 | Φ1 ).

(3.46)

and
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In the following, it is assumed that the estimate deviations 4H, which can be seen as

the noises of estimates, are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables with variances
%2 = (%21 , %22 , ..., %2N )T , denoted as 4H ∼ ℵ(0, %2 ), and are independently distributed. Note
that only the noises of attribute estimates are assumed to be the zero-mean complex Gaussian
random variables. The multiple physical layer attributes can follow different distributions.
Upon denoting Xn [t] = (h0n [t] − b
µn )/%0n , it obeys Gaussian random distribution, which can
0
2
2
2
be expressed as Xn [t] ∼ ℵ(µ0n [t], 1), where %02
n = 4(%An + %n )/(bn − an ) and µn [t] = 2(H n [t +

1] − H An [t + 1] + υn [t] −b
µn )/(%0n (bn − an )). Note that the Xn at time instant t is Gaussian random
variable, but Xn at different time instants does not obey Gaussian random distribution, since the
mean µ0n [t] is time-varying. Therefore, each Xn2 [t] obeys the noncentral chi-squared distribution,
which can be expressed as Xn2 [t] ∼ X 2n (1, λn [t]). It has two parameters: the number of degrees
of freedom, namely for 1, and the noncentrality parameter λn [t], satisfying λn [t] = µ02
n [t]. Using
the relationship between the central and noncentral chi-squared distributions, the probability
density function (PDF) and the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of variable Xn2 [t] can be
given as
fXn2 [t] (x; 1, λn [t]) =

p
1
x + λn [t]
x − 41
exp(−
)(
) I− 12 ( λn [t]x),
2
2
λn [t]

(3.47)

and
∞

λn [t] X (λn [t]/2) j
PXn2 [t] (x; 1, λn [t]) = exp(−
)
Q(x; 1 + 2 j),
2
j!
j=1

(3.48)

√
respectively. I− 12 ( λn [t]x) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind given by
√
∞
p
λn [t]x − 12 X (λn [t]x/4) j
I− 12 ( λn [t]x) = (
)
.
2
j!Γ(
j
+
1/2)
j=0
Moreover, Q(x; 1 + 2 j) is the CDF of the central chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of
freedom shown as
Q(x; 1 + 2 j) =

Υ((1 + 2 j)/2, x/2)
,
Γ((1 + 2 j)/2)

(3.49)
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where Υ(·) is the lower incomplete Gamma function, and Γ(·) represents the Gamma function.

Then, the output of the developed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model y of (3.43)
at time t can be rewritten as
y[t] =

N
X

b
αn [t] exp(−

n=1

%02
n
X 2 [t]).
2b
σ2n [t] n

(3.50)

The following theorem can be obtained:
Theorem 3.4: The false alarm rate and misdetection rate of the designed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model can be given, respectively, by
N

z
Z }| Z{ Y
N
···
PFA [t] = P(0 < Y[t] < ν) =
fξn [t] (xn )dx1 · · · dxN
C1

(3.51)

n=1

and
N

z
Z }| Z{ Y
N
PMD [t] = P(ν ≤ Z[t] ≤ 1) =
···
fςn [t] (xn )dx1 · · · dxN ,
C2

(3.52)

n=1

where
Y[t] =

N
X

ξn [t], ξn [t] = b
αn [t] exp(−

n=1

%02
2(υn [t] − b
µn [t]) 2
n
2
FA
Xn,λ
).
FA [t] ), λn [t] = (
2
0
n
2b
σn [t]
%n (bn − an )

(3.53)

fξn [t] (xn ) and Fξn [t] (xn ) are the PDF and CDF of variable ξn [t], respectively, which are given as
2b
σ2 [t]
xn
Fξn [t] (xn ) = 1 − PXn2 [t] (− n02 ln(
); 1, λFA
n [t]) =
b
%n
αn [t]

Z

xn

fξn [t] (τ)dτ.

(3.54)

−∞

Moreover,
Z[t] =

N
X

ςn [t], ςn [t] = b
αn [t] exp(−

n=1

λMD
n [t] = (

%02
n
2
Xn,λ
MD [t] ),
2
n
2b
σn [t]

2(H En [t] − H An [t] + υn [t] − b
µn ) 2
).
0
%n (bn − an )

(3.55)
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fςn [t] (xn ) and Fςn [t] (xn ) represent the PDF and CDF of variable ςn [t], which are given as
2b
σ2 [t]
xn
); 1, λMD
Fςn [t] (xn ) = 1 − PXn2 [t] (− n02 ln(
n [t]) =
b
αn [t]
%n
Furthermore,

Q

Z

xn

fςn [t] (τ)dτ.

(3.56)

−∞

represents the product of a sequence. C1 and C2 are denoted as the domains of

multiple integral in (3.51) and (3.52), respectively, which satisfy 0 < Y[t] < ν and ν ≤ Z[t] ≤ 1.
Proof: According to (3.50), the probability of occurrence PFA [t] of (3.45) can be calculated as
P(0 < y[t] < ν | Φ0 ) = P(0 <
= P(0 <

N
X
n=1
N
X

b
αn [t] exp(−

%02
n
X 2 [t]) < ν | Φ0 )
2
2b
σn [t] n

ξn [t] < ν).

(3.57)

n=1
2
Note that Xn,λ
FA [t] obeys the noncentral chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom and
n

λFA
n [t]

in the case of Φ0 . Therefore, the CDF of variable ξn can be shown in (3.54), and the

false alarm rate of the proposed scheme is expressed as (3.51). Furthermore, PMD [t] of (3.46)
is given by
P(ν ≤ y[t] ≤ 1 | Φ1 ) = P(ν ≤

N
X

b
αn [t] exp(−

n=1

= P(ν ≤

N
X

%02
n
X 2 [t]) ≤ 1 | Φ1 )
2b
σ2n [t] n

ςn [t] ≤ 1).

(3.58)

n=1
2
Note that Xn,λ
MD [t] obeys the noncentral chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of freedom and
n

λMD
n [t]

in the case of Φ1 , and its CDF is shown in (3.56). Therefore, the misdetection rate of

the fuzzy learning-based authentication scheme is expressed as (3.52).



Remark 3.9. It is observed from Theorem 3.4 that the false alarm rate depends on the variations
of Alice’s attributes υn [t], n = 1, 2, ..., N. Therefore, without updating the system parameters,
namely for b
σ2n , b
µn and b
αn in (3.50), the designed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model
will result in low authentication accuracy in the time-varying environment. In next section, a
hybrid learning algorithm will be proposed for updating these system parameters.
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Multi-Dimensional Adaptive Authentication Architecture

In this section, an optimization problem based on the expressions of false alarm rate and misdetection rate and a multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture are designed. Then, a
hybrid learning algorithm is proposed to describe and update the system parameters of the designed fuzzy multiple attribute combination model. The hybrid learning algorithm focuses on
updating the system parameters to solve the designed optimization problem, which describes
the false alarm vs. misdetection trade-off, thus reliable authentication in the time-varying environment can be achieved.
As discussed above, the authentication performance of the designed fuzzy multiple attribute
combination model can be improved by well deciding and updating the parameters b
µn , b
σ2n and
b
αn in (3.50). Due to the inevitable trade-off between false alarm and misdetection [2, 114], the
authentication optimization problem is designed as
min

(b
µn ,b
σ2n ,b
αn ,ν),n=1,2,...,N

PFA ,

s.t. PMD ≤ δ,

(3.59)

where δ represents the threshold of misdetection rate. Given a δ, the threshold of authentication
in (3.3), namely for ν, can be determined by letting PMD = δ. Then, the threshold ν is fixed
in the subsequent authentication process, and the proposed scheme focuses on improving the
authentication accuracy through tracking the variations of the adopted physical layer attributes
of Alice and updating system parameters near-instantaneously.
In order to study and update the system parameters (i.e., b
µn , b
σ2n and b
αn ) near-instantaneously,
the fuzzy combination model of (3.43) is described as a multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture with these parameters in Figure 3.9. In this adaptive architecture, each inputoutput behavior is determined by a collection of modifiable parameters. The multi-dimensional
adaptive authentication architecture can be expressed as follows:
Step 1: The inputs of multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture are denoted as
h0 [t] = (h01 [t], h02 [t], ..., h0N [t])T with each element is designed in (3.41). Then a degree of membership value u[−1,1] (h0n [t]) of (3.42) can be obtained.
Step 2: By multiplying the parameter b
αn with the output u[−1,1] (h0n [t]) of Step 1, the b
αn u[−1,1] (h0n [t])
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Figure 3.9: Multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture with linear parameters b
αn
2
and nonlinear parameters b
µn , b
σn .
can be obtained.
Step 3: The overall output of the multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture is the
summation of outputs of Step 2, which can be written as
y[t] = b
α1 exp(

−(h0N [t] − b
µN )2
−(h02 [t] − b
µ2 )2
−(h01 [t] − b
µ1 )2
b
b
)
+
α
exp(
)
+
·
·
·
+
α
exp(
).(3.60)
2
N
2b
σ21
2b
σ22
2b
σ2N

As shown in Figure 3.9, the multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture is feedforward, since the output of each step propagates from the input side (left) to the output side
(right) unanimously. Besides, it is shown in (3.60) that the output of multi-dimensional adaptive authentication architecture is linear in b
αn , while it is nonlinear in b
µn and b
σ2n . Therefore, b
αn
are called as linear parameters, while b
µn and b
σ2n are named as nonlinear parameters.

3.4.2

Hybrid Learning for Parameters Update

In this subsection, a hybrid learning algorithm is designed by combining the gradient descent
and the least-square estimator for fast updating the system parameters.

Gradient Descent for Nonlinear Parameter Update
Given weights b
αn , n = 1, 2, ...N, the Gradient descent is applied to update the nonlinear parameters b
µn and b
σ2n , thereby to solve the optimization problem of (3.59), which can be expressed
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as
b
µn [k + 1] = b
µn [k] − 

∂PFA
|k
∂b
µn

(3.61)

b
σ2n [k + 1] = b
σ2n [k] − 

∂PFA
|k ,
∂b
σ2n

(3.62)

and

where  represents the step size of Gradient descent. ∂PFA /∂b
µn and ∂PFA /∂b
σ2n are the first order
partial derivatives of PFA with respect to b
µn and that with respect to b
σ2n , respectively. Again,
given the physical layer attributes adopted and attribute observations of Alice, the closed-from
expression of PFA can be obtained. Hence, the gradients in (3.61) and (3.62) can be derived.

Least-Square Estimator for Linear Parameter Update
Given the non-linear parameters b
µn and b
σ2n , the least-square estimator is applied to update the
weights b
αn in (3.60). Consider that a set of Alice’s observations {(h0l ,b
yl ), l = 1, 2, ..., L} is given,
which is used for training the weights b
α = (b
α1 , b
α2 , ..., b
αN )T in the least-square estimator. Then,
using the matrix notation, the following equation holds
b
y = y + e = Ub
α + e,

(3.63)

where b
y = (b
y1 ,b
y2 , ...,b
yL )T are the observations for training, while y = (y1 , y2 , ..., yL )T represent
the outputs of the fuzzy learning-based scheme with the corresponding inputs h0l , l = 1, 2, ..., L.
Moreover, e = b
y − y represent the errors between the observations and outputs of the fuzzy
learning-based scheme, and


u[−1,1] (h0 ) · · · u[−1,1] (h0 )
11
N1 


..
..
.


.

U = 
.
.
.




u[−1,1] (h01L ) · · · u[−1,1] (h0NL )

.

(3.64)

L×N

Instead of finding the exact solution for (3.59), the proposed fuzzy learning-based scheme
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aims at searching for optimal linear parameters, i.e., b
α∗n , for minimizing the sum of squared
error, which is given by
E(b
α) =

L
X
l=1

γL−l e2l

=

L
X

γL−l (b
yl − yl )2 = (b
y − Ub
α)T γ(b
y − Ub
α),

(3.65)

l=1

where the γ ∈ [0, 1] is forgetting factor to place the heavier emphasis on more recent data and

γL−1 0


 0 γL−2
γ =  .
..
 ..
.


0
0


0 


· · · 0 

.. 
..
. . 


· · · γ0

···

.

(3.66)

L×L

The utilization of forgetting factor γ in the proposed hybrid learning algorithm can decrease the
influence of historical samples in the authentication system gently due to the decorrelation of
physical layer attributes in the time-varying environment. According to [115], the closed-form
of solution for minimizing E(b
α) of (3.65) can be obtained as
b
α∗ [L] = (UT γU)−1 UT γb
y.

(3.67)

Hence, given non-linear parameters b
µn and b
σ2n , (3.67) provides an optimal linear parameter b
α∗
for multi-dimensional adaptive authentication.
Remark 3.10. If estimate of an attribute, i.e., Hn , cannot be obtained at some moments, b
αn =
0 is set directly, and update the other linear parameters via (3.67). Since each attribute in
the authentication model (3.43) is independently taken into account, the parameter update for
each attribute is also independent. This demonstrates the benefit of the proposed solution
compared with the nonparametric methods [2], that is, once some attributes are unavailable at
some moments, the remaining attributes will still contribute to the authentication model and
make the model work, leading to a robust authentication performance.
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Hybrid Learning Algorithm
In order to improve the convergence performance of parameters updating, the gradient descent
and least-square estimator presented above is combined, named as hybrid learning. The hybrid
learning is implemented in a batch mode, each learning epoch is composed of forward pass and
backward pass [115]. Given a threshold ν and a set of observations {(h0l ,b
yl ), l = 1, 2, ..., L}, the
weights b
αn are updated according to (3.67) in the forward pass. After the weights b
αn are identified, the b
µn and b
σ2n can be updated via (3.61) and (3.62), respectively, in the backward pass.
Then, the threshold ν is updated by letting PMD = δ with the updated parameters (b
µ∗n , b
σ∗2
α∗n ).
n ,b
As a conclusion, the proposed hybrid learning algorithm can be summarized in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Hybrid learning for multi-dimensional adaptive authentication
Given N physical layer attributes adopted, Alice’s observations h0l , l = 1, 2, ..., L, step size
of Gradient descent , initial parameters b
αn [0], b
µn [0], b
σ2n [0], and ν[0].
1. Iteration: t = 1, 2, ...L
Gradient descent:
1.1 obtain (b
µ∗n [t], b
σ∗2
µn [k + 1] and variances b
σ2n [k + 1] via
n [t]) through updating means b
(3.61) and (3.62), respectively, until |b
µn [k] − b
µn [k − 1]| < ε1 &|b
σ2n [k] − b
σ2n [k − 1]| < ε2 ;
∗
∗2
1.2 update PFA (b
µn [t], b
σn [t]) via (3.51);
Least square estimator:
1.3 if the estimate of attribute n is unvailable
1.4 set b
αn [t] = 0;
1.5 else
1.6 obtain optimal weights b
α∗n [t] through (3.67) and update PFA (b
α∗n [t]) via (3.51);
1.7 end if
1.8 update threshold ν by letting PMD (b
µ∗n [t], b
σ∗2
α∗n [t]) = δ;
n [t], b
2. Multi-dimensional adaptive authentication: t = L + 1
2.1 obtain new physical layer attribute estimate of authenticating transmitter H[t];
2.2 predict authentication result using parameters (b
µ∗n [L], b
σ∗2
α∗n [L]) via (3.44):
n [L], b
Alice/Eve;
2.3 update parameters via Step 1 by renewing observation set to {(h0l ,b
yl ), l = 1, ..., L + 1};
Figure 3.10 characterizes the hybrid learning process of parameter update in the fuzzy
learning-based scheme. Since the optimization problem of (3.59) is nonconvex, there may exist
several minimal points and saddle points, as shown in Figure 3.10 (a). Given the initial values
of linear parameters, the nonlinear parameters b
µn and b
σ2n are updated by using gradient descent
(GD) to achieve the point 1. Then based on the fixed b
µn and b
σ2n , the least-square (LS) estimator
is used to find an optimal weights b
α∗n according to (3.67), achieving to point 2. Continuing this
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process, the point 4 can be found as shown in Figure 3.10 (d). Note that the false alarm rate
of the proposed scheme is changing during the hybrid learning process. Therefore, through the
proposed hybrid learning algorithm (see Algorithm 2), most of the minimal points and saddle
points can be avoided, achieving better convergence performance.
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Figure 3.10: Schematic diagram of the proposed hybrid learning process.
Remark 3.11. Given fixed b
µn and b
σ2n , the weights b
α∗n of (3.67) are the optimal values b
αn in the
weights space because of the squared error measure used. Therefore, by proposing the hybrid
learning procedure (see Algorithm 2), the dimension of the search space is reduced, and the
time needed to reach convergence is substantially decreased.

3.4.3

Convergence Analysis of Fuzzy Learning-based Scheme

This subsection analyzes the convergence of Algorithm 2 to show the performance of the proposed fuzzy learning-based authentication scheme. A general case is considered that at least
one physical layer attribute adopted in the proposed scheme is dynamic. Then the following
results can be obtained:
Theorem 3.5: If υ[t] , 0 satisfies, the proposed fuzzy learning-based authentication scheme
with parameters b
α[t], b
µ[t], and σ
b2 [t] in Algorithm 2 performs better than that with parameters
b
α[t − 1], b
µ[t − 1], and σ
b2 [t − 1] at time instant t.
Proof: Given b
α[t−1], b
µ[t−1], and σ
b2 [t−1] at time instant t−1, the least-square estimator b
α∗ [t]
of (3.67) can be obtained, which minimizes the sum of squared error for real-value authentica-
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tion of (3.65) with a new observation b
y[t]. Therefore, for the given b
µ[t − 1] and σ
b2 [t − 1], the
sum of squared error for real-value authentication of (3.65) with parameters b
α∗ [t] is smaller
than that parameters b
α[t − 1].
Then, given parameters b
α∗ [t], by setting PMD = δ in optimization problem (3.59), the
nonlinear parameters b
µn [t] and b
σ2n [t] can be updated via (3.61) and (3.62). Then it can be
observed from Algorithm 2 as well as equations (3.61) and (3.62) that if the step size  small
enough, the following inequation satisfies
PFA (b
µ[t − 1], b
σ2n [t − 1]) > PFA (b
µ[t], b
σ2n [t]).
Therefore, the results of Theorem 3.5 are proved.

(3.68)


Remark 3.12. Theorem 3.5 shows that Algorithm 2 achieves a reliable authentication performance in the time-varying environment. The reason is that the fuzzy learning-based physical
layer authentication scheme promptly adjusts the authentication system to adapt the dynamic
environment, so that a compelling false alarm rate vs. misdetection rate trade-off is achieved.
Remark 3.13. The proposed hybrid learning algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 2) combines the gradient descent and least-square estimator to update the system parameters for multi-dimensional
adaptive authentication. On one hand, the false alarm rate PFA is continuous, and satisfies Lipschitz condition with constant J > 0 in an arbitrary bounded subset of real numbers. Hence,
if gradient descent is ran for k iterations with a fixed step size  ≤ 1/J, gradient descent is
guaranteed to converge with convergence rate O(1/k). On the other hand, given the matrix U
and closed-form of solution (3.67), the complexity of least-square estimator is O(N 2 L).

3.4.4

Simulation Results

In order to show the performance of the proposed fuzzy learning-based scheme, case study and
simulation results are provided in this section. Firstly, the proposed scheme is validated in a
simulated urban scenario by utilizing carrier frequency offset (CFO), channel impulse response
(CIR), received signal strength indicator (RSSI), and in-phase and quadrature imbalance (IQI).
The parameter design and convergence performance of Algorithm 2 are demonstrated. Then,
the fuzzy learning-based scheme is validated in a simulated indoor office scenario to show
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its performance. The comparison results between the fuzzy learning-based scheme and some
existing schemes are presented, i.e., the optimal weights-based scheme and neural networkbased scheme, demonstrating the superior permanence of the fuzzy learning-based scheme.
Urban scenario for simulation of our scheme
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Figure 3.11: An urban scenario in the simulation.

Table 3.2: Simulation parameters of Chapter 3
Variable
Initial position of Alice
Initial position of Eve
Antenna number of Bob
Velocity of Alice
Center frequency fc
Range

Value
[400; 600] m
[600; 400] m
8
[8; -9] m/s
5 GHz
1000 m × 1000 m

Variable
Position of Bob
Antenna number of Alice/Eve
Antenna height
Velocity of Eve
Sampling rate
SNR

Value
[900; 900] m
4
1m
[-6.72; 2.26] m/s
20 MHz
20 dB

In this subsection, the proposed scheme is studied in an urban scenario, where its system
topology is given in Figure 3.11. The locations of Alice, Bob and Eve, as well as the velocities
of both Alice and Eve (denoted as vA and vE , respectively) are shown in this figure. The
simulation parameters in this case study are given in Table 3.2. Specifically, the multipath
channel model in this urban scenario is formulated as
HIR (τ; t) =

K
X
κ=1

Aκ (t)δ(τ − κ∆τ),

(3.69)
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where K is the number of multipath propagation paths, κ∆τ and Aκ represent the delay and
complex amplitude of κ-th multipath component, respectively. Moreover, according to [118],
the path loss model is given as
PL = 22.7 log10 (d[m]) + 41 + 20 log10 (

fc [GHz]
),
5

(3.70)

where d is the distance between the transceiver.
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Figure 3.12: Variation measurements of CFO, CIR, RSSI, and IQI of Alice and Eve for simulation.
Given simulation parameters in Table 3.2, observations of CIR, CFO, RSSI, and IQI of both
Alice and Eve can be obtained, where their variation measurements are shown in Figure 3.12.
In the proposed scheme, 12 system parameters should be determined, namely for weights b
αn ,
means b
µn and widths b
σ2n , n = 1, 2, 3, 4 corresponding to CIR, CFO, RSSI, and IQI, respectively.
Figure 3.13 characterizes the parameter design and update of the fuzzy learning-based scheme
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by Algorithm 2 with respect to weights b
αn , means b
µn and widths b
σ2n , n = 1, 2, 3, 4. The parameters are updated for each observation, and only 1 iteration is needed in the least square learning
process. In this figure, 10 observations are used for training at the beginning of parameter
design and authentication. It is shown in Figure 3.13 that with the increasing authentication
time, the parameters are updated according to the variations of physical layer attributes. More
importantly, Figure 3.13 demonstrates the compact characteristic of the proposed scheme in
dealing with the dynamics of physical layer attributes due to only 10 observations used for
learning and 12 system parameters to be determined in the case of utilizing 4 attributes. Figure
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Figure 3.13: Parameter design and update by Algorithm 2.
3.14 characteristics the convergence of the proposed hybrid learning algorithm for 11-th observation, which is the convergence performance of the developed gradient descent for nonlinear
parameter update in Algorithm 2. It is observed from Figure 3.14 that only about 50 iterations
are needed for identifying a new attribute estimate of the transmitter with the learned system
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parameters (based on 10 observations).
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Figure 3.14: Convergence performance of Algorithm 2 for 11-th observation in Figure 3.13.
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Figure 3.15: False alarm rate of the fuzzy learning-based scheme by different numbers of
attributes.
Considering the utilization of different numbers of physical layer attributes, the authentication performance of the proposed scheme is characterized in Figure 3.15. Its system parameters
of the proposed scheme in different cases, i.e., CIR & CFO, CIR & CFO & RSSI, and CIR & CFO & RSSI & IQI, are updated similarly as Figure 3.13. One can observe from Figure 3.15 that
a larger number of attributes used leads to a more obvious improvement in authentication per-
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formance of the fuzzy learning-based scheme. The reason for this trend is that it is extremely
unlikely for an adversary to predict or imitate all the attributes from the received signals. Moreover, reliable and robust authentication can be achieved by utilizing multiple attributes because
of their different contributions on authentication and more information considered for identifying the transmitter. Therefore, utilization of multiple attributes for authentication schemes is
extremely helpful to provide high uncertainty for the adversaries as well as high-dimensional
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Figure 3.16: Robust performance of the fuzzy learning-based scheme.
Figure 3.16 characterizes the robust performance of the fuzzy learning-based scheme. Explicitly, 10 attribute observations are used for learning at the beginning of authentication. The
adaptive authentication process is performed relying on four attributes, i.e., CIR & CFO &
RSSI & IQI, during 11-100th authentication time instant. Then, the IQI is unavailable at the
receiver from 101-th observation. It is observed from Figure 3.16 that once some of the adopted
attributes are unavailable, the remaining attributes still contribute to the authentication model
and make the model work, demonstrating the robustness of the fuzzy learning-based scheme
in the complex time-varying environment.
Figure 3.17 characterizes the comparison results of the fuzzy learning-based (FL) scheme
and the optimal weight-based (OW) scheme [114] in different cases, namely for CIR & CFO &
RSSI & IQI and CIR & CFO & RSSI. It is observed from Figure 3.17 that with the increasing
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Figure 3.17: Comparison results of the fuzzy learning-based scheme and the optimal weightbased scheme of [114].
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Figure 3.18: Comparison results of the fuzzy learning-based scheme and the neural networkbased scheme of [119].
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authentication time, the false alarm rate values of the fuzzy learning-based scheme in both cases
keep stable, while that of the optimal weights-based scheme dramatically increase. The reason
for this trend is that the optimal weights-based scheme is a static scheme and cannot update the
system parameters according to the variations of physical layer attributes, thus cannot adapt to
the dynamic environment. This also supports the results of Theorem 3.5. These all indicate that
the proposed scheme performs better than the weights-based authentication scheme of [114].
As a conclusion, the results of Figure 3.15-3.17 characterize the benefits of the fuzzy learningbased scheme based on both multiple physical layer attributes and adaptive scheme.
Figure 3.18 characterizes the comparison results of the fuzzy learning-based (FL) scheme
and a three-layer neural network-based (NN) scheme having 10 neurons for each layer [119].
It is observed from Figure 3.18 that the proposed scheme performs much better than the neural
network-based scheme. Furthermore, the neural network-based scheme requires observations
of the Spoofer for training, which limits its application in practical networks. Specifically, the
fuzzy learning-based scheme straightforwardly utilizes the physical properties of the attributes
in the fuzzy learning-based authentication process (see Figure 3.9), while the neural network
cannot provide such information in the training process analytically and explicitly.

3.5

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a kernel learning-based physical layer authentication scheme was proposed for
combining the multiple physical layer attributes and for modelling the authentication as a linear system. Through the kernel machine-based multiple attribute fusion model, the number of
dimensions of the search-space was reduced from N to 1, and the learning objective was formulated as a convex problem. Therefore, its complexity was substantially reduced. Then, by
conceiving an adaptive authentication process relying on the kernel machine-based multiple attribute fusion model, the process advocated readily accommodated a time-varying environment
by discovering and learning this complex dynamic environment. Both the convergence performance and the authentication performance of the proposed intelligent authentication process
were theoretically analyzed and numerically validated. The simulation results showed that the
authentication performance can be dramatically improved by increasing the number of physi-
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cal layer attributes exploited by the proposed intelligent authentication process. Moreover, the
proposed scheme has a much better authentication performance in a time-varying environment
than its non-adaptive counterpart.
Then, a fuzzy learning-based physical layer authentication scheme was developed to improve the authentication performance from a robust and compact perspective. A fuzzy model
was designed to combine the multiple physical layer attributes, which can efficiently mitigate
the imperfectness of estimated attributes. By proposing an adaptive hybrid learning algorithm,
i.e., the combination of least-square estimator and gradient method, the system parameters can
be updated in real-time to adapt to the time-varying environment. Both the convergence performance and authentication performance of the proposed multi-dimensional adaptive authentication scheme were theoretically analyzed and validated in different simulation scenarios. It
was demonstrated that the proposed scheme has much better authentication performance than
some exiting schemes, such as the optimal weights-based scheme and neural network-based
scheme.
In next chapter, the trust management will be explored for mitigating the risks of misdetection of authentication utilizing physical layer attributes. To be more specific, an adaptive trust
management-based scheme will be proposed to achieve soft authentication and progressive
authorization. The trust relationship between the transmitter and receiver will be established
by validating the physical layer attributes. Moreover, the trust management will provide an
efficient metric and method for multiple-level access control.

Chapter 4
Adaptive Trust Management for Soft and
Progressive Security
Conventional authentication mechanisms routinely used for validating communication devices
are facing significant challenges. This is mainly due to their reliance on both ‘spoofable’
digital credentials and static binary characteristic, and inevitable misdetection in physical layer authentication using time-varying attributes, leading to the cascading risks of security and
trust. To circumvent these impediments and further reduce the effects of inevitable wrong decision of physical layer authentication, an adaptive trust management-based soft authentication
and progressive authorization scheme is proposed in this chapter by intelligently exploiting the
time-varying communication link-related attribute of the transmitter to improve wireless security. First of all, the trust relationship between the transmitter and receiver is established based
on the evaluation of selected physical layer attribute for fast authentication and multiple-level
authorization. Through the designed trust model, the transmitter is authorized by the specific level of services/resources corresponding to its trust level, so that soft security is achieved.
To dynamically update the trust level of the transmitter, an online conformal prediction-based
adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed relying on the real-time validation of its attribute estimates at the receiver, thus resulting in progressive authorization. The performance
of the proposed scheme is theoretically analyzed in terms of its individual risk and individual
satisfaction. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme significantly improves
the security performance and robustness in time-varying environments, and performs better
80
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than the static binary authentication scheme and existing physical layer authentication benchmarker.

4.1

Introduction

Due to the broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, owing to the intermittent nature of
communications and the complex dynamic network environments encountered, wireless communications are vulnerable to spoofing attacks [4, 2, 79]. A spoofer may intercept the transmissions between legitimate devices and imitate them to obtain illegal benefits from networks/
systems, while counterfeiting authorized identities for fraud or other malicious purposes.
Although key-based cryptographic techniques [22, 23, 120, 121] have been widely used for
authentication, they face increasing challenges in securing wireless communications. Differentiating devices with the aid of digital credentials cannot be readily achieved when the diverse
attributes of communication devices are disregarded, thus leading to a high risk of undetected
spoofing attacks [25]. Furthermore, the conventional key-based cryptographic techniques are
static in time and binary in nature, where the devices either pass the security check or fail by a
one-time authentication. These security schemes cannot help in detecting/preventing spoofers after the initial authentication has been completed. Although repeated authentication may
theoretically be achieved with the aid of key-based cryptographic techniques by repeatedly
logging into the server/system, the excessive latencies and computational overhead are particularly undesirable for delay-sensitive communications as well as for devices having limited
battery lifetime and computational capability, such as the IoT devices [4, 2, 79].
Physical layer security techniques [25, 30, 37, 43, 48, 122, 123, 124] provide alternative
authentication methods relying on the uniquely random link-related attributes, as exemplified
by the channel impulse response (CIR) [2], carrier frequency offset (CFO) [37], and received
signal strength (RSS) [25], just to name a few, which are difficult for malicious devices to impersonate and predict. Although they have obvious advantages including the low computational
requirement, low network overhead and modest energy consumption, most of the physical layer
authentication schemes based on the classic hypothesis test are also static in the time-domain,
as exemplified by [43, 37, 30, 48]. Hence, they tend to be unsuitable for providing continuous
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identification. A kernel learning-based physical layer authentication scheme is proposed in [2]
and Chapter 3 through tracking multiple time-varying attributes to provide lasting protection
for legitimate links. However, the above schemes constitute binary admit/reject solutions as
well as rely on separate authentication and authorization, hence resulting in latent loopholes
for spoofing attacks because of the potential misdetection events in the physical layer authentication. Once an adversary passed the authentication by spoofing a legitimate device, the
corresponding information/services/resources in the system will be leaked to this adversary.
Furthermore, these binary-type solutions fail to provide differentiated levels of access control.
To overcome these challenges, the concept of soft authentication and progressive authorization is extremely beneficial for holistic system optimization in dynamic communication
environments. The soft security solution provides a fast authentication and multiple-level authorization, while the progressive approach achieves continuous identification to enhance the
security by multiple-step validation of the physical layer attribute observations. Through such
a scheme, the threats and uncertainties caused by adversaries as well as the cascading risks in
security and trust can be evaluated and controlled in real-time. In achieving this, the decisionmaking in a high layer is also required for modeling the soft authentication and progressive
authorization as well as for security enhancement.
Trust management processes symbolic representations of the trustworthiness in support of
a decision-making process, which has been widely studied in dealing with security problems in the literature [9, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132]. However, conventional trust
management approaches are usually used for modeling the trust relationships among authenticated users/devices for supporting cooperations in wireless networks. This chapter focuses on
proposing an adaptive trust management approach by evaluating the attribute estimation of the
transmitter to establish the trust relationship between transceiver for authentication and to provide metric for authorization. Through exploring the adaptive trust management, this radical
solution provides fast authentication and dynamic multiple-level authorization, thus resulting
in soft and progressive security. More importantly, the trust management-based scheme moves
further away from the classical mechanisms, since it quests a holistic system design of unified
authentication and authorization based on the continuous evaluation of time-varying physical
layer attribute, which requires new wireless radio technologies. Hence, the machine learning
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techniques [4, 2] are studied in this chapter for adaptive trust management through classifying
the time-varying attribute estimates of the transmitter.
In the unsupervised machine learning techniques of [133, 134, 135, 136], an assumption is
usually made for the classification between normal and abnormal events that normal events are
those that occur frequently and anomalous events occur rarely. This leads to a high false alarm
rate in physical layer authentication, since those rare attribute observations may be deemed to
be from the Spoofer. Therefore, the family of supervised learning techniques is invoked for
the classification of the time-varying physical layer attribute estimates, which may be from
legitimate devices and (or) adversaries. However, most of the existing supervised machine
learning techniques have a limited capability to update the trustworthiness of an authenticating
transmitter because of the lack of information on how close their predictions are to the real
observations. Hence, the conformal prediction technique of [137, 138, 139] is explored in this
chapter, where a valid measurement of each individual prediction is provided along with a
confidence value based on the learning algorithms. More importantly, by invoking the online
machine learning technique of [140, 141], the associated real-time classification results can be
used for adaptive trust management, thus improving the security performance in time-varying
communication scenarios.
In a nutshell, the proposed online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust management
approach provides differentiated levels of continuous protection for legitimate communications. Such approach evaluates the trustworthiness of an authenticating transmitter using its
physical layer attribute dynamically, thereafter the corresponding level of services/resources is
authorized to the transmitter according to its trust level. Furthermore, it integrates authentication and authorization for achieving seamless and holistic system optimization, thus leaving
fewer loopholes open for spoofing attacks.
Specifically, the contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• To achieve the soft security, a trust model is designed for evaluating the trustworthiness
of an authenticating transmitter relying on physical layer attribute without requiring its
statistical properties. This model achieves fast authentication and provides a metric for
multiple-level authorization to deal with the threats caused by adversaries and to control
the risks of being attacked;
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• An online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed
for real-time validation of transmitter and for dynamically updating the trust model developed. Therefore, the proposed scheme becomes capable of adapting to time-varying
environments for security enhancement;
• Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme describes a soft access control and continuous procedure of authentication, thereby providing reliable adaptive protection for legitimate communication links. The superiority of the proposed scheme is
demonstrated over the static binary authentication scheme and an exiting physical layer
authentication scheme.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, the system model used

in this chapter is presented. In Section 4.3, the online conformal prediction-based adaptive
trust management scheme is proposed for achieving soft authentication and progressive authorization using physical layer attribute. The security performance analysis of the proposed
scheme is also presented in Section 4.3, while the simulation results are discussed in Section
Table 4.1: Notations of Chapter 4
Notations
HA
HO
F
N
Rind
S ind
Ψ0
Ψ1
Γ
y
Z
Y

1−
e
A
α
p
L

Definitions
Attribute estimate collected from Alice.
Attribute estimate collected from Alice or the Spoofer.
Trust value of relationship {Bob : T ransmitter, Alice}.
Number of authorization levels.
Individual risk of the proposed scheme.
Individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme.
Scenario that the transmitter is the Spoofer.
Scenario that the transmitter is Alice.
Conformal predictor.
Label of an attribute estimate.
Set of training samples in conformal predictor.
Predicted set of conformal predictor.
Significance level of conformal predictor.
Confidence level on the predicted set Y.
Error made by the conformal predictor.
Nonconformity measure function.
Nonconformity score.
p-value of the conformal predictor.
Number of training samples.
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4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
Notations: In this chapter, scalars are denoted by italic letters, while vectors are respectively
denoted by bold-face letters. Table 4.1 shows the notations of this chapter.

4.2

System Model and Problem Formulation
Legitimate Signal
Spoofing Signal

F[t]
H1

H2

H3

H4

...

vN Misdetection

Progressive
authorization
of Alice

...

Alice

Attribute
estimates

Bob

Progressive
authorization
of Spoofer

v2
v1
Spoofer

Soft
authentication 1

2

3

4

t

Figure 4.1: Soft authentication and progressive authorization system between Alice and Bob
using a physical layer attribute continuously.
As shown in Figure 4.1, the attack model in a time-varying environment is characterized,
where Alice and Bob represent a pair of legitimate devices and aim for communicating in the
presence of a Spoofer, who tries to impersonate Alice and hence to access the system. More
explicitly, the Spoofer not only tries to intercept Alice’s transmission, but also to imitate her for
obtaining illegal benefits from Bob. The Spoofer also tries to counterfeit authorized identities
for fraud or other malicious purposes. The aggregated spoofing channel (i.e., the physical
channel spanning from the Spoofer to Bob, as well as the hardware and analog components
involved) is assumed to be independent of the main channel between Alice and Bob. Therefore,
it is hard for the Spoofer to predict and clone Alice’s physical layer attributes, such as her CIR,
CFO, and RSS. In this chapter, only one physical layer attribute is utilized for authentication
and authorization.
At the beginning of communication between Alice and Bob, existing security schemes have
been used to establish initial authentication between them explicitly. Indeed, it is reasonable to
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expect that the devices have to be registered before joining the communication system, which
is a basic prerequisite of physical layer authentication schemes [43, 37, 30, 48]. L estimates
of the selected physical layer attribute of Alice can be obtained during the established initial
authentication phase, which are denoted as
HA1 , HA2 , ..., HAL ,

(4.1)

where each HAl represents an attribute estimate collected from Alice, l ∈ {1, 2, ..., L} is an estimation time index, and L is the number of estimates during the established initial authentication
phase. The major objective of physical layer authentication is to verify that the information
received is from a legitimate device (i.e., Alice) by exploiting the difference between the estimates HA1 , HA2 , ..., HAL and new estimates of the selected attribute arriving from the transmitter
(i.e., Alice or the Spoofer) during the subsequent communication stages. The new attribute estimates are denoted as HOt , explicitly showing the time instants of physical layer authentication
t = 1, 2, 3, .... Due to the dynamic nature of the environment encountered, the attribute estimates HOt are likely to be time-varying. Explicitly, the new attribute estimates HOt may have
arrived from Alice or the Spoofer, and the validation of these estimates has to identify whether
they are from Alice or the Spoofer. Moreover, the physical layer authentication starts at time
instant t = 1 by identifying the estimate HO1 , which is arranged to be the (L + 1)-st attribute
estimate, because L estimates of Alice have been collected during the initial authentication
phase. Then, the physical layer authentication at time instant t = 1 is formulated as
∆HO1 = f (HA1 , HA2 , ..., HAL , HO1 ),

(4.2)

where f (·) represents a function that quantifies the difference between the estimates HA1 , HA2 ,
..., HAL and HO1 . The nonconformity measure of [143] will be applied in the proposed scheme
for characterizing this difference. If the difference ∆HOt is small enough, the signal is deemed
to be coming from Alice, otherwise, from the Spoofer. It is assumed that the attribute estimation noises of Alice and the Spoofer are independent and identically distributed, which may
caused by the measurement errors, channel noises, interferences in the wireless communication
environment, and so on.
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In order to achieve security enhancement, this chapter focuses on proposing a novel adaptive trust management approach for achieving soft authentication and progressive authorization
in dynamic communication environments. To be more specific, the proposed soft security solution provides prompt authentication and multiple-level authorization, while the progressive
approach enhances the security by multiple-step validation of the time-varying physical layer
attribute considered. The varying threats and uncertainties caused by the Spoofer and the cascading risks in security can be evaluated and controlled in real-time by the proposed scheme.
Furthermore, various levels of protection can be provided for legitimate communications.
The trust relationship between the transmitter (i.e., Alice or the Spoofer) and Bob is characterized for the sake of evaluating the trustworthiness of the transmitter as follows:
Definition 4.1: The trust level of the relationship {Bob : T ransmitter, Alice} at time t is defined as the probability that the transmitter is deemed to be Alice in Bob’s point of view by
identifying the selected physical layer attribute, which is represented as
F [t] = Pr{Bob : T ransmitter, Alice} ∈ [0, 1].

(4.3)

It can be observed from Definition 4.1 that Bob has full trust in the transmitter when F [t] = 1,
and Bob totally distrusts the transmitter if F [t] = 0. Then the new concept of multiple-level
authorization is developed, where N classes of security services/resources are defined, denoted
as {Φ0 , Φ1 , ..., ΦN−1 }. The multiple-level authorization classes satisfy Φ0 ⊂ Φ1 ⊂ ... ⊂ ΦN−1 ,
where ΦN−1 represents the highest level of authorization, while Φ1 is the lowest one. Moreover,
Φ0 represents failed authentication and access denial for Bob. The proposed soft authentication
and progressive authorization scheme can be formulated as





Φ0 :










Φ1 :














ΦN−1 :

F [t] ∈ [ν0 , ν1 ]
F [t] ∈ (ν1 , ν2 ]
..
.

,

F [t] ∈ (νN−1 , νN ]

where the thresholds satisfy 0 = ν0 < ν1 < ν2 < · · · < νN−1 < νN = 1.

(4.4)
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As shown in Figure 4.1, upon assuming the estimation range of the selected physical layer

attribute as [−a, a], the soft authentication and progressive authorization process is designed
based on the trust level F [t] by evaluating the estimates of the selected attribute HOt as follows:
Soft authentication: The initial trust level of the relationship {Bob : T ransmitter, Alice} is
set relying on the physical layer attribute estimate HO1 at time instant t = 1 according to the
authentication of (4.2) as
F [1] = 1 − ∆HO1 .

(4.5)

If the initial trust level satisfies F [1] ∈ (νn , νn+1 ], the transmitter is allowed to access the services/resources associated with n-th level of authorization, namely at Φn , n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N −1}. In
contrast to the conventional hypothesis testing-based authentication schemes [43, 37, 30, 48],
the proposed soft authentication solution does not require any knowledge of the statical properties of the attribute selected and neither does it require the derivation of optimal thresholds
for hypothesis testing. These simplifications lead to prompt authentication via (4.4), but the
lack of having an optimal threshold may lead to an increased misdetection rate during the soft
authentication of (4.5). Fortunately, both the multiple-level authorization and following progressive authorization designed for the proposed scheme are capable of enhancing the security
by authorizing the corresponding class of security services and resources according to the trust
level F as well as through the multiple-step validation of the physical layer attribute selected.
Progressive authorization: Given estimates of the selected physical layer attribute HOt ∈
[−a, a] at time instants t = 2, 3, 4, ..., the trust level F should be updated to control the individual risk and individual satisfaction, which is formulated as
F (HOt , F [t − 1]) : [−a, a] × [0, 1] → [0, 1],

(4.6)

where the individual risk and individual satisfaction are given in Definitions 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. The proposed progressive solution provides security enhancement by validating the
transmitter continuously for ensuring that the security risks caused by inevitable misdetection
during the soft authentication can be evaluated by the proposed trust management approach as
well as carefully controlled by the judicious adjustment of the authorization level via (4.4).
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Upon denoting the scenarios when the signal is from the Spoofer and from Alice by Ψ0
and Ψ1 , respectively, the individual risk and individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme is
defined as:
Definition 4.2: The individual risk level of the proposed soft authentication and progressive
authorization scheme at time t is formulated as
Rind [t] =

N−1
X

rn · Pr(F [t] ∈ (νn , νn+1 ] | Ψ0 ),

(4.7)

n=1

where rn is Bob’s degree of loss or damage, if the system assigns the authorization level Φn to
the Spoofer.
Definition 4.3: The individual satisfaction level of the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme at time t is given by
S ind [t] =

N−1
X

sn · Pr(F [t] ∈ (νn , νn+1 ] | Ψ1 ),

(4.8)

n=1

where sn denotes Alice’s degree of satisfaction at the authorization level Φn .
According to Definitions 4.2 and 4.3, the individual risk quantifies the potential loss of Bob
if the Spoofer is granted authentication, while the individual satisfaction level quantifies the
utility of services/resources granted to Alice by Bob. Note that PMD = Rind and PFA = 1 − S ind
satisfy in the conventional binary authentication associated with N = 2 and r1 = s1 = 1, where
PMD and PFA represent the misdetection rate and false alarm rate, respectively. Furthermore, it
is observed from (4.7) and (4.8) that there is a trade-off between the individual risk and individual satisfaction level associated with the thresholds ν1 , ν2 , ..., νN−1 . If the thresholds are set
too low, Bob will suffer from a higher individual risk, because the Spoofer may more easily
succeed in imitating Alice and accessing a higher authorization level, but Alice will access
more valuable services/resources to achieve a higher level of individual satisfaction. By contrast, if they are set too high, the proposed scheme may suffer from a low individual satisfaction
level because of the lower authorization level Alice has, although Bob will experience a lower risk level. In the specific communication scenarios requiring high-security protection, the
thresholds of the proposed scheme can be increased for reducing the risk caused by the Spoofer
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during the soft authentication stage.
Remark 4.1. The designed trust model provides an efficient metric for multiple-level authorization and for coping with the uncertainty and uncontrollability caused by the Spoofer. In
contrast to the conventional physical layer authentication schemes [43, 37, 30], which minimize the misdetection rate while guaranteeing the false alarm rate, the proposes scheme focuses on enhancing security by updating the trust level F [t] based on the validation of the attribute
estimates HOt continuously. Hence, an adaptive trust adjustment algorithm will be proposed to
achieve soft authentication and progressive authentication in next section.

4.3

Proposed Adaptive Trust Management Scheme

In order to adaptively update the trust level F for soft authentication and progressive authorization, the online conformal prediction technique is explored for classifying the new collected
estimates of the physical layer attribute used, i.e., HOt , t = 1, 2, 3, ..., which are time-varying
and imperfectly estimated. Through developing an adaptive trust adjustment algorithm based
on the confidence of prediction results, security enhancement can be achieved by multiplestep validation of the selected attribute and by appropriately adjusting authorization level in
real-time.

4.3.1

Conformal Predictor for Classification of Attribute Estimates

To classify the new attribute estimates, the conformal prediction technique is explored in this
subsection, which is a method conceived for providing valid measures of confidence for individual predictions by machine learning algorithms [142]. One of the main advantages of a
conformal predictor is that it can guarantee that the probability of making erroneous predictions
is the same as a pre-defined significance level (apart from some statistical fluctuations) [138].
The initial training set is denoted as {z1 , z2 , ..., zL } = {(HA1 , 1), (HA2 , 1), ..., (HAL , 1)}. In general,
each training sample zl contains an attribute estimate in the set [−a, a] and a label of yl ∈ {0, 1}.
The label ‘0’ indicates that the attribute estimate is from the Spoofer, while label ‘1’ indicates
that it is from Alice. The set of training inputs is denoted by Z = [−a, a] × {0, 1}.
Given a new sample having the observed attribute HO1 and a defined significance level of
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 ∈ [0, 1], a conformal predictor outputs a predicted set of YL+1
⊆ {0, 1} for the unknown label

yL+1 . Note that HO1 is arranged to be L + 1-th attribute estimate because of the L estimates of
Alice collected during the initial authentication phase. The complementary value of (1 − ) is
1
2
called confidence level. It will always consider nested prediction sets YL+1
⊆ YL+1
when 1 ≥ 2 .

The conformal predictor is formulated as a measurable function
Γ : Z∗ × [−a, a] × [0, 1] → {∅, {0}, {1}, {0, 1}}
z1 , z2 , ..., zL , HO1 , 


→ YL+1
,

(4.9)

where (z1 , z2 , ..., zL ) ∈ Z∗ .
The predicted set is valid at the specified significance level  in the sense that the probability
of an error satisfies

Pr(yL+1 < YL+1
) ≤ ,

(4.10)

under the randomness assumption [142]. That is to say, it has more than (1 − ) confidence in

the predicted set YL+1
. For example, in the case of  = 0.1, the probability that a prediction set

includes the true label is at least 90%. Whether Γ makes an error on the L + 1-th trial can be
represented by 1 and by 0 in case of no error as

eL+1








1, if yL+1 < YL+1
=




0, otherwise

.

(4.11)

The basic idea of conformal prediction is to estimate the p-value for y ∈ {0, 1}, denoted
as py , and to exclude those labels from the predicted set, which satisfy py < . This p-value
indicates how different a sample is from a set of training samples, and the higher the p-value,
the better this sample fits the group of other samples. In order to obtain the p-value, the
nonconformity measure of [143] is applied for estimate HO1 as
AL+1 : Z∗ × Z → <.

(4.12)
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Then the nonconformity score, which measures how different a sample zl is from other samples
in the set {z1 , z2 , ..., zL , zL+1 } [143], can be defined as
αl : AL+1 ({z1 , z2 , ..., zl−1 , zl+1 , ..., zL , zL+1 }, zl )

(4.13)

for each sample zl in {z1 , z2 , ..., zL , zL+1 }. It can be observed from (4.13) that zL+1 depends on
an unknown yL+1 , so that the nonconformity score αl relies on a variable y ∈ {0, 1}, which
is a possible label for the new observation of the selected physical layer attribute HO1 . The
nonconformity scores are based on the output of a classical underlying predictor, as exemplified
by the ridge regression technique of [144], the k-nearest neighbours method of [145] and the
autoregressive moving average solution of [146].
Then the p-value of zL+1 with different y in set {0, 1} can be estimated as the ratio of the
nonconformity scores α1 , α2 , ..., αL that are at least as large as αL+1 , which is given as
py,L+1 =

| {l = 1, 2, ...., L : αl ≥ αL+1 } |
,
L

(4.14)

where | · | represents the number of samples in the set {z1 , z2 , ..., zL } satisfying αl ≥ αL+1 [142].
The predicted set is formed by estimating the p-value for each sample having a nonconformity
score, and by adding those samples associated with p-value≥ , which is formulated as

= {y : y ∈ {0, 1}, py,L+1 ≥ }.
YL+1

(4.15)

Remark 4.2. Given the conformal predictor developed, the estimates of the selected physical
layer attribute can be classified. Then the trust level F [t] can be adaptively adjusted depending on the classification results and the confidence level (1 − ) in real-time for progressive
authorization, which will be explored in next subsection.

4.3.2

Adaptive Trust Adjustment based on Online Machine Learning

In order to dynamically update the trust level F based on the validation results of estimates
HOt , t = 1, 2, 3, ... in this subsection, an online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm is proposed. In online learning, the samples zL+t = (HOt , yL+t ), t = 1, 2, 3, ...,
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are presented one by one. The attribute estimate HOt is observed and its label yL+t is predicted
for each time, and then it moves on to the next attribute estimate. After obtaining the label of
each physical layer attribute estimate, the training set {z1 , z2 , ..., zL } is updated by incorporating
it and its label, as well as by removing the decorrelated historical training estimates. This is
because the physical layer attribute used may become gradually uncorrelated after a period of
time. Hence, the training set is also time-varying for maintaining its capability of adapting
to the dynamic environment. Note that the attribute estimate at time instant t, namely HOt , is
arranged to represent the (L + t)-th trial in the online conformal predictor due to having L initial
training samples used at the beginning of physical layer authentication.
This algorithm focuses on validating the collected attribute estimates of the transmitter,
i.e., HOt , t = 1, 2, 3, ..., thereby to dynamically update the trust level F relying on the real-time
classification results of HOt , so that progressive authentication associated with multiple-level
authorization can be achieved. To be more specific, according to Definition 4.1, if Bob observes
that the attribute estimate HOt is classified to be from Alice, the trust level F will be increased,
otherwise, it will be decreased. In this way, the designed trust model becomes robust even if
an inaccurate classification occurs during the learning process. At the same time, the risk of a
misdetection taking place during the soft authentication stage can be controlled by authorizing
the corresponding class of security services/resources according to the trust level F [t] and by
multiple-step validation.
According to the results in [142], the confidence predictor Γ is exactly valid if for each ,
e1 , e2 , ... is a sequence of independent Bernoulli-distributed random variables. Unfortunately,
the notion of exact validity is vacuous for confidence predictors, since no-confidence predictor
is exactly valid [142]. A modification of conformal predictors is developed in [143], named
smooth conformal predictor Γsm , by redefining p-value as
psm
y,L+t =

| {l : αl > αL+t } | +η | {l : αl = αL+t } |
,
L+t−1

(4.16)

where l ranges over {1, 2, ..., L+t−1} and η is generated randomly from the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. Then, the following Lemma can be obtained:
Lemma 4.1 [143]: Given any significance level , the output of the smooth conformal predictor
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Γsm satisfies
lim ℘t = 1 − ,

t→∞

(4.17)

where ℘t is denoted as the prediction accuracy of the proposed online conformal predictor at
time instant t. It is formulated as
| {i = 1, 2, ...., t − 1 : ei = 0} |
℘t =
.
t−1

(4.18)

Based on the above analysis, the validation result of the online conformal predictor at time
instant t associated with dynamically updating the trust level F is designed as




−(1 − ),







θt = 
1 − ,








0,


if YL+t
= {0}

if YL+t
= {1} .

(4.19)

otherwise


In this equation, (1 − ) represents the confidence in the prediction set YL+t
= {1}, namely that

the attribute estimate collected is from Alice at time instant t. By contrast, −(1 − ) quantizes

the opposite of the confidence in the prediction set YL+t
= {0}, namely that the collected at-

tribute estimate is deemed to be from the Spoofer at time instant t. The validation result for


updating the trust level F [t] is set as θt = 0 in the cases of YL+t
= {0, 1} and YL+t
= ∅, since

the prediction results are invalid for authentication and authorization. It is plausible that if


YL+t
= {0, 1} or YL+t
= ∅, it shifts to other confidence levels, especially to specific confidence

levels  for which YL+t
is a singleton. Although the empirical error rate of the online confor-

mal predictor approaches  in the wireless communication scenarios, the validation result in
(4.19) is set according to the confidence concerning the prediction results. This is because the
proposed scheme requires multiple-step validation of the transmitter, thus resulting in a robust
performance as a benefit of the progressive authorization process.
Then the trust level F at time instant t can be obtained by Definition 4.1 and (4.6), which
is updated as
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P
ρF [t − 1] + θt ρt−1 F [1] + ti=2 ρt−i (ρ + 1)i−2 θi
F [t] =
=
,
ρ+1
(ρ + 1)t−1
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where ρ ∈ (0, 1] is the forgetting factor. Note that the forgetting factor should be chosen
according to the specific application scenario. Upon using this forgetting factor in the trust
management, the closer validation results will have a higher influence on the trust level F . It is
observed from (4.20) that (1−) ∈ [0, 1], −(1−) ∈ [−1, 0], F [1] ∈ [0, 1], and F [t −1] ∈ [0, 1].
Upon setting F [t] ≤ 0 to 0, F [t] ∈ [0, 1] satisfies. In summary, the developed adaptive trust
adjustment procedure conceived for soft authentication and progressive authorization is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Online conformal prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment
Given initial training set {z1 , z2 , ..., zL } and significance level ;
1. Soft authentication:
1.1 obtain the initial trust level F [1] via (4.5);
1.2 if F [1] ∈ (νn , νn+1 ], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}
1.3
authorize this transmitter with Φn and go to Step 2;
1.4 else
1.5
authenticate this transmitter as the Spoofer and go to Step 3;
1.6 end if
2. Progressive authorization:
2.1 update training set by {z1 , z2 , ..., zL } + (HO1 , yL+1 ) − z1 ;
2.2 for authentication time instants t = 2, 3, 4, ...
2.3
collect new physical layer attribute estimate HOt ;

2.4
obtain value psm
y,L+t and predicted set YL+t via (4.16) and (4.15), respectively;
2.5
obtain validation result θt via (4.19), and then update trust level F [t] via (4.20);
2.6
if F [t] ∈ (νn , νn+1 ], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N − 1}
2.7
authorize this transmitter with Φn ;
2.8
else
2.9
terminate the communication with this transmitter and go to Step 3;
2.10 end if
2.11 update training set as {zt , zt+1 , ..., zL+t−1 } + (HOt , yL+t ) − zt ;
2.12 end for
3. END
Remark 4.3. In Algorithm 3, Bob authenticates the transmitter (Alice or the Spoofer) through
an adaptive process based on the classification of the physical layer attribute estimates. Once
the transmitter is believed to be the Spoofer, i.e., its trust level F is lower than ν1 , the commu-
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nication session will be terminated by Bob, otherwise, the proposed scheme will be operated
until the end of their communications. This algorithm describes a soft authentication and progressive authorization process, which supports prompt connection and enhanced security for
legitimate devices.

4.3.3

Security Performance Analysis

According to Algorithm 3 and the proposed scheme, the following theorems can be formulated:
Theorem 4.1: In the case of ν1 ≥ (ρ+ −1)/(ρ+1) and sn = rn , n = 1, 2, ..., N −1, the individual
risk and individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme at time instant t satisfy
℘[t]Rind [t] = (1 − ℘[t])S ind [t].

(4.21)

Proof : According to Definitions 4.2 and 4.3, and the proposed adaptive trust adjustment approach of (4.20), the individual risk and individual satisfaction at time instant t can be expressed, respectively, as
Rind [t] =

N−1
X

rn · Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

=

N−1
X

νn (ρ + 1) − θt νn+1 (ρ + 1) − θt
,
] | Ψ0 )
ρ
ρ

rn · {Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

+ Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) + 1 −  νn+1 (ρ + 1) + 1 − 
,
])℘[t]
ρ
ρ

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
])(1 − ℘[t])},
ρ
ρ

(4.22)

and
S ind [t] =
=

N−1
X
n=1
N−1
X

sn · Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) − θt νn+1 (ρ + 1) − θt
,
] | Ψ1 )
ρ
ρ

sn · {Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

+Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
])℘[t]
ρ
ρ

νn (ρ + 1) + 1 −  νn+1 (ρ + 1) + 1 − 
,
])(1 − ℘[t])}.
ρ
ρ

Given the condition ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1), the following equation can be obtained

(4.23)
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νn (ρ + 1) + 1 −  νn+1 (ρ + 1) + 1 − 
,
]) = 0,
ρ
ρ

since 0 < ν1 < ν2 < · · · < νN = 1 and (νn (ρ + 1) + 1 − )/ρ ≥ 1. Then the individual risk and
individual satisfaction at time instant t can be rewritten as
Rind [t] = (1 − ℘[t])

N−1
X

sn Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
])
ρ
ρ

(4.24)

and
S ind [t] = ℘[t]

N−1
X

sn Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
])
ρ
ρ

(4.25)

under the condition of sn = rn . Therefore, the individual risk and individual satisfaction of the
proposed scheme at time instant t satisfy (4.21).



Theorem 4.2: In the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme, the
individual risk at time instant t satisfies
(1 − ℘[t])Rind [t − 1] ≤ Rind [t] < 1 − ℘[t]

(4.26)

under the condition ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1) and νN−1 ≤ 1 − .
Proof : According to Definition 4.2 and the proposed adaptive trust adjustment approach of
(4.20) as well as the results of Theorem 4.1, the individual risk at time instant t can be expressed
as
Rind [t] = (1 − ℘[t])

N−1
X
n=1

rn Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
])
ρ
ρ

(4.27)

under the conditions ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1) and νN−1 ≤ 1 − . Then the following results can
be obtained
νn (ρ + 1) − (1 − )
≤ νn , n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1,
ρ

(4.28)
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Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νN−1 (ρ + 1) − 1 +  (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
]) ≥ Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (νN−1 , 1]).
ρ
ρ

(4.29)

Hence, the following result holds
Rind [t] ≥ (1 − ℘[t])Rind [t − 1].

(4.30)

Furthermore, due to
N−1
X
n=1

Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
]) ≤ 1,
ρ
ρ

(4.31)

the following results are obtained
(1 − ℘[t])

N−1
X

rn Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

n=1

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
]) < (1 − ℘[t]). (4.32)
ρ
ρ

Hence, the individual risk at time instant t satisfies (4.26) in the proposed scheme.



Theorem 4.3: In the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme, the
individual satisfaction at time instant t obeys
℘[t]S ind [t − 1] ≤ S ind [t] < ℘[t]

(4.33)

under the condition ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1) and νN−1 ≤ 1 − .
Proof : Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2, given the conditions ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1) and
νN−1 < 1 − , the individual satisfaction at time instant t is shown in (4.23). Based on the results
of (4.25) and (4.29), as well as 0 ≤ s1 < s2 < · · · < sN−1 ≤ 1, the following result is obtained
S ind [t] ≥ ℘[t]S ind [t − 1].

(4.34)

Given the result of (4.31), the following inequality is satisfied
℘[t]

N−1
X
n=1

sn Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (

νn (ρ + 1) − 1 +  νn+1 (ρ + 1) − 1 + 
,
]) < ℘[t].
ρ
ρ

(4.35)
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Hence, the individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme at time instant t satisfies (4.33). 
Corollary 4.1: When t is large enough, the individual risk and individual satisfaction of the
proposed scheme at time instant t satisfy
(1 − )Rind [t] ≈ S ind [t],

(4.36)

under conditions ν1 ≥ (ρ +  − 1)/(ρ + 1) and sn = rn , n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1.
Proof : According to Lemma 4.1, when t is large enough, the empirical prediction accuracy of
the online conformal predictor obeys
℘t ≈ 1 − 

(4.37)


according to (4.17). Hence, the result of Corollary 4.1 can be obtained.

It can be observed from Theorems 4.1-4.3 that the individual satisfaction and individual
risk of the proposed scheme depend both on the dynamic trust level F [t] as well as on the
prediction accuracy ℘[t], which rely on the real-time validation results of the selected timevarying attribute. One can be observed from Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 that the proposed scheme
evaluates the physical layer attribute used, thereby promptly adjusting the trust model, so that
the individual risk can be dramatically reduced within a short time. Given the specific distribution of the attribute estimates used in the proposed scheme, the closed-form expressions of the
Rind [t] and of the S ind [t] can be obtained.
Case study: In order to characterize the performance of the proposed scheme, a special case
is studied assuming that the specific physical layer attribute of Alice and that of the Spoofer
obey the classic Gaussian distribution with means of µ1 and µ2 as well as with variances of σ21
and σ22 , respectively, and setting N = 3 and ρ = 1. Then the following results can be obtained:
Corollary 4.2: The closed-form expressions of the individual risk and individual satisfaction
of the proposed scheme at time instant t = 1 can be formulated, respectively, as
Z µ1 −µ2 +2a(1−ν
Z µ1 −µ2 −2a(1−ν
Z µ1 −µ2 +2a(1−ν
1)
2)
2)
√
√
√
σ2 2
σ2 2
σ2 2
r
r1
2
2
2
2
Rind [1] = √ [ µ −µ +2a(1−ν ) e−x dx + µ −µ −2a(1−ν ) e−x dx] + √
e−x dx (4.38)
µ
−µ
−2a(1−ν
)
1 2 √
1
π 1 2σ √2 2
π 1 2σ √2 2
σ 2
2

2

2
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and
√

√
√
2a(1 − ν1 )
2a(1 − ν2 )
2a(1 − ν2 )
S ind [1] = s1 [erf(
) − erf(
)] + s2 erf(
),
σ1
σ1
σ1

(4.39)

where erf(·) is the error function.
Proof : In this case study, it is assumed that the attribute observations of Alice and that of
Spoofer obey Gaussian distribution with means µ1 and µ2 and variances σ21 and σ22 , respectively,
as well as set N = 3 and ρ = 1. F [1] = |HA − HO1 |/2a is formulated, where HA is the average
of HA1 , HA2 , ..., HAL , and |HA − H1 |/2a normalizes the range of difference ∆HO1 in (4.2) to the
limited set [0, 1]. Then the individual risk and individual satisfaction at time instant t = 1 can
be given as (4.40) and (4.41), respectively.
Rind [1] = r1 Pr(F [1] ∈ (ν1 , ν2 ] | Ψ0 ) + r2 Pr(F [1] ∈ (ν2 , 1] | Ψ0 )
= r1 Pr(|HA − HO1 | ∈ [2a(1 − ν2 ), 2a(1 − ν1 )) | Ψ0 ) + r2 Pr(|HA − HO1 | ∈ [0, 2a(1 − ν2 )) | Ψ0 )
1
HA + 2a(1 − ν1 ) − µ2
HA + 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ2
HA − 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ2
= r1 [erf(
) − erf(
) + erf(
)
√
√
√
2
σ2 2
σ2 2
σ2 2
HA + 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ2
HA − 2a(1 − ν1 ) − µ2
1
HA − 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ2
−erf(
)] + r2 [erf(
) − erf(
)]
√
√
√
2
σ2 2
σ2 2
σ2 2
µ1 − µ2 + 2a(1 − ν1 )
µ1 − µ2 + 2a(1 − ν2 )
µ1 − µ2 − 2a(1 − ν2 )
1
) − erf(
) + erf(
)
= r1 [erf(
√
√
√
2
σ2 2
σ2 2
σ2 2
µ1 − µ2 − 2a(1 − ν1 )
1
µ1 − µ2 + 2a(1 − ν2 )
µ1 − µ2 − 2a(1 − ν2 )
−erf(
)] + r2 [erf(
) − erf(
)]. (4.40)
√
√
√
2
σ2 2
σ2 2
σ2 2

S ind [1] = s1 Pr(F [1] ∈ (ν1 , ν2 ] | Ψ1 ) + s2 Pr(F [1] ∈ (ν2 , 1] | Ψ1 )
= s1 Pr(|HA − HO1 | ∈ [2a(1 − ν2 ), 2a(1 − ν1 )) | Ψ1 ) + s2 Pr(|HA − HO1 | ∈ [0, 2a(1 − ν2 )) | Ψ1 )
1
HA + 2a(1 − ν1 ) − µ1
HA + 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ1
HA − 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ1
= s1 [erf(
) − erf(
) + erf(
)
√
√
√
2
σ1 2
σ1 2
σ1 2
HA − 2a(1 − ν1 ) − µ1
HA + 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ1
1
HA − 2a(1 − ν2 ) − µ1
−erf(
)] + s2 [erf(
) − erf(
)]
√
√
√
2
σ1 2
σ1 2
σ1 2
2a(1 − ν1 )
2a(1 − ν2 )
2a(1 − ν2 )
= s1 [erf(
(4.41)
√ ) − erf(
√ )] + s2 erf(
√ ).
σ1 2
σ1 2
σ1 2
Therefore, the closed-forms of individual risk and individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme
at time instant t = 1 are shown in (4.38) and (4.39), respectively.
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Corollary 4.3: The closed-form expressions of the individual risk and individual satisfaction
of the proposed scheme at time instant t = 2, 3, 4, ... can be obtained based on the results of
Corollary 4.2, respectively, as
Rind [t] = r1 (1 − ℘[t])Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2ν2 − 1 + ])
+r2 (1 − ℘[t])Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 − 1 + , 1])

(4.42)

and
S ind [t] = s1 ℘[t]Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2ν2 − 1 + ])
+s2 ℘[t]Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 − 1 + , 1])

(4.43)

under condition ν1 ≥ /2.
Proof : In this case study, the individual risk and individual satisfaction at time instant t =
2, 3, 4, ... can be obtained based on the results of Theorems 4.1-4.3 and Corollary 4.2 as
Rind [t] =

2
X

rn Pr(

n=1

F [t − 1] + θt
∈ (νn , νn+1 ] | Ψ0 )
2

= (1 − ℘[t])r1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2ν2 − 1 + ])
+(1 − ℘[t])r2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 − 1 + , 1])
+℘[t]r1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 + 1 − , 2ν2 + 1 − ])
+℘[t]r2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 + 1 − , 3 − ])

(4.44)

and
S ind [t] =

2
X
n=1

sn Pr(

F [t − 1] + θt
∈ (νn , νn+1 ] | Ψ1 )
2

= ℘[t]s1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2ν2 − 1 + ])
+℘[t]s2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 − 1 + , 1])
+(1 − ℘[t])s1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 + 1 − , 2ν2 + 1 − ])
+(1 − ℘[t])s2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 + 1 − , 3 − ]).

(4.45)
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According to the derived Rind [1] and S ind [1] in (4.40) and (4.41), respectively, the individual
risk and individual satisfaction of the proposed scheme at time instant t = 2, 3, 4, ... are given as
(4.42) and (4.43), respectively, under condition ν1 ≥ /2.



Corollary 4.4: Based on the results of Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3, the solution of the following
problem does exist.
(ν1 , ν2 ) = arg max S ind [t],

(4.46)

s.t. Rind [t] ≤ δ, 0 < ν1 < ν2 < 1,
where δ denotes maximum tolerate individual risk invoked for controlling the risk in the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization process.
Proof : Given the problem of (4.46), maximum S ind [t] can only be achieved when Rind [t] = δ,
since there is a trade-off between the individual risk and individual satisfaction associated with
the thresholds ν1 , ν2 . Hence, the following results can be obtained as
(1 − ℘[t])r1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2ν2 − 1 + ])
+(1 − ℘[t])r2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν2 − 1 + , 1]) = δ
⇒ ν2 = g(ν1 ),

(4.47)

where g(·) is the function of ν2 in terms of ν1 . Then the problem of (4.46) can be rewritten as
ν1 = arg max{℘[t]s1 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2ν1 − 1 + , 2g(ν1 )
−1 + ]) + ℘[t]s2 Pr(F [t − 1] ∈ (2g(ν1 ) − 1 + , 1])}.

(4.48)

Therefore, the solution of problem (4.46) does indeed exist because the righthand side of (4.48)
is a continuous function in terms of ν1 based on the closed-form expression of individual satisfaction of (4.43).



Remark 4.4. Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 give the closed-form expressions of the individual risk
and individual satisfaction in the soft authentication phase (i.e., t = 1) and in the following
phases (namely t = 2, 3, 4, ...), respectively. It is observed from Corollary 4.2 that the required
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soft security is achieved by setting multiple authorization levels, thus the risk of a misdetection
can be carefully controlled by configuring this device for a low authorization level.
Remark 4.5. As it can be observed from above Theorems and Corollaries that the individual
risk and individual satisfaction depend on the thresholds ν1 , ν2 , ..., νN−1 . Most of the conventional physical layer authentication techniques determine the threshold of the authentication
system based on the Neyman-Pearson criterion [2, 25, 37], which minimizes the misdetection
rate subject to a maximum tolerable constraint on the false alarm rate. However, these schemes
constitute binary authentication solutions, which are unsuitable for achieving the soft authentication and progressive authorization. More importantly, for a communication system, the
thresholds can be flexibly determined to meet the requirement of security.

4.4

Simulation Results

In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme, simulation results are provided in this section by utilizing both carrier
frequency offset (CFO) and received signal strength indicator (RSSI). Firstly, the training process and results characterizing the proposed online conformal predictor are presented. Then
the performance of the proposed soft authentication solution is characterized by studying the
trade-off between individual satisfaction level vs. individual risk level during the soft authentication stage. A scenario is studied for characterizing the security performance and robustness
of the proposed progressive authorization solution, where a misdetection event occurs during
the soft authentication stage or the Spoofer imitates Alice after the soft authentication. Compared to the static binary authentication scheme and the kernel learning-based authentication
scheme of [2], the superiority of the proposed scheme is highlighted.
In order to achieve soft authentication and progressive authorization, both the CFO [37] and
RSSI [117] are utilized for the validation of the proposed scheme. The observations of the CFO
seen in Figure 4.2 (a) and those of the RSSI seen in Figure 4.3 (a) used for training and testing
are collected from the implementation-oriented contributions of [37] and [117], respectively.
In a little more detail, the authors of [37] built a software-defined radio platform based on the
Universal Software Radio Peripheral to capture the real CFO data. The system implemented

Carrier Frequency Offset [KHz]
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Figure 4.2: Performance of the proposed online conformal predictor relying on CFO.
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comprises two transmitters (i.e., Alice and the Spoofer) and one receiver (Bob) operating at
a carrier frequency of 2.47 GHz. Furthermore, the authors of [117] collected data throughout
three different measurement campaigns, seven days combined and spread across two summer
seasons. The measurements were carried out in an approximate range of 0-100 m at points
which were approximately 10 m apart from each other at 9 different parts of the orchard described in [117] along five directions, namely along, across, 30◦ , 45◦ , and 60◦ with respect to
the tree rows. As shown in Figure 4.1 and the system model, the Spoofer can be viewed as the
second transmitter, who is located in a third location (i.e., more than a wave-length away from
Alice) and tries to imitate Alice for gleaning illegal advantages from Bob. Hence, the CFO and
RSSI estimates of the Spoofer are also collected for testing in the simulation.
Given the initial training set {z1 , z2 , ..., zL }, L = 40, and the significance level of  = 0.1, the
proposed online conformal predictor is trained and tested by utilizing the collected observations
of the CFO. Note that only Alice’s CFO observations are used for training, i.e., the first 40
samples in Figure 4.2 (a), and the CFO observations of both Alice and the Spoofer are utilized
for testing the prediction accuracy of the proposed scheme based on the online conformal
predictor. The distribution of the smoothened p-values recorded for y = 1 (i.e., the CFO
observations are from Alice) is given in Figure 4.2 (b), which is used to form the predicted set
of (4.15). To be more specific, the x-axis represents the p-values, while the y-axis is the number
of CFO observations. When the p-value is below the significance level , the class (either 0
or 1) will be removed from the predicted set Yt . Then a confidence level of 0.9 is obtained
concerning the predicted set. More importantly, Figure 4.2 (c) characterizes the prediction
accuracy of the proposed online conformal predictor relying on new CFO observations, i.e., ℘t .
It can be observed from Figure 4.2 (c) that the prediction accuracy values concerning new CFO
observations are all higher than 0.9. The reason for this trend is that the proposed conformal
predictor keeps the error rate below the significance level .
Similarly, only Alice’s RSSI observations are used for training, i.e., the first 40 samples in
Figure 4.3 (a), and the RSSI observations of both Alice and the Spoofer are utilized for testing
in the online conformal predictor. Figure 4.3 (b) and (c) characterize the online conformal
prediction results relying on the RSSI observations by setting the significance level of  = 0.2,
where (b) presents the p-values for the class of y = 1, and (c) demonstrates the prediction
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accuracy of the proposed scheme concerning new RSSI observations. It is observed from
Figure 4.3 (c) that the prediction accuracy concerning new observations is higher than 0.8.
0.6
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Figure 4.4: Individual satisfaction vs. threshold of individual risk for the numbers of authorization levels N = 2, N = 3, and N = 4 based on the results of Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.4 characterizes the individual satisfaction vs. the individual risk with respect to
the number of authorization levels of N = 2, N = 3, and N = 4 by utilizing CFO of Figure
4.2. It can be observed from Figure 4.4 that upon increasing the individual risk threshold,
namely δ, the individual satisfaction values increase in all cases. The reason for this trend is
that there is a trade-off between the individual risk and individual satisfaction as demonstrated
by the analytical results of subsection 4.3. Furthermore, when the threshold of the individual
risk is lower than 0.2, the individual satisfaction value of the scenario associated with N = 4
is the highest, while that of N = 2 is the lowest. It is because using multiple authorization
levels in the proposed scheme helps to access services/resources quickly when the threshold of
individual risk is low, i.e., the security requirement is high.
Then the scenario when a misdetection event occurs during the soft authentication stage or
when the Spoofer attacks Alice after the soft authentication stage is studied. In Figure 4.5, the
performance of the proposed progressive authorization scheme is characterized by utilizing the
CFO (see Figure 4.2) with respect to the forgetting factors of ρ = 0.8, ρ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.4
compared to that of the static binary authentication scheme. In this figure, the number of
authorization levels is set to N = 3 in the proposed scheme, while the classification of the
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services/resources is given by Φ0 , Φ1 , and Φ2 . It can be observed from Figure 4.5 that the
individual risk values of the proposed scheme decrease in all cases upon increasing the number
of observations (i.e., the estimates of CFO) of the transmitter. The reason for this trend is
that if Bob observes that the CFO is in nonconformity with the training samples of Alice, the
trustworthiness of this transmitter will be decreased. Thereafter the authorization level will be
reduced to Φ0 within a short time. However, in the static binary authentication scheme, the
individual risk value will not be decreased, leading to substantial losses in this scenario. This
demonstrates that the static binary authentication scheme fails to deal with the scenario, when
a misdetection occurs during the soft authentication phase or the Spoofer attacks the authorized
device after the soft authentication stage. It also demonstrates the superiority of the proposed
scheme after soft authentication by providing additional protection. Additionally, it can be
observed from Figure 4.5 that the individual risk of the proposed scheme associated with the
forgetting factor of ρ = 0.8 is higher than that of ρ = 0.6 and ρ = 0.4. The risk level associated
with ρ = 0.4 is the lowest in these three cases. This is because the historical observations of
Alice’s CFO have more substantial effects on the adaptive trust adjustment system in the case
ρ = 0.8, so that the trust level F is reduced slower than that of the forgetting factors of ρ = 0.6
and ρ = 0.4.
10

0

Individual Risk

Our scheme, =0.8
Our scheme, =0.6
Our scheme, =0.4
Static binary authentication scheme

10

-1

10-2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Number of Observations

Figure 4.5: Performance of the proposed progressive authorization solution for different forgetting factors benchmarked against the static binary authentication scheme.
In Figure 4.6, the security performance of the proposed scheme for N = 3, N = 4 and
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Figure 4.6: Security performance and robustness of the proposed progressive authorization
solution parameterized by different numbers of authorization levels.
N = 5 authorization levels is characterized to show the effects of N on the proposed scheme
in the scenario that a misdetection event occurs in the soft authentication stage or the Spoofer
attacks the authorized device after the soft authentication stage. Some transient observations
(from 3 to 5 observations) are added to show the robustness of the proposed scheme, which
represent the prediction errors in the proposed online conformal predictor, and are mainly
caused by the imperfect estimates and variations of the CFO, noisy observations, as well as
owing to the dynamic behaviors of the Spoofer. It can be observed from Figure 4.6 that the
individual risk value of the proposed scheme recorded for N = 3 decreases quicker than in the
other cases in Stage 1. The reason is that when the CFO estimates are identified by Bob to be
from the Spoofer, the authorization of the transmitter in the N = 3 scenario will be reduced to
the lowest level more quickly. By contrast, the case of N = 5 needs more time (observations) to
achieve a low individual risk. Furthermore, the performance of the proposed scheme recorded
for N = 3 suffers from the lowest robustness, although the individual risk level of this scenario
decreases more quickly than in the other cases in Stage 1. To be specific, the risk level of
N = 3 decays fastest in Stage 1 (before 3 observations), while it increases fastest in Stage 2
(from 3 to 5 observations). In Stage 3, it decreases fastest in all cases. This indicates that the
proposed scheme having a lower number of authorization levels is less robust, but it achieves
a reduced individual risk more quickly in the scenario that a misdetection event occurs in the
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soft authentication stage or the Spoofer attacks Alice after the soft authentication stage.
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Figure 4.7: Individual satisfaction comparison results of the proposed scheme and the scheme
of [2] in the scenario that false alarms happen during the authentication process.
Figure 4.7 characterizes the individual satisfaction comparison results of the proposed progressive authorization process and the kernel learning-based physical layer authentication process of [2]. In this figure, a scenario that false alarm events occur during the authentication
process is studied because of the imperfect estimates and variations of the CFO, as seen from
6 to 8 observations. It is observed from Figure 4.7 that the individual satisfaction level of the
proposed scheme is a bit lower than that of the physical layer authentication process of [2]
for less than 6 CFO observations. This is because of the specific nature of the trust management approach used in the proposed scheme, where the individual satisfaction level depends
on the trust level between Alice and Bob. However, once a false alarm event occurs during
the authentication process, the individual satisfaction value of the authentication process of [2]
tends to 0, because the communication session between Alice and Bob is terminated by Bob.
By contrast, the proposed progressive authorization scheme exhibits its robustness in term of
tolerating a few false alarms. In conclusion, both Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.7 demonstrate that
the proposed soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme performs better than the
kernel learning-based authentication scheme of [2] when the threshold of individual risk is low
or when false alarm events occur during the authentication process, hence resulting in a faster
access and higher robustness.
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Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme based on the trust
management was proposed to achieve security enhancement by evaluating the physical layer
attribute estimates. A trust model was firstly designed for evaluating the trustworthiness of the
relationship between transmitter and receiver, and for supporting a multiple-level authorization. Then a conformal predictor was developed for classifying the estimates of the physical
layer attribute selected, which are used for characterizing the trustworthiness of the transmitter. An adaptive algorithm based on online machine learning was developed to update the
trust management in real time. The simulation results characterized the benefits of the proposed scheme, demonstrating its superiority over the static binary authentication scheme and
the exiting physical layer authentication scheme benchmarker.
In next chapter, the security, trust, and privacy will be comprehensively designed for the
blockchain-enabled IoT systems. To be more specific, a distributed access control scheme will
be proposed by jointly considering security and privacy-preservation to secure the access of
devices and to protect the private information stored in the blockchain. The trust management
will be designed to achieve multiple-level authorization and accountable security services for
all nodes in the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT systems.

Chapter 5
Accountable Distributed Access Control
with Privacy Preservation
While being able to avoid the risk of single point failure, decentralized security provisioning
(e.g., access control and authentication) is facing new challenges of increased system complexity, lacking a sense of responsibility, and privacy preservation. To circumvent these impediments, a distributed access control scheme using consortium blockchain is proposed for
the Internet of Things (IoT) systems. In achieving overall system efficiency and privacy preservation, the proposed framework has three key components, i.e., a distributed recommendation
mechanism, an anonymous credential generation strategy, and a reputation update scheme for
accountability. In the proposed recommendation mechanism, multiple authorized nodes are utilized as referrers to efficiently confer their trust on a new public entity. The authentication can
be conducted by the referrers in a distributed behavior to issue the required credential for the
new entity to join in the system, and an anonymous credential generation strategy is developed
for the new entity to further protect its privacy from linking attacks. A reputation update strategy is proposed based on the new entity’s behaviors after its joining in the system, and a false
recommendation will reduce the referrers’ reputation values. The accountability of the referrers can be achieved by lessening its significance in the new authentications and by adaptively
adjusting its authorization based on the proposed dynamic multiple-level authorization strategy. The results show that the proposed scheme significantly improves security performance
and provides privacy preservation for IoT systems.
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Introduction

IoT systems have attracted a multitude of interests from research and industrial communities
due to their ongoing convergence with vertical industry applications [4, 151]. The growing
complexity of IoT systems as well as dramatically increased use of intelligent machines and
devices within industry processes bring many security vulnerabilities in IoT systems, such as
data injection, spoofing, privacy leakage, and so on [14, 194]. Access control techniques protect against unauthorized use of network resources, and also ensure that only the authorized
persons or devices can access the network resources, services, data, and information flows.
However, most state-of-the-art IoT systems are heavily centralized relying on third parties,
which are facing a lot of challenges, such as security, privacy, and trust risks when the third
parties are compromised, as well as the lacks of data accountability and traceability, especially
in the decentralized industry applications [14]. Hence, distributed access control with security enhancement, privacy protection, and reputation management for defending against both
outside and inside attacks is extremely helpful in securing the IoT systems.
Blockchain is a growing list of blocks that record transaction data based on distributed consensus mechanisms [152]. Given its advantages including decentralized nature, traceability,
coordinability, and robustness to data tampering, the integration of blockchain technology and
IoT infrastructures has been widely studied in [152, 153, 154, 8, 155, 156, 157, 158]. It not
only decentralizes the management and operation of IoT systems, but also brings many potential benefits, such as higher adaptability of heterogeneous IoT, higher fault tolerance. Different
from the private blockchain [152] and public blockchain [155, 156], a consortium blockchain
is controlled by several authorized nodes from multiple organizations, as exemplified by Hyperledger [154, 8], Quorum [153], and Corda [153]. Compared with a public blockchain, the
consortium blockchain is more scalable and acceptable among IoT applications due to its much
higher system interaction efficiency [153]. Such integration systems can be applied in different
areas, for example, smart building and smart industry, and can also achieve the collaborations
among different networks as exemplified by information sharing among these networks relying
on different gateways or clusters.
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Security Weaknesses and Motivations

In a consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system, several authorized nodes will decide who can
be part of the system, who can transact, mine, and deploy smart contracts, as well as whether
read or write permissions would be public or limited to selected authorized nodes. They have
common goals but do not fully trust each other. More importantly, such integration systems are
facing some critical security threats from both outside and inside of the system, which limits
its deployment in distributed IoT applications. To be specific, the adversaries may imitate or
forge the identities of legitimate users to bypass the authentication, then try to obtain illegal
benefits from the system. Moreover, the insider attacks are more challenging because they are
caused by the misbehaved authorized nodes, e.g., false data injection attacks [159] and denial
of service attacks [160]. The private information of authorized nodes may also be leaked
to the attackers by linking the IoT data stored in blocks to their real identities. Hence, all the
nodes should be authenticated and authorized before they access and transact in the consortium
blockchain-enabled IoT system [154].
The access control methods have been studied in [50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 147, 148, 149]. However, most of the existing access control methods are centralized and rely on the trusted third
parties or managers, binary in nature and static in time, where nodes either pass the security check or fail by a one-time verification. Once the trusted third parties or static protocols
are cracked, the IoT data stored in blocks will be revealed to adversaries. Hence, a dynamic
multiple-level authorization is necessary to provide the soft and accountable security service
for protecting the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system, which aims at ensuring that malicious behaviors are able to be identified and punished [161]. More importantly, in the existing
consortium blockchain-enable IoT systems, a trusted membership service provider is required
to maintain the identities for all nodes, and the credential authorities take responsibility to issue
credentials for authentication and authorization, such as [154, 162, 163]. Such a centralized
mechanism goes against the partially distributed property of the consortium blockchain.
In a nutshell, the concept of distributed access control with privacy preservation and accountable security service is exceedingly helpful in the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT
system. However, such a scheme is facing the following challenges for the IoT systems, i.e.,
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P1. How to achieve a reliable and secure access control, so that the integration system can be
protected from outside attacks?
P2. How to achieve the privacy preservation for IoT entity as well as IoT data for each authorized node in the system?
P3. How to respond to the incorrect recommendations and authentications to provide accountable security service?

5.1.2

Technical Contributions

In this chapter, a novel distributed access control scheme is proposed based on the consortium
blockchain for IoT systems. First, a recommendation mechanism is developed, where several
authorized nodes act as referrers to provide recommendations for a public node and to a issue
credential to it for further authentication and authorization, which provides a solution for P1.
To address P2, an anonymous credential generation strategy is proposed, so that the private
information of each new authorized node stored in the blockchain will not be directly linked
to its real identity. Finally, a reputation update strategy is proposed to achieve accountable
security service through decreasing the referrers’ reputation values if they provide wrong recommendations, as well as lowering their authorization levels based on the proposed dynamic
multiple-level authorization strategy, thus P3 is solved.
The contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• A recommendation mechanism is proposed for distributed access control relying on multiple referrers to protect the IoT data from outside attacks. The trade-off between false
alarm and misdetection of the proposed scheme can be improved by using more referrers
based on the proposed scheme;
• The privacy of each authorized node is further protected from the linking attacks by
generating anonymous credentials. Through both the recommendation mechanism and
anonymous credential generation strategy, the private information of authorized nodes in
the integration system can be protected from both the outside and inside nodes;
• The developed reputation update strategy provides a method for evaluating the behaviors
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of authorized nodes and for dynamic multiple-level authorization. Moreover, the accountable security services can be achieved by the proposed scheme through decreasing
the reputation values of referrers if they provide wrong recommendations.

Table 5.1: Notations of Chapter 5
Notations
N
K
Ψ0
Ψ1
ν1 , ..., νK−1
M
Rn
S
Sm
PFA
PMD

Definitions
Number of authorized nodes who control the blockchain.
Number of authorization levels.
The case that the transmitter is an adversary.
The case that the transmitter is a legitimate node.
Thresholds of the multi-level authorization.
Number of referrers.
Reputation value of n-th authorized node.
Average recommendation score.
Recommendation score of m-th referrer.
False alarm rate.
Misdetection rate.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, the system model used and
the key requirements of this chapter are presented. In Section 5.3, the distributed access control
scheme is proposed, and the performance analysis is presented. The simulations and numerical
results are shown in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
Notations: In this chapter, scalars are denoted by italic letters, while vectors are respectively
denoted by bold-face letters. Table 5.1 shows the notations of this chapter.

5.2

System Model

The framework of a consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system is shown in Figure 5.1. Each
block in the blockchain contains the hash of the previous block (previous hash), transaction
data, an arbitrary nonce, a timestamp, and hash of the current block (current hash). In this
integration system, all communications go through the blockchain, and N authorized entities
are acting as end-points in the blockchain network. Each authorized node is designed to hold
one copy of the blockchain and is capable of voting on each transaction prior to appending it
to the blockchain. There are also some public nodes in this IoT system, who want to join in the
consortium blockchain system for the data access. This work considers the system having no
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centralized service provider, credential authority, and manager, corresponding to the properties
of consortium blockchain but increases the grade of challenge imposed on the legitimate users
as well. The Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) algorithm [154] is applied in this
integration system.
Block j

Block j+1

Block j+2

Previous Hash
Transaction 1
Transaction 2
Transaction 3
...
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...
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Timestamp

Nonce
Timestamp
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Figure 5.1: Framework of a consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system.
In this integration system, the adversary aims at accessing and obtaining illegal benefits
from the system. Although the N authorized nodes have a common goal, they do not fully trust
each other, and some of them may attack/cheat for illegal benefits. Furthermore, the public
nodes and authorized nodes may try to observe private information of other authorized nodes
from the IoT data stored in blocks. To improve the security performance and protect privacy,
this chapter focuses on proposing a new distributed access control scheme for the consortium
blockchain-enabled IoT system to meet the following requirements:
− Authentication: Public nodes should be authenticated before their access to the integration
system with the help of authorized nodes in a distributed way, so that the system will be protected from the outside attackers.
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− Authorization: Every node in the integration system should be authorized what it can do,
as exemplified by transacting and deployment of smart contracts. Moreover, the dynamic
multiple-level authorization is required to provide soft and progressive security service for
protecting system.
− Privacy Preservation: The IoT data and the privacy of authorized nodes stored in blocks
should be protected from both public nodes and other authorized nodes. In other words, the
public nodes cannot gain any knowledge of the transactions in the system, and transactions
stored in blocks are anonymous;
− Accountability: Authorized nodes in the IoT system should be accountable for their behaviors, especially for the adversarial behaviors. It means that malicious behaviors are able to be
identified and punished in the integration system.

5.3

Proposed Distributed Access Control Scheme

In this section, a recommendation mechanism is firstly developed that several authorized nodes should act as referrers to authenticate a public node before its access to the consortium
blockchain-enabled IoT system, so that P1 will be addressed. These referrers will then issue
the initial credential together to the new authenticated node based on an anonymous credential
generation strategy, so that the IoT data stored in blocks will not be linked to the real identities of devices, thus P2 will be solved. Then, a reputation update strategy is developed for
adaptively updating the reputation values of authorized nodes based on their interactions with
other nodes and recommendations, so that the dynamic multiple-level authorization is achieved
according to their reputation values. This strategy provides a solution for P3, since an incorrect recommendation will lead to punishments on the referrers by decreasing their reputation
values.

5.3.1

Recommendation for Distributed Access Control

As shown in Figure 5.2, if a public node, i.e., Alice or Adversary, wants to access/join in the
consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system, M referrers in the set of N authorized nodes are
incentivized to provide their recommendations for this node. The recommendation score of
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Figure 5.2: The proposed recommendation mechanism for distributed access control.

m-th referrer on new public node is denoted as S m , which depends on the familiarity degree
of referrer m on this public node and satisfies S m ∈ [−1, 1]. If the value of S m is high, the
referrer m is familiar with this public node and its recommendation is Alice, while S m = 0
represents that referrer m has no knowledge of this public node. Moreover, if the value of S m
is low and less than 0, it means that the referrer m is familiar with this public node and its
recommendation is Adversary. Then the average recommendation score of referrers on this
public node is formulated as
PM
S =

S m Rm
,
M

m=1

(5.1)

where Rm ∈ [0, 1] is the reputation value of referrer m representing the global perception of its
trustworthiness in the system. The recommendations of the referrers and reputation values of
all authorized nodes are stored in the blockchain as transactions. It is observed from (5.1) that
a referrer having higher reputation value has higher significance on the recommendation for
the public nodes.
K authorization levels are set by dividing the services/resources of the integration system
into K sets, denoted as Φ0 , Φ1 , ..., ΦK−1 , in the system according to their importance. Φ0 represents the service set with lowest authorization level, which means the node is not allowed
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to access any services/resources of the system, while ΦK−1 is denoted as the service set with
highest authorization level, with which the nodes can access all services/resources in the system. Therefore, ∅ = Φ0 ⊂ Φ1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ ΦK−1 satisfies, where ∅ represents null set. Then, the
distributed access control is formulated as





Φ0 :










Φ1 :














ΦK−1 :

S ∈ (−∞, ν1 ]
S ∈ (ν1 , ν2 ]
..
.

,

(5.2)

S ∈ (νK−1 , ∞)

where ν1 < ν2 < · · · < νK−1 ,






S ∈ (−∞, ν1 ] Ψ0
,





S ∈ (ν1 , ∞)
Ψ1

(5.3)

S = G(·) |t0 .

(5.4)

and

Ψ1 indicates that the public node is a legitimate node, while Ψ0 represents that it is an adversary.
t0 represents the initial authentication time instant.
According to the proposed recommendation mechanism of (5.1) and (5.2), the false alarm
rate and misdetection rate of the distributed access control can be calculated, respectively, as
PFA = Pr(S ≤ ν1 |Ψ1 ) = Pr(

M
X

S m Rm ≤ Mν1 |Ψ1 )

(5.5)

m=1

and
PMD

M
X
= Pr(S > ν1 |Ψ0 ) = Pr( S m Rm > Mν1 |Ψ0 ).

(5.6)

m=1

The recommendation score S m is assumed to be Gaussian variable in [−1, 1], where its
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probability distribution functions (PDF) of Ψ1 and Ψ0 are formulated, respectively, as
(x − µ1 )2
)
2σ21

(5.7)

1
(x − µ0 )2
fΨ0 (x) = √
exp(−
),
2σ20
2πσ0

(5.8)

fΨ1 (x) = √

1
2πσ1

exp(−

and

where µ0 < 0 < µ1 holds. Hence, the average recommendation score S is also a Gaussian
variable. Then, the false alarm rate and misdetection rate of (5.5) and (5.6) can be derived,
respectively, as
PFA =

Z

Mν1

−M

PM
(x − µ1 m=1
Rm )2
exp(−
)dx
q
P
M
2
2
PM 2
2σ
R
m=1
m
1
2π m=1 Rm σ1

(5.9)

PM
(x − µ0 m=1
Rm )2
exp(−
)dx.
q
P
M
2
2
PM 2
2σ
R
m=1
m
0
2π m=1 Rm σ0

(5.10)

1

and
PMD =

Z

M
Mν1

1

Then, the security performance of the proposed scheme depends on both the number of
referrers M and threshold ν1 . According to (5.9) and (5.10), there is a trade-off between false
alarm and misdetection relying on the threshold ν1 . Therefore, the optimization problem of the
access control is designed as
min P MD
M,ν1

(5.11)

s.t. PFA ≤ δ, M ≤ Mmax , and ν1 > 0,
where δ represents the threshold of false alarm rate, and Mmax is the threshold of referrer
number, which is set to control the time latency and communication overhead of the proposed
scheme. This optimization problem can be evaluated based on the Neyman-Pearson criterion
[23]. It is concluded that P MD achieves the minimum value while PFA meets equality constraint
δ. Thresholds ν2 , ···, νK−1 are determined by the users depending on the historical knowledge of
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Algorithm 4 Distributed access control
1. Initialization:
{1, 2, ..., N}: set of authorized nodes
{R1 , R2 , ..., RN }: set of reputation values of the authorized nodes
2. Referrer selection and threshold design:
2.1 sort authorized nodes relying on their reputation values in descending order as
τ1 , τ2 , ..., τN ;
2.2 for M = 1, 2, ..., Mmax
2.3
select referrers τ1 , τ2 , ..., τ M ;
2.4
obtain optimal threshold ν1∗ by setting PFA = δ;
2.5
obtain misdetection rate P MD via (5.10) based on M and ν1∗ ;
2.6 end for
2.7 obtain the optimal number of referrers M ∗ , which achieves the minimum P MD (M, ν1∗ ) in
set {1, 2, ..., Mmax }
2.8 referrers τ1 , τ2 , ..., τ M∗ provide recommendations for the public node;
2.9 authorize this public node with Φi via (5.2) based on the average recommendation score
of (5.1).

the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system and the specific application. In order to solve
this optimization problem, a distributed access control algorithm is proposed as Algorithm 4.

5.3.2

Anonymous Credential Generation

In the distributed access control, the selected M ∗ referrers will issue a credential together to this
public node if it is authorized with one of Φ1 , ..., ΦK−1 . A credential is also shown in Figure 5.2,
which contains authorization level, validity period, credential number, referrers’ public keys,
and referrers’ signatures. The validity period is denoted as Γ, which is determined and agreed
by more than 50% authorized nodes in the system initialization phase. Any authorized nodes
can verify the credential by checking the referrers’ signatures.
To achieve privacy preservation, the anonymous credentials are issued by the referrers to
Alice for further authentication and authorization. Figure 5.3 characterizes the process of
anonymous credential generation. Firstly, Alice generates L credentials, and blinds them by
mixing a randomly blinding factor [164], so that the referrers cannot recognize its original
credentials based on the blind versions. Then, Alice sends the blinded credentials to request
signatures from its referrers. To verify the blinded credentials, the referrers challenge Alice to
show randomly assigned L − 1 credentials. After Alice opens the specific L − 1 credentials,
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Figure 5.3: Anonymous credential generation procedure.
the referrers verify them and sign the remaining ones if those L − 1 credentials are all valid.
Here, a credential is valid if I1-I3 in Figure 5.2 are all valid. Finally, after Alice receives the
new signed credentials, it removes the blinding factor from the signatures to obtain the real
credentials [164]. It can be observed from the process of anonymous credential generation that
the real identity of Alice in the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system will not be linked
to its public key by its referrers. Furthermore, a higher L defends against the cheating attacks
of signed credentials by Alice, but leads to higher computation, communication overhead, and
time latency.

5.3.3

Accountability based on Adaptive Reputation Update and Dynamic
Multiple-Level Authorization

The reputation values of N authorized nodes at time t are denoted as R1 [t], R2 [t], ..., RN [t] and
are recorded in the blocks. Note that once a public node joined in the system, the set of
authorized nodes will be renewed by adding this node. To stimulate them to provide recommendations for the new public nodes, the referrers’ reputation values will be increased as
Rm [t + 1] = Rm [t] + θ0 ,

(5.12)
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where θ0 represents the reward for the recommendations.
If the authorized node n attacks the system, such as false data injection attacks [159], denial
of service attacks [160], and spoofing other authorized nodes to obtain illegal benefits, the
attacked node(s) will broadcast its behaviors to the other authorized nodes, once more than
50% authorized nodes verified them as adversarial, then the reputation value of authorized
node n will be decreased as
Rn [t + 1] = Rn [t] − ϑn [t], n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N},

(5.13)

where ϑn [t] ∈ [0, 1] represents the attack level, which is defined corresponding to the specific
IoT application. ϑn [t] = 1 indicates the case that this node attacked the IoT system with
highest level at time t, while ϑn [t] = 0 means this node was well-behaved at time t. The
average recommendation score of its referrers on this node in the distributed access control of
(5.1) is the initial reputation value of authorized node n.
More importantly, if authorized node n attacked the IoT system at time t, the reputation
values of its referrers will be decreased as
Rnm [t + 1] = Rnm [t] − θ, m = 1, 2, ..., M,

(5.14)

where Rnm represents the m-th referrer of authorized node n and θ is the punishment of recommending a misbehaved node to the system. The punishment on decreasing their reputation
values is set to be higher than the reward for the recommendations θ0 . It can be observed
from (5.14) that an incorrect recommendation will lead to the decrease of their own reputation
values, resulting in an accountable recommendation mechanism.
The dynamic multiple-level authorization is processed as
Φk : Rn [t] ∈ (νk , νk+1 ], n = 1, 2, ..., N.

(5.15)

Once the reputation value of authorized node n is lower than ν1 , it will be denied to access the
system.
As shown in Figure 5.2, a smart contract is used for the effective, efficient, and secure
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creation of the proposed scheme, which operates as autonomous actors, and can be trusted to
drive forward any on-chain logic that can be expressed as a function of on-chain data inputs
[165]. The corresponding functions for adding nodes should be contained in the smart contract,
while their opposite functions should also be designed for removing the nodes. To achieve
the reputation update for dynamic multiple-level authorization in the system, the adversarial
behaviors of a node will be recorded in the blocks, so that the reputation update for both
this node and its referrers can be achieved via (5.12), (5.13), and (5.14), respectively. The
reputation update function can be executed by the authorized nodes to update the reputation
value of a misbehaved node in the smart contract. More importantly, the dynamic multiplelevel authorization of (5.2) is also implemented in the smart contract, so that the authorization
levels of all authorized nodes can be adaptively updated through publishing the transactions
containing adversarial behaviors of the authorized nodes to trigger the function.

5.3.4

Analysis

In the proposed scheme, if an authorized node tries to deanonymize Alice, the anonymity set
size is N − 1, which is defined as the set of nodes that are indistinguishable from Alice with the
set including Alice itself [166]. Then the entropy of the anonymity set, denoted as Hq , which
expresses the attacker’s knowledge of the anonymity set [167], is formulated as
Hq = −

N−1
X

qn log2 qn ,

(5.16)

n=1

where qi represents the probability of Alice being the target of this attacker. If all authorized
nodes except the attacker have the same probabilities to be the target, Hq achieves its maximum
value, denoted as Hmax , which is given by
Hmax = log2 (N − 1).

(5.17)

The accountability is guaranteed in the proposed scheme, and a misbehaved authorized
node in the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system is traceable and punished. To be specific, the adversarial behaviors of authorized nodes and all the recommendations are stored
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as the transactions in blocks. These records indicate the trustworthiness of authorized nodes,
and guarantee the accuracy of reputation values of authorized nodes, so that the multiple-level
authorization can be achieved to protect system and to control the risk level of being attacked.
More importantly, the referrers should be responsible for their recommendations based on the
proposed scheme.

5.4

Simulation Results

In this section, simulation and numerical studies are provided to evaluate the performance
of the proposed scheme. Firstly, a blockchain is built, which is controlled by 20 authorized
nodes (ANs). The size of block is set to 10. A smart contract is created containing functions
for adding and removing nodes, as well as for reputation update. The recommendations of
the selected referrers, as well as reputation values and malicious behaviors of all ANs are
recorded in the blocks as transactions. Each transaction contains time, transaction identity
(ID), blockchain ID, node ID, and public key of exponent. After a transaction is generated, it
is signed by the exponent using its private key.
Attack model in the simulation: The 9-th AN (denoted as AN9) is set to be a misbehaved
node who cheats the other ANs in the recommendation process and voting process. Moreover,
10-th AN (denoted as AN10) is set to be a misbehaved node who attacks the other ANs in the
system and causes denial of service attacks, false data injection attacks, or spoofing attacks
by imitating the other ANs to collect private information and obtain illegal benefits in the
system. Furthermore, an adversary, who is a public node, tries to join in the integration system
controlled by ANs to obtain the illegal benefits. Specifically, Type I attacks represent the
cheating attacks and wrong recommendations, while the denial of service attacks, false data
injection attacks, and spoofing attacks are denoted as Type II attacks. The punishments for
Type I and Type II attacks are set to be 0.1 and 0.2, respectively.
Figure 5.4 characterizes the trade-off between misdetection and false alarm of the proposed
recommendation mechanism with respect to different numbers of referrers, i.e., M = 2, M = 3,
and M = 4. One can be observed from Figure 5.4 that the misdetection rates of all cases
decrease with the increase of threshold of false alarm rate. More importantly, by utilizing more
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Figure 5.4: Misdetection rate vs. false alarm rate with different numbers of referrers.

referrers in the proposed recommendation mechanism, the misdetection rate of the proposed
scheme is lower with a specific threshold of false alarm rate, leading to the improvement of
trade-off between misdetection and false alarm.
Figure 5.5 characterizes the effects of referrer number, i.e., M, on the false alarm rate of the
proposed scheme with respect to different thresholds, namely for ν1 = 0.2, ν1 = 0.3, ν1 = 0.4,
and ν1 = 0.5, in the distributed access control. It can be observed from Figure 5.5 that as
the number of referrers increasing, the false alarm rates of all cases decrease significantly.
The reason is that the use of more referrers provides more recommendation information and
achieves robust authentication in the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the false alarm rate of the
proposed scheme with ν1 = 0.2 is the lowest, while that of ν1 = 0.5 is the highest. The reason
for this trend is that a higher threshold ν1 leads to higher probability of failure of Alice to join
in the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT system.
Figure 5.6 characterizes the misdetection rate versus the number of referrers, i.e., M, to
show the authentication performance of the proposed mechanism with respect to ν1 = 0.2,
ν1 = 0.3, ν1 = 0.4, and ν1 = 0.5 in the distributed access control. It can be observed that the
increase of referrer number results in the decrease of misdetection rate. The reason is that it
is more difficult for an adversary to conclude or cheat the referrers when more referrers are
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Figure 5.5: False alarm rate vs. number of referrers with respect to different thresholds in the
distributed access control.
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Figure 5.6: Misdetection rate vs. number of referrers with respect to different thresholds in the
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required in the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the higher ν1 leads to lower misdetection rate,
which demonstrates the trade-off between the false alarm rate and misdetection rate (see both
Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6).
5
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Figure 5.7: Comparison results of privacy preservation between the scheme of [8] and the proposed scheme in the case that the trusted third party or one of Alice’s referrers is compromised
with a probability.
Figure 5.7 characterizes the comparison results between the scheme of [8] and the proposed scheme, where authentication and authorization in [8] are based on a membership service provider (MSP) and a credential authority (CA), while that of the proposed scheme utilizes
multiple referrers. The trusted third party in the scheme of [8] and one of the Alice’s referrers
in the proposed scheme are compromised with a probability. It is observed from Figure 5.7
that as the increase of probability of trusted third party or one of Alice’s referrers being compromised, the entropy values (5.16) of all cases are decreasing. The reason for this trend is that
both the scheme of [8] and the proposed scheme suffer from a lower entropy of anonymity set
if the third trusted third party or one of Alice’s referrers is compromised with a higher probability. One can also observe from Figure 5.7 that the entropy value of the proposed scheme
is higher than that of [8] because the scheme in [8] is centralized and controlled by the trusted
third party, and the privacy of all authorized nodes in the system will be leaked once the trusted
third party is being compromised.
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Figure 5.8: Reputation update of the misdetected adversary with respect to different attacking
behaviors in the proposed scheme.
Assuming that the Adversary passed the initial authentication and joined the consortium
blockchain-enabled IoT system, the reputation value update results of this new authenticated
node can be obtained in Figure 5.8 with respect to different attacking behaviors in the case
K = 3. The observations represent the behaviors of the node observed by the other ANs
and recorded as transactions in the blocks. The hybrid attacks of Type I and Type II attacks
are denoted as mixed attacks. In Figure 5.8, the attacking behaviors are set to be “on-off” in
the system with a probability, e.g., 10% and 30%. The threshold ν1 of (5.2) can be obtained
from Algorithm 4 as 0.18, and another threshold is set to be ν2 = 0.5 by users. One can
observe from Figure 5.8 that the reputation values of misdetected adversary decrease faster if it
performs Type II attacks or with a higher attacking probability. The reason for this trend is that
the Type II attacks and higher attacking probability cause more damages to the system, thus
the punishment will be higher in decreasing the reputation value of this node. According to the
multiple-level authorization of (5.2), when the reputation value of this misdetected adversary is
lower than 0.5, it will be authorized by Φ1 with less services/resources to reduce the damages
caused by this node as well as to protect the other ANs. Moreover, it will be denied to access
the system if its reputation value is lower than 0.18.
The reputation values of the misdetected Adversary and its referrers in the system are given

5.5. Chapter Summary

131

1
Authorization

Adversary
Referrer AN9
Referrer AN10

2

0.9
0.8

Reputation Values

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2

Authorization

1

0.1
Authorization
0
10

0

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Observations

Figure 5.9: Reputation update of the misdetected adversary and its referrers in the proposed
scheme.
in Figure 5.9. The observations represent the behaviors of the node and its referrers observed
by the other ANs and recorded as transactions in the blockchain. AN9, and AN10 are chosen
as the referrers of the misdetected Adversary in the case M = 2. In this figure, the misdetected
Adversary performs Type II attacks with 30% attacking probability. It can be observed from
Figure 5.9 that the reputation values of the misdetected Adversary, AN9, and AN10 are decreasing with the increase of observations. Moreover, the reputation value of AN10 is lower
than that of AN9, since it also attacks the system during the distributed access control. In a
nutshell, Figure 5.9 characterizes the proposed scheme with the accountable security service
based on the developed reputation update strategy.

5.5

Chapter Summary

A distributed access control scheme is proposed for the consortium blockchain-enabled IoT
system in this chapter. The developed recommendation mechanism utilizes multiple referrers,
who are the authorized nodes in the integration system, to authenticate public nodes in a distributed way. To protect the private information, an anonymous credential update strategy is
developed, so that the real identity of each authorized node can be concealed. Then a reputation
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update strategy was proposed for the referrers to take responsibility for their recommendations
and for achieving multiple-level authorization. The simulation and numerical results demonstrated that by increasing the number of referrers, the trade-off between the misdetection rate
and false alarm rate of the proposed scheme is increased. Furthermore, the accountability can
be achieved based on the proposed scheme.
In next chapter, the communication performance and security enhancement will be comprehensively considered for securing resource-constrained communications. A lightweight continuous authentication scheme will be proposed to identify devices via their pre-arranged pseudorandom access sequences. A device will be authenticated as legitimate if its access sequences
are matched with the pre-agreed unique order between the transceiver pair, without incurring
long latency and high overhead.

Chapter 6
Lightweight Continuous Authentication
via Intelligent Access
Conventional authentication techniques based on cryptography and computational hardness
are facing growing challenges for deployment in resource-constrained Internet-of-Things (IoT)
devices. To meet the stringent and diverse security requirements of IoT applications, the dramatically increased security overhead and latency from the inherent computational processing
make these conventional static security techniques undesirable for emerging machine communications. In this chapter, a novel lightweight continuous authentication scheme is proposed for
identifying multiple resource-constrained IoT devices via their pre-arranged pseudo-random
access time sequences. A transmitter will be authenticated as legitimate only if its access time
sequential order is matched with a pre-agreed unique pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS)
between itself and the base station. The seed for generating the PRBS between each transceiver
pair is acquired by exploiting the channel reciprocity and applying the support vector machine
(SVM) algorithm, which is time-varying and difficult for a third party to predict. Hence, the
proposed scheme provides seamless protection for legitimate communications by refreshing
the seeds adaptively without incurring long latency, complex computation, and high communication overhead. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme achieves high entropy and
seed bit randomness, and low bit mismatch rate, as well as is robust in the noisy environment.
Finally, the superiority of the proposed scheme over the existing schemes is demonstrated in
quantization performance, authentication performance, and computation cost.
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Introduction

The fifth generation (5G)-and-beyond networks connect billions of things that include sensors,
actuators, services, and other Internet-connected objects, enabling the future smart life and
connected industries by Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications, as exemplified by smart cities,
intelligent transportation, smart building, just to name a few [4, 168]. However, resourceconstrained IoT devices in 5G-and-beyond networks are extremely vulnerable to spoofing attacks, leading to unauthorized access to network resources/services and privacy leakage. The
root causes for security weaknesses in wireless IoT communications mainly include the open
broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, intermittent machine communications, heterogeneous complex network architecture, as well as the abundance of miniaturized and resourceconstrained IoT devices used [2, 95]. More importantly, wireless sensors are widely used in
5G-and-beyond networks for monitoring and recording the physical conditions of the environment, while being equipped with limited computation, storage, and power resources. Hence,
lightweight authentication is extremely critical for guarding against the spoofing attacks in
5G-and-beyond networks.
Although the conventional cryptographic techniques [169, 170] have been widely studied, their excessive latency and computation overhead are extremely undesirable for resourceconstrained IoT devices. For example, the group key agreement protocols require thousands
of interactions to exchange keys for establishing group keys among 5-client groups [26]. The
authors of [27] developed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol based on the public
key encryption for smart city applications, which strikes a balance between the efficiency and
communication cost without sacrificing the security. A scalable framework for lightweight
authentication and hierarchical routing in data networking IoT is proposed in [28]. However,
these schemes also require many rounds for the key generation, refresh, and delivery, resulting in long time latency and high communication overhead. The authors of [29] proposed a
two-factor lightweight privacy-preserving authentication scheme to enhance the security of vehicular ad-hoc network communications relying on the decentralized certificate authority and
the biological passwords, which is also unsuitable for the authentication between multiple IoT
devices and the base station. Furthermore, the key transmission process in the security man-
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agement procedures of the cryptographic techniques could lead to potential key leakage [14].
Physical layer authentication techniques of [37, 171, 172] may provide lightweight authentication by exploiting the inherent physical attributes and channel reciprocity of wireless
communication links. Compared with the conventional cryptographic based authentication
techniques, security overhead and reduced energy consumption in IoT devices can be achieved
with physical layer authentication by eliminating the explicit key exchange and its related computation process. The authors of [173] proposed a lightweight mutual authentication protocol
based on physical unclonable functions, which may be regarded as unique physical features
of a device. Unfortunately, the physical features of a device suffer from imperfect and timevarying estimates, causing their estimates to differ between the transmitter and receiver. Hence,
the physical layer key generation techniques of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179] require a key
agreement process to guarantee the key correctness between transceiver, but the information of
the generated keys may be intercepted during this process. Moreover, the physical layer key
generation techniques suffer from very low key generation rates.
Most of the existing authentication schemes are static in time, e.g., [37, 171, 172], thus
resulting in abundant loopholes for the adversaries owing to the time-varying wireless environment and heterogeneous complex architecture of 5G-and-beyond networks. Furthermore,
the authentication after initial identification cannot be achieved using these one-time schemes.
To overcome these challenges, a continuous physical layer authentication scheme is proposed
in [2] based on the kernel machine learning approach as an intelligent process by utilizing
multiple communication link-related and device-related attributes. Its performance still suffers
from the imperfect estimates and variations of physical layer attributes, leading to inevitable
misdetections and false alarms in the continuous authentication process.
Hence, a new lightweight continuous authentication scheme is proposed by identifying the
pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequence of each transmitter (i.e., IoT device), which
provides high uncertainties for the adversaries as well as seamless protections for legitimate
communications. To be more specific, a pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) is pre-agreed
between a pair of IoT device and base station for authentication, which is difficult for the
adversaries to predict and does not require additional hardware for implementation. The access
time sequence of an IoT device, which is different from this pre-agreed PRBS, will be identified
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to be coming from a spoofer by the base station. Different from the time-division multiplexing
(TDM) methods [180], the time domain is divided into recurrent time slots of fixed length and
arrange them intelligently for authentication purposes.
In order to achieve lightweight continuous authentication, the channel reciprocity [14] is
explored to acquire the seeds for generating PRBSs, where a transceiver pair can observe the
same channel simultaneously. To be more specific, the physical layer features are utilized for
generating dynamic seeds, which benefit from their time-varying characteristic and are difficult for the adversaries to predict. In contrast to the physical layer key generation techniques
of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179], the seed acquisition technique does not require a high seed
generation rate, since the seeds are used for generating PRBSs rather than for practical applications directly, as exemplified by encryption and decryption. Moreover, only three phases
are required for seed acquisition, namely for channel probing, quantization and verification,
where the quantization phase is the main phase of the developed seed acquisition technique for
transferring the extracted channel measurements into bits.
Although the received signal strength (RSS)-based quantization method [175] is easy to
implement, its entropy is low and does not work well for wireless communication systems
that consist of static nodes. Moreover, the frequency phase-based quantization method [179]
applies multiple thresholds to quantize each estimated frequency-phase, but wrong decisions
can be made if the estimated frequency phases are close to the region boundaries, leading to
a high mismatch rate of quantization between the transceiver pair. Hence, the fundamental
principle of machine learning-based anomaly detection techniques [181, 182] is studied in
this chapter to improve the quantization performance. Different from the anomaly detection
techniques, which focus on maximizing the detection accuracy, the objective of quantization
in this chapter is to divide the channel measurements into bits by designing a region boundary
intelligently to achieve high entropy and seed bit randomness as well as low bit mismatch rate
on transceiver sides, so that a high quantization accuracy and uncertainty can be achieved.
In this chapter, a lightweight continuous authentication scheme is proposed by identifying the pre-arranged access time sequence of each IoT device corresponding to the PRBS
pre-generated by an identical unique seed on both transceiver sides. To obtain the seed, a
new support vector machine (SVM)-based seed acquisition technique is developed by utilizing
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physical layer features for generating specific PRBSs between the base station and multiple IoT
devices, which consists of three phases, namely channel probing, quantization, and verification.
The SVM is applied to derive an optimal nonlinear boundary for quantizing the measurements
of physical layer attributes used into bits to improve entropy and seed bit randomness while
decreasing the bit mismatch rate of the obtained seed. The seeds for PRBS generation are
updated dynamically by estimating the time-varying physical layer features, thus resulting in
natural adaptive protections for the legitimate communication parties and high uncertainty for
the adversaries.
Specifically, the contributions of this chapter are summarized as follows:
• A novel authentication scheme is proposed to identify the access time sequence of each
IoT device corresponding to its pre-agreed unpredictable PRBS. This scheme is lightweight
and provides continuous authentication between a base station and multiple IoT devices.
Explicitly, this scheme provides a new device authentication method, which is radically different from the existing authentication schemes via the identification of keys or
communication-related features;
• A seed acquisition technique is developed by utilizing physical layer features to obtain
identical seeds for PRBS generation and update between a base station and IoT device
pair without exchanging the obtained seed, so that the PRBS leakage could be avoided.
To transform the measurements of the physical layer features into seeds, the SVM is
explored to derive an optimal nonlinear boundary to improve the quantization accuracy;
• Simulation results are presented to demonstrate the superior performance of the proposed
scheme in quantization performance, time complexity, authentication performance, and
computation cost, compared with some exiting schemes. Furthermore, the results show
that the proposed scheme is robust in the noisy communication environment and false
alarm events can be avoided.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, the system model used in
this chapter is presented. The lightweight continuous authentication scheme is proposed based
on the intelligently arranged pseudo-random access in Section 6.3. The performance analysis
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is also presented in Section 6.3. Simulation results are given in Section 6.4. Finally, Section
6.5 concludes this chapter.
Table 6.1: Notations of Chapter 6
Notations
N
HB
L
Hl
BII
γ0
c
R
J

Definitions
Number of physical layer attributes used.
Attribute estimates at the base station.
Number of IoT devices.
Attribute estimates at the l-th IoT device.
Bit mismatch rate of quantization phase.
Ratio of 0 bits in the obtained seed.
Center of quantization boundary.
Radius of quantization boundary.
Number of samples for training at the base station.

Notations: In this chapter, scalars are denoted by italic letters, while vectors are respectively
denoted by bold-face letters. Table 6.1 shows the notations of this chapter.

6.2

System Model and Dynamically Arranged Pseudo-Random
Access

Base station
Spoofing
attacks

Spoofers

Legitimate
communications

IoT devices

Figure 6.1: System model in the 5G-and-beyond network. The communications between multiple IoT devices and a base station suffer from the spoofing attacks caused by the adversaries.
As shown in Figure 6.1, wireless communications between legitimate IoT devices and a
base station suffer from spoofing attacks. The spoofers aim at imitating the legitimate IoT
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devices, then try to access the system for gleaning illegal advantages or injecting false data
to the cloud/Internet, leading to unauthorized access, privacy leakage, wrong decisions, and
so on. The base station needs to unambiguously and continuously identify the spoofers from
the legitimate devices. It is assumed that the spoofers are located more than a wavelength
away from the legitimate IoT devices, and that the clocks of IoT devices and base station
are synchronized. More importantly, owing to the characteristics of IoT devices, namely the
limited computation, storage, and power resources, the concept of lightweight authentication
is extremely critical in the 5G-and-beyond networks.
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Figure 6.2: The developed authentication method between IoT devices 1-4 (transmitters) and
a base station (receiver) through the identification of the pre-arranged pseudo-random access
time sequences of IoT devices according to the pre-agreed PRBSs.
Figure 6.2 characterizes the novel authentication scheme based on the arranged pseudorandom access in the time-domain, which aims at supporting the authentication between a base
station and multiple IoT devices, e.g., devices 1-4. To be more specific, the time domain is
divided into recurrent time slots of fixed length. Each IoT device sends its messages to the
base station in the time slots corresponding to its identical pseudo-random binary sequence
(PRBS) pre-agreed between this IoT device and the base station, thus an incorrect access in the
time-domain will be detected from a spoofer. The PRBSs are very difficult for the adversaries
to predict, if their seeds are concealed from the spoofers. More importantly, a seed can be used
to generate a number of PRBS bits, thus providing a lengthy secure identification of each IoT
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device at the base station. In contrast to the conventional key-based cryptographic and physical
layer security techniques, authentication via pseudo-random access does not require complicated computation, extra hardware, and excessive latencies. Hence, a lightweight continuous
authentication between a base station and multiple IoT devices can be achieved.
To achieve the lightweight continuous authentication, the seeds for generating PRBSs are
required to satisfy the following policies: 1) a transceiver pair should obtain the same seed,
so that an identical PRBS could be generated for authentication at the base station; 2) seeds
should be concealed from any other devices, thus the generated PRBSs will be difficult for the
spoofers to predict; and 3) seeds should be refreshed dynamically to achieve a continuous authentication having high uncertainty for the spoofers. To meet these requirements, the physical
layer features are utilized to develop a new seed acquisition technique for PRBS generation,
e.g., channel state information (CSI) [4], carrier frequency offset (CFO) [37], and received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [39], just to name a few. The main reason is that the physical
layer features provide a high degree of uncertainty for adversaries as well as strong correlated
information between a transceiver pair. In other words, it is very difficult for spoofers to predict
the physical layer features of a transceiver if they are at different locations, while each pair of
transceiver can obtain the same channel estimates at the same time because of the channel reciprocity property [174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179]. More importantly, the time-varying features
of communication links provide a natural refresh method for renewing seeds.
However, perfect channel reciprocity is generally impractical mainly due to the mobility of
devices, the different responses of the radio frequency front ends and the non-symmetric interference characteristics observed at the two devices of a communication link, the quantization
and measurement errors, as well as the time lag between the bidirectional channel measurements [174, 175]. This imperfect channel reciprocity directly influences the accuracy of seed
acquisition, thus leading to a possible disagreement of the generated PRBSs on both sides. The
channel estimates at the base station and IoT devices are denoted, respectively, as
HB [t1 ] = (HB1 [t1 ], HB2 [t1 ], ..., HBN [t1 ])T ,
and

(6.1)
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Hl [t2 ] = (Hl1 [t2 ], Hl2 [t2 ], ..., HlN [t2 ])T , l = 1, 2, ..., L,
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where N is the number of physical layer features used, L denotes the number of IoT devices,
and T represents the transposition of a vector. t1 and t2 are estimation time instants at the base
station and IoT device, respectively, which represent the time lag of channel estimation on
different sides.
The objective is to obtain an identical unique seed between the base station and each IoT
device based on HB [t1 ] and Hl [t2 ], which satisfies the policies listed above, and will directly
affect the performance of the proposed scheme. To facilitate the discussion of the developed
seed acquisition technique, some important evaluation metrics are presented next to assess the
performance of the proposed scheme.
Entropy: which refers to the uncertainty associated with a random variable [175], and is used
to evaluate the security strength of the proposed scheme. It is defined as
E=

K
X

Ek ,

(6.3)

k=1

where
Ek = −pk0 log pk0 − (1 − pk0 ) log(1 − pk0 ),

(6.4)

K is the binary bit number of the acquired seed and pk0 denotes the posterior probability of its
k-th bit when the bit is 0 from the spoofers’ knowledge.
Bit mismatch rate: which represents the difference between the seeds obtained by the base
station and each IoT device relying on physical layer attribute estimation [175], and is defined
as
B=

|S B − S l |
,
K

(6.5)

where S B and S l represent the seeds obtained at the base station and IoT device l, respectively.
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Seed bit randomness: which is used to evaluate the security performance of the seed acquisition
technique, since a less random seed will result in a smaller search space by brute force attacks
thus compromising the security [174].
This chapter focuses on developing a new seed acquisition technique to increase the entropy
and seed bit randomness, as well as to decrease the bit mismatch rate to achieve the lightweight
continuous authentication via pseudo-random access in the time-domain (see Figure 6.2).

6.3

Intelligently Arranged Access for Lightweight Continuous Authentication
Wireless channel
Message generation
PRBS
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IoT device
011100101
Seed acquisition
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Base station
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generation

011100101
Seed acquisition

Figure 6.3: Framework of the proposed lightweight continuous authentication scheme through
identifying the pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequences of IoT devices.
As shown in Figure 6.3, the proposed scheme contains three components at both the base
station and IoT device sides. IoT device l should probe the channel between itself and the
base station to obtain a channel estimate, namely for Hl [t2 ], which is used for acquiring a seed.
Then, IoT device l sends its messages in the time sequence corresponding to the PRBS generated by this seed. The base station should also obtain the same seed relying on the channel
estimate, i.e., HB [t1 ], for generating an identical PRBS to authenticate IoT device l. In this section, a new seed acquisition technique based on the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm
is firstly proposed to obtain identical seeds between the base station and IoT device l by utilizing multiple features of the communication links. Note that the machine learning algorithm
is implemented at the base station, which is used to derive an optimal non-linear boundary
to quantize the channel measurements into bits (i.e., seeds). Then, the PRBS generation and
update schemes as well as the performance analysis are presented.
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Figure 6.4: Process of the developed new seed acquisition technique for PRBS generation
containing three phases: Channel probing, Quantization, and Verification.
The developed seed acquisition technique at the base station and each IoT device operates
in three phases shown as Figure 6.4 as follows:
Phase I. Channel probing: This is used to collect channel measurements by the base station
and IoT devices [183, 184]. In this phase, the base station and IoT device l exchange channel
probing signals with each other. Then, highly correlated measurements of the physical layer attributes used are collected by the base station and IoT device l because of the channel
reciprocity property, namely for HB [t1 ] and Hl [t2 ], respectively.
In the channel probing process, a higher probing rate enjoys a high seed generation rate but
compromises the randomness of the generated seed sequence because of correlation between
the sampled data, while a lower probing rate results in a lower seed generation rate [179]. Different from the physical layer key generation techniques [174, 175, 179], the developed seed
acquisition technique does not require a high seed generation rate. The reason is that the seeds
are used for generating PRBSs rather than for applications directly, such as encryption and
decryption.
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Phase II. Quantization: This phase is used to quantize the extracted channel measurements
into bits [175, 179]. It is the main phase of the developed seed acquisition technique, since it
provides the initial binary sequences for seed acquisition and significantly affects the authentication performance. Note that wrong decisions can be made in the quantization phase if the
channel measurements are close to the region boundaries. The imperfect channel reciprocity
and the noise are the main factors that impact the quantization accuracy [179]. More importantly, the measurements of physical layer attributes are usually not uniformly distributed. For
example, according to [37], the estimated CFO can be well approximated by a Gaussian random variable. Hence, most of the measurements of physical layer attributes used could be
intensively distributed. In this case, the quantization accuracy will be low if the region bound-

Measurements of physical layer attribute 2

ary crosses those intensive measurements.
Boundaries

Measurements of physical layer attribute 1

Figure 6.5: The schematic diagram of the developed SVM-based quantization method with
multiple boundaries. The red dots are the measurements of physical layer attributes used.
The extracted channel measurements are quantized into bits by designing an optimal region
boundary based on the support vector machine (SVM) algorithm [185, 186, 187, 188]. A twodimensional example of the developed quantization method with different boundaries is shown
in Figure 6.5, where only two physical layer attributes are used in this example. As it is
shown in Figure 6.5, those sparsely distributed data are partitioned by each boundary from the
intensively distributed data, thereby the quantization accuracy will be increased because there
are fewer data close to the boundary. Those intensive data in the boundary are quantized to
1, and the others are quantized to 0. It can also be observed from Figure 6.5 that a larger
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boundary will lead to a smaller number of 0 bits in the generated seed, leading to low entropy,
although achieving a better quantization accuracy. On the other hand, a smaller boundary will
result in a higher bit mismatch rate of the seed, since there are more data close to the boundary.
Hence, there is a trade-off between the quantization performance and security performance in
this phase, and the boundary, which is a super-circle, should be well-designed to achieve a
better trade-off.
The objective of quantization is to minimize the bit mismatch rate while guaranteeing the
minimum number of 0 bits required by deciding the radius and center of the boundary. Hence,
the quantization optimization problem in the proposed scheme can be formulated as
(R, c) = arg min BII ,

(6.6)

s.t. γ0 ≥ θ,
where BII represents the bit mismatch rate between the base station and IoT device l in phase
II, while R and c = (c1 , c2 , ..., cN )T denote the radius and center of the boundary, respectively.
The parameter γ0 is the ratio of 0 bits in the obtained seed, which is formulated as
γ0 =

K0
,
K

(6.7)

where K0 represents the number of 0 bits, and θ in (6.6) is the threshold of the ratio of 0 bits in
the obtained seed.
In order to solve the optimization problem of (6.6), the SVM technique is applied to determine the radius and center of the optimal boundary. Assuming that J samples of the utilized physical layer features of IoT device l are used for training at the base station, i.e.,
Hl j , j = 1, 2, ..., J, the optimization problem of (6.6) is turned into the classification problem
min {R + C
2

(R,c,ξ)

J
X

ξ j}

(6.8)

j=1

s.t. k Hl j − c k2 ≤ R2 + ξ j , ξ j ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, ..., J,
where ξ j , j = 1, 2, ..., J, are known as slack variables [189] and commonly used in optimization
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to define relaxed versions of some constraints, ξ = (ξ1 , ξ2 , ..., ξ J )T . In this optimization problem,
a slack variable ξ j measures the distance by which vector Hl j violates the desired inequality,
i.e., k Hl j − c k2 ≥ R2 . Parameter C determines the trade-off between margin-maximization
P
and the minimization of the slack penalty Jj=1 ξ j . Note that C can be determined to satisfy
γ0 ≥ θ in (6.6) according to specific training data obtained, i.e., Hl j , j = 1, 2, ..., J. In other
words, if the slack penalty C is set to be smaller, the slack variables ξ j will be higher, then more
channel measurements will be quantized to be 0s in the developed seed acquisition technique.
However, the amount of physical layer feature estimates of legitimate IoT devices available is
usually limited to set aside a validation sample since that would leave an insufficient amount of
training data in practice. Therefore, the cross-validation method [189] is applied to exploit the
labeled data for determining C in the implementation of the proposed scheme, which satisfies
ϑ0 ≤ C ≤ ϑ.

(6.9)

ϑ0 and ϑ are two parameters designed to satisfy the condition γ0 ≥ θ in (6.6), since a smaller
C results in higher γ0 while ϑ0 represents the minimum C that leads to γ0 = 0.5.
The optimization problem of (6.8) is a convex optimization problem, since the constraints
are affine and convex, and the objective function is convex. Hence, the Lagrangian function is
derived with Lagrange variables α = (α1 , α2 , ..., α J )T and β = (β1 , β2 , ..., β J )T as
L(R, c, ξ, α, β) = R2 + C

J
X
j=1

ξj −

J
X
j=1

β jξ j −

J
X

α j (R2 + ξ j − k Hl j − c k2 ).

(6.10)

j=1

Defining the Lagrange dual function F as the minimum value of the Lagrangian function over
(R, c, ξ), it has
F (α, β) = inf L(R, c, ξ, α, β) = inf {R2 + C
(R,c,ξ)

−

J
X
j=1

(R,c,ξ)

α j (R2 + ξ j − k Hl j − c k2 ) −

J
X

ξj

j=1
J
X

β j ξ j }.

(6.11)

j=1

Since the dual function is the pointwise infimum of a family of affine functions of (α, β), it is
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also concave. Then, the Lagrange dual problem associated with the problem of (6.8) is given
as
max F (α, β) = max inf L(R, c, ξ, α, β).
(α,β) (R,c,ξ)

(α,β)

(6.12)

According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)’s theorem of [189], the KKT conditions apply at the optimum and can be obtained by setting the gradient of the Lagrangian function of
(6.10) with respect to the primal variables R, c, and ξ j to zero. Hence, the flowing equations
can be obtained
J
X
j=1

α j = 1,

J
X

α j Hl j = c, α j + β j = C,

j=1

α j = 0 ∨ R2 + ξ j =k Hl j − c k2 , β j = 0 ∨ ξ j = 0.

(6.13)

Then, the Lagrange dual problem of (6.12) can be rewrote as

max
α

J
X

J
J
X
X
T
α j k Hl j − c k = max{ α j Hl j Hl j −
αi α j HliT Hl j },
2

α

j=1

j=1

(6.14)

i, j=1

s.t. 0 ≤ α j ≤ C, j = 1, 2, ..., J,
where C satisfies (6.9). This is a quadratic programming problem, which can be solved by
some well-studied algorithms, as exemplified by the interior point, active set, augmented Lagrangian, conjugate gradient, gradient projection, extensions of the simplex algorithm [190].
Theorem 6.1: In the quantization phase, the optimal boundary for dividing the estimates of
attributes used in the proposed scheme is a hypersphere with center and radius given, respectively, by
c =
∗

J
X

α∗j Hl j ,

(6.15)

j=1

and
b li − c∗ k2
R∗2 =k H

(6.16)
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where α∗ = (α∗1 , α∗2 , ..., α∗J )T is the solution of the quadratic programming problem of (6.14).
b li is the support vector, whose Lagrange variable satisfies 0 < α∗ < C.
H
i
Proof: According to the KKT conditions of (6.13), the center of the optimal boundary can
be obtained directly as (6.15) by deriving the solution of the quadratic programming problem
of (6.14). Moreover, some results of the developed SVM-based quantization method can be
obtained as follows
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= 0 & k Hli + c k2 ≤ R2 ,

if αi = 0

= 0 & k Hli + c k2 = R2 ,

if 0 < αi < C

≥ 0 & k Hli + c k2 ≥ R2 ,

if αi = C

= 0 & αi = 0,

if k Hli + c k2 < R2

> 0 & αi = C,

if k Hli + c k2 > R2

.

(6.17)

Hence, if 0 < α∗i < C, k Hli + c∗ k2 = R2 satisfies. To obtain the radius of the optimal boundary,
b li is utilized. Then, the radius of the optimal boundary in the developed
the support vector H
SVM-based quantization method is formulated as (6.16).



Remark 6.1: The designed boundaries in the existing quantization methods, e.g., the RSSbased quantization method [175] and frequency phase-based quantization method [179], are
static in time. Moreover, only one-dimensionality is considered in these quantization methods,
i.e., RSS and frequency phase. These all lead to low quantization performance of the proposed
scheme relying on multiple attributes in the time-varying environment. This is mainly because
these quantization methods lack analysis of the physical layer attributes used and adaptation in
the noisy dynamic environment. The developed SVM-based quantization method is intelligent
in designing the optimal boundaries based on the measurements of physical layer attributes,
which circumvents the intensively distributed data, thus resulting in high quantization accuracy
and seed randomness.
As shown in Figure 6.4, after obtaining the optimal radius and center of the boundary, the
base station sends the trained super-circle to the IoT device l, so that highly similar binary sequences will be acquired on both the base station and IoT device sides. Note that the spoofers
cannot predict the seed generated by the base station and IoT device l, even though they in-
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tercept and compromise the boundary information. It is because they do not observe the same
channel between the base station and IoT device l if they are at different locations. More importantly, the super-circle can be trained in the beginning of network establishment, and updated
frequently at the base station. Hence, the developed seed acquisition technique is lightweight
at the IoT devices, as well as achieves high entropy and seed bit randomness while minimizing
the bit mismatch rate of binary sequences S B and S l .
Phase III. Verification: In order to make sure that the seeds generated at both the base station
and IoT device l sides are identical, the verification is designed in the last phase of the seed
acquisition technique. The block diagram of verification is given in Figure 6.4 (on the right
side). Firstly, both the base station and IoT device l use the same hash function to generate hash
values for binary sequences S B and S l obtained in Phase II, and exchange their hash values to
verify the agreement of the binary sequences S B and S l . An agreement is reached if their hash
values are identical. Otherwise, they divide each binary sequence into two binary sequences
with the same length, and verify both of them until an identical binary sequence appears. This
identical binary sequence is specified as the final seed of the base station and IoT device l for
generating PRBS.
Remark 6.2: It can be observed from the verification process that the seed exchange is not
required, so that authentication information (i.e., PRBS) leakage could be avoided. This is
mainly because the SVM is applied to achieve high quantization accuracy for acquiring the
highly similar binary sequences S B and S l . More importantly, the identical seed is acquired
between the base station and each IoT device although the physical layer features suffer from
the imperfect estimation and variations in the complex time-varying environment. In other
words, the proposed scheme is robust in the noisy wireless communication environment.

6.3.2

PRBS Generation and Update

After obtaining a seed between the base station and IoT device l, the PRBS can be generated
using the linear feedback shift registers [191]. A PRBS sequence is generated by a monic
polynomial of degree µ with typical values of µ equal to 7, 9, 11, 15, 20, 23, and 31. 2µ − 1 is
the maximum number of bits. Note that the PRBS generator design has been well-studied, and
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is not a main focus in this chapter.
One can be observed from the process of seed acquisition in Figure 6.4 that the key physical
layer feature is the time-varying nature of the channel, so that the seeds for PRBS generation
between the base station and each IoT device can be renewed naturally by repeating the developed seed acquisition process. Due to the unique property of physical layer features used for
seed acquisition, the pseudo-random access designed for authentication, and the PRBS update,
it is extremely difficult for spoofers to imitate the legitimate IoT devices. Moreover, the time
period can be decided for renewing the seed between the base station and each IoT device
based on the sequence generating monic polynomial used.
Remark 6.3: Collisions may occur when multiple IoT devices transmit the packets to the base
station at the same time, since their PRBSs are pre-generated by seeds utilizing the channel
estimation. This provides high uncertainty for spoofers but makes it difficult to control the
collisions as well. The orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme can be
applied to reduce the collisions, but resulting in the waste of spectrum resources in the 5Gand-beyond network. In order to overcome this difficulty, the code-domain or power-domain
non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) can be applied to reduce the collisions as well as to
improve the quality of services (QoS). The principle is that the multiple domains (i.e., time
domain, frequency domain, power domain, and code domain) can be well designed to coordinate the accesses of IoT devices, so that both high communication performance and efficient
security management can be achieved.
Remark 6.4: The proposed authentication scheme is suitable for those IoT applications that devices are not distributed with a high density or different authentication schemes are co-existing
for smart services.

6.3.3

Performance Analysis

As shown in Figure 6.4, the quantization phase significantly affects the performance of seed
acquisition, i.e., entropy, bit mismatch rate, and seed bit randomness. Performance analysis of
the proposed scheme on these evaluation metrics is presented as follows:
Entropy
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Due to the physical layer features used in the proposed scheme for obtaining the seed between the base station and each IoT device, it is extremely difficult for the spoofers, who are
in different locations, to observe and predict the same channel measurements. Furthermore,
the proposed SVM-based quantization method provides further entropy improvement. To be
specific, on the one hand, the channel measurements are quantized to bits, instead of using
them directly. On the other hand, the binary sequences obtained in the quantization phase will
be further processed in the verification phase without releasing any seed information between
the base station and each IoT device in the developed seed acquisition technique. Hence, the
unique property of physical layer features, SVM-based quantization, and verification of the
proposed scheme provide multi-dimensional and multi-layered protections for the legitimate
communications between the base station and IoT devices, resulting in high entropy.
Bit mismatch rate & Seed bit randomness
Theorem 1 provides the optimal solution for the optimization problem of (6.6), which minimizes the bit mismatch rate under the constraint γ0 ≥ θ. Since a higher γ0 will result in higher
randomness of seed bits, the optimization problem of (6.6) describes a trade-off between the bit
mismatch rate and seed bit randomness. In the proposed scheme, given the requirement of seed
bit randomness θ, the lowest bit mismatch rate in Phase II of the developed seed acquisition
technique can be obtained.
Lightweight authentication
The proposed scheme authenticates the IoT devices through their pseudo-random access in the
time-domain. Compared with the conventional key-based cryptographic techniques [169, 170],
the proposed scheme does not require a number of rounds for the system setup, key generation, distribution, refreshment, and revocation. Different from the physical layer security techniques [37, 171, 172], the proposed scheme provides robust continuous authentication even
in noisy complex communication without continuous parameter updating. Note that the developed SVM-based quantization method can be implemented at the base station before the
authentication. Hence, the proposed scheme is a lightweight solution and provides continuous protections for the communications between the base station and each IoT device in the
5G-and-beyond network.
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Simulation Results

In this section, the simulation of the proposed lightweight continuous authentication scheme
is firstly presented to show its feasibility. To be specific, the optimal quantization boundary
(R∗2 , c∗ ) given in Theorem 1 is derived relying on the estimates of given physical layer attributes, namely carrier frequency offset (CFO), channel impulse response (CIR), and received
signal strength indicator (RSSI). After the verification phase, the seeds of multiple pairs of
transceivers are acquired. The continuous authentication between each pair of transceiver is
achieved based on the identical PRBS generated by their unique seed. Then, the comparison
results between the proposed scheme and state-of-the-art schemes are given to demonstrate the
superior performance of the proposed solution in quantization performance, authentication performance, and computation cost. Specifically, it is compared with the RSS-based quantization
scheme of [175], physical layer key generation schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178], static authentication scheme, continuous kernel machine learning-based physical layer authentication
scheme of [2], and physical layer authentication scheme of [39].

6.4.1

Implementation of The Proposed Scheme

Table 6.2: Simulation parameters of Chapter 6
Parameters
Range
Center frequency fc
Sampling rate
Antenna number of IoT devices
Antenna number of the base station
Time lag between the bidirectional channel measurements

Value
1 km × 1 km
5 GHz
20 MHz
4
8
10 ms

The proposed lightweight continuous authentication scheme is simulated by utilizing multiple physical layer attributes, i.e., CFO [37], CIR [2], and RSSI [39], in an urban scenario. The
simulation parameters for the implementation are shown in Table 6.2 and the system topology
of the simulation is shown in Figure 6.6. Specifically, 10 IoT devices are distributed in the
range of 1 km × 1 km, and the multipath channel model used in the simulation is formulated
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Figure 6.6: Simulation scenario of the proposed scheme.
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Figure 6.7: Observations of physical layer attributes used at base station and Device 1.
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as
hIR (τ; t) =

I
X

Ai (t)δ(τ − i∆τ),

(6.18)

i=1

where I is the number of multipath propagation paths, i∆τ and Ai represent the delay and
complex amplitude of the i-th multipath component, respectively. According to [118], the path
loss model is given as
PL = 22.7 log10 (d[m]) + 41 + 20 log10 (

fc [GHz]
),
5

(6.19)

where d[m] is the distance between each pair of transceiver in meters.
Device

Binary sequence

Base station

1 0
0
0
1

0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
0
1
1

0
1
1
0

1
1
1
0

0
1
0
0

0
1
1
1

0
1
1
0

0
0
1
0

1
0
1
1

1
0
1
0

1
0
1
1

1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1

0
1
0
1

0
1
1
0

0
1
1
0

0
1
1
1

0 1
1 0
0 1
1

IoT device

1 0
0
0
1

0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

0
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
0
1
1

0
1
1
0

1
1
1
0

0
1
0
0

0
1
1
1

0
1
1
0

0
0
1
0

0
0
1
1

1
0
1
0

1
0
1
1

1
0
0
1

1
0
0
1

0
1
0
1

0
1
1
0

0
1
1
0

0
1
1
1

0 1
1 0
0 1
1

Seed acquired 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1

Figure 6.8: Initial binary sequences obtained (100 bits) at the base station and Device 1 in
Phase II of the developed seed acquisition technique, as well as the unique seed acquired (50
bits) in the proposed scheme.

The observations at the base station and Device 1 are given in Figure 6.7. The initial 100
observations of these attributes are used to derive the optimal boundary given in Theorem 1,
namely for (R∗2 , c∗ ), where the estimates of three-dimensional training samples are divided into
two sets, i.e., inside the sphere and outside the sphere. To be specific, those estimates inside
the sphere are set to 1, while the remaining estimates are set to 0. Then, the initial binary
sequences in Phase II of the developed seed acquisition technique (please see Figure 6.4) can
be obtained. The initial binary sequences of the base station and first IoT device are shown in
Figure 6.8. In the quantization Phase, 63 bits of ‘1’ are obtained at the base station, while 62
bits are generated at the IoT device because of the imperfect estimates and different estimation
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times at the base station and IoT device. Through the verification phase of the developed seed
acquisition technique, a 50 bits seed is acquired in the implementation as shown in Figure
6.8. Finally, a PRBS with 500 bits is generated by this seed for the authentication between the
base station and this IoT device. To be more specific, only when the access time sequence of
this IoT device is identical to the pre-agreed PRBS, it will be identified as a legitimate device.
Otherwise, it will be authenticated as a spoofer.

6.4.2

Comparison Results
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Figure 6.9: Comparison results between RSS-based quantization method of [175] and the proposed SVM-based quantization method.
The comparison results between the RSS-based quantization method of [175] and the proposed SVM-based quantization method are depicted in Figure 6.9 assuming that 250, 400, and
500 observations of physical layer features are used. The proposed SVM-based quantization
method utilizes RSSI, CIR, and CFO, while the RSS-based quantization method only uses one
physical layer attribute. As it is shown in Figure 6.9, the mismatch rate of the RSS-based
quantization method of [175] utilizing RSSI is slightly lower than that of the proposed quantization method, while the mismatch rates of other cases (i.e., utilizing CIR or CFO) are much
higher that of the proposed SVM-based quantization method. The reason is that the proposed
SVM-based quantization method derives an optimal boundary, while the RSS-based quantiza-
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tion method only applies a fixed threshold for quantization. Moreover, since the RSSI changes
faster than the other physical layer attributes (see Figure 6.7), the fixed threshold in the RSSbased quantization method can achieve a smaller mismatch rate. However, this highly depends
on both the physical environment and physical layer attribute used, and this method suffers
from very low seed bit randomness. Hence, the generated seed could be easily compromised
by spoofers.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison results between the proposed scheme and the physical layer key
generation schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178].
Figure 6.10 characterizes the comparison results between the physical layer key generation
schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178] and the proposed scheme. It can be observed from Figure
6.10 that the schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178] are static in time and one-time authentication, while the proposed scheme achieves continuous identification of multiple IoT devices in
the time-domain. To achieve security enhancement, the high key generation rate is required in
the schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178], but it is not required in the proposed scheme. Furthermore, the seed transmission is not required in the proposed scheme, thus resulting in privacy
protection of the obtained seed. On the contrary, the physical layer key generation schemes
need the key transmission during the process, which leads to the potential key leakage. More
importantly, the time complexity for N times of authentication in the proposed scheme is much
lower than that of the schemes of [174, 175, 176, 177, 178], where N represents the number of
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authentication times between the transceiver pair. In a nutshell, the proposed scheme achieves
higher security performance and continuous protection for legitimate devices as well as lower
time complexity.
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Figure 6.11: False alarm comparison results between the Kernel Learning-based Authentication as an Intelligent Process (KLAIP) scheme of [2] and the proposed Lightweight Continuous
Authentication (LCA) scheme.
The false alarm comparison results between the proposed scheme and the scheme of [2]
with respect to SNR=30dB, 20dB, and 10dB are characterized in Figure 6.11. Due to the
verification phase designed in the developed seed acquisition technique, an identical seed is
acquired at both the base station and IoT device sides for PRBS generation. To be specific, the
PRBS generated in the proposed scheme for authentication between an IoT device and base
station pair is unique and identical. Therefore, the false alarm events can be avoided in the
proposed lightweight continuous authentication scheme. However, the false alarm events are
inevitable in the scheme of [2] due to the imperfect and time-varying estimates of the physical
layer attributes encountered, although the kernel machine learning approach is explored for
tracking the attributes to achieve continuous authentication. Lower SNR could lead to a higher
false alarm rate in the scheme of [2], since its performance relies on the observations of physical
layer attributes used.
Figure 6.12 characterizes the misdetection rate of the proposed scheme with respect to S-
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Figure 6.12: Misdetection comparison results of the Kernel Learning-based Authentication as
an Intelligent Process (KLAIP) scheme of [2], Static Authentication (SA) scheme, and the
proposed Lightweight Continuous Authentication (LCA) scheme.

NR=30dB, 20dB, and 10dB. With the increase of access time slots, the misdetection rate of
the proposed LCA scheme significantly decreases because it is more difficult for the spoofer to
predict more access time slots of the legitimate IoT devices. More importantly, it can be observed from Figure 6.12 that the misdetection rates of the proposed scheme remain unchanged
with the decrease of SNR. The reason for this trend is that the authentication of the proposed
scheme depends on the identification of the access time sequences of the IoT devices and
the verification phase designed. Hence, the proposed scheme is robust in the noisy wireless
communication environment. Figure 6.12 also demonstrates that the continuous authentication
schemes, including the KLAIP scheme of [2] and the proposed LCA scheme, perform better
than the static authentication scheme because they adapt to the time-varying communication
environment. More importantly, the proposed scheme performs best after a few time slots, typically less than 6, and does not require a complex system parameter update scheme, resulting
in a lightweight solution.
Figure 6.13 characterizes the computation overhead comparison between the proposed
Lightweight Continuous Authentication (LCA) scheme and the schemes of [39], i.e., Incremental Aggregated Gradient (IAG), Frank-Wolfe (FW), and distributed Frank-Wolfe (dFW). The
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Figure 6.13: Computation cost comparison between the proposed Lightweight Continuous
Authentication (LCA) scheme and the schemes of [39], namely IAG, FW, and dFW.

total computation overhead of the schemes of [39] is according to the Lemma 4 of [39]. Explicitly, the schemes of [39] are static and one-time authentication solutions requiring the help of
landmarks for collecting RSSI of signals, while the proposed LCA scheme is continuous. The
computation overhead of the proposed LCA scheme stays stable as O(max(J, N) min(J, N)2 )
[192, 193] with the increase of authentication times, which is 900 in this case. Note that the
computation is required to obtain the optimal boundary for quantization in the proposed LCA
scheme. The designed optimal boundary can be used for generating multiple PRBSs for authentication, where each PRBS containing 500 bits representing 500 authentication times. The
schemes of [39] require the iterations to reach optimal solutions, thus leading to much higher
computation overhead compared with the proposed scheme with the increase of authentication
times. By calculating 15 iterations in IAG, FW, and dFW, their computation overhead values are 35758, 151140, and 389940 runs for only one authentication, respectively. With the
increase of authentication, the computation overhead values of the schemes of [39] increase
linearly.
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Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a lightweight continuous authentication scheme was proposed by identifying the
pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequences of the IoT devices in 5G-and-beyond networks. First, a new seed acquisition technique was developed for generating identical PRBSs
between each pair of the base station and IoT device by utilizing channel reciprocity. Second,
a SVM-based method was explored to derive an optimal boundary for quantizing the estimates
of physical layer attributes into bits, so that the bit mismatch rate can be reduced, while the seed
bit randomness is guaranteed. Then, if the access time sequence of an IoT device is identical to
its pre-agreed PRBS, it will be authenticated as a legitimate device by the base station. Finally,
the proposed scheme was verified by comparing it with state-of-the-art schemes to demonstrate
its superior performance in quantization, authentication, and computation cost.
Through identifying the access sequences of IoT devices in the time domain, the authentication between multiple devices and the base station could be significantly simplified. Similarly, different access methods, e.g., in the frequency domain, the power domain, and the code
domain, can be developed for authentication in the future works. Moreover, by intelligently
design the authentication method in multiple domains, the security performance and communication performance will be improved.

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter presents the conclusion of this thesis. Some future works are also presented in
this chapter.

7.1

Conclusion

In this thesis, two multi-dimensional adaptive physical-layer authentication schemes were firstly proposed based on AI techniques as an intelligent process to learn and utilize the timevarying and imperfectly estimated communication link attributes, i.e., the kernel learningbased scheme and fuzzy learning-based scheme. In the former scheme, a kernel-based fusion
model was designed to deal with the multiple attributes without knowledge of their statistical
properties. The authentication was developed as a linear convex model, which greatly reduces
authentication complexity. In the latter scheme, fuzzy functions were explored to characterize
the multiple physical-layer attributes with imperfectness and uncertainties as parametric models. A hybrid learning-based adaptive algorithm was proposed to near-instantaneously update
the authentication parameters. These two schemes both act as an intelligent process to tackle
the variations of the utilized attributes and hence to improve the reliability and robustness of
the authentication.
An adaptive trust management based soft authentication and progressive authorization scheme
was proposed by intelligently exploiting the time-varying communication link-related attributes.
Through evaluating the selected attributes, the trust relationships between transceivers were
161
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established. To dynamically update the trust level of the transmitter, an online conformal
prediction-based adaptive trust adjustment algorithm was proposed relying on the real-time
validation of attributes estimated at the receiver, resulting in soft security and progressive authorization.
A privacy-preserved distributed access control scheme based on accountable recommendation was proposed for blockchain-enabled IoT systems. In the recommendation mechanism,
multiple authorized devices were utilized as referrers to authenticate a public device and issue
the required credential for joining the system. Then, the anonymous credential generation strategy was developed to further achieve privacy protection, and the reputation update mechanism
was proposed to evaluate the behaviors of the authorized devices.
Finally, to meet the stringent and diverse security requirements of 5G-and-beyond systems, a lightweight continuous authentication scheme was proposed for identifying multiple
resource-constrained IoT devices via their pre-arranged pseudo-random access time sequences.
A transmitter will be authenticated as legitimate if and only if its access time-sequential order
is matched with a pre-agreed unique pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) between itself
and the base station. The seeds for generating PRBS between each transceiver pair were determined by exploiting the channel reciprocity and by applying Support Vector Machine (SVM)
algorithm. Through the proposed scheme, seamless protection for legitimate communications
can be achieved without incurring long latency, complex computation, and high communication overhead.

7.2

Future Work

With the rapidly increasing number of intelligent devices used in 5G-and-beyond networks,
there are also many other perspectives and areas in which AI can play a remarkable role and
improve the quality of human lives. A range of future research ideas on AI for intelligent
security and smart services in future wireless communications can be summarized as follows.
The AI techniques may be utilized for other security applications, such as anomaly/ fault/
intrusion detection, access control, and authorization. This is mainly due to their ability to provide continuous protection for legitimate communications in 5G-and-beyond networks. Fur-
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thermore, with the ongoing convergence between wireless devices and human beings, machine
learning provides a new insight for studying human-device interaction, and the interplay between devices and information security, as well as the database security and data mining, operation systems security, Internet and cyber-security, incident handling, hacking, biometric techniques, smart cards, infrastructure protection, and risk management. Through identifying and
learning the dynamic adversarial systems, automatic security management may be achieved by
machine learning techniques.
With the fast development of distributed communication systems (e.g., blockchain), machine learning may facilitate distributed security management. To be specific, it may be explored for inferring the mobile users’ decision making and device’s dynamic states under unknown network conditions for better security performance, for example, adversarial behaviors
study for predicting the possible attacks of adversaries in peer-to-peer networks. The family of
machine learning algorithms may be also applied for better decision making, such as resource
allocation, distributed computing, analytical thinking, customer orientation, strategy, and planning. These are expected to be extremely important for 5G-and-beyond wireless networks to
achieve intelligent and autonomous services for human beings.
The design of more effective machine learning and distributed machine learning algorithms
is also beneficial for wireless communication applications and security provisioning. Statistical
learning methods ranging from a simple calculation of averages to the construction of complex
models may be utilized, such as Bayesian learning and maximum-likelihood learning. Some
AI techniques may be also explored for reducing the dimensionality of authentication and
authorization systems, such as principal component analysis.
Considering that the insider attacks caused by adversaries who have passed the authentication may cause cascaded damages to large-scale IoT systems, the game theory may be also
utilized for defending against insider attacks through modelling the behaviors of attackers.
Some typical game models for studying interactions between legitimate devices and adversaries include the potential game, Stackelberg game, and evolutionary game, just to name a
few. The incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism can be designed for achieving security enhancement and cooperations among untrusted entities in smart applications.
For resource allocation problems, the game theory, auction theory, and reinforcement learn-
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ing can be explored to achieve better decision making. The interactions among devices can be
modeled based on game theory, so that cooperations can be consummated by searching its equilibrium based on learning algorithms. Auction theory, such as ascending-bid auctions and
descending-bid auctions, may be utilized for modeling the resource competitions among multiple entities in 5G-and-beyond networks, so that the reliable “market” may be built for wireless
communication applications.
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